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Abstract 
Transnational networks are growing in prevalence and importance as 
states, nongovernmental, and intergovernmental organizations seek to meet 
climate change goals; yet, the organizations in these networks struggle between 
the global, technical and local, contextual sources of power, authority, and 
knowledge used to influence decision-making and governance. This dissertation 
analyzes these contestations in Pacific Islands climate change diplomacy and 
governance efforts by asking: i) What do power relations look like among the 
Pacific Islands’ networked organizations? ii) To what authority do organizations 
appeal to access sources of power? iii) What sources of knowledge are produced 
and reproduced by these organizations? and iv) How do these patterns fit within 
the broader history of the Pacific Islands and climate change? I draw from 
interviews, document analysis, event participation, and social network analysis of 
Pacific Island climate change diplomacy and governance. This examination leads 
me to propose the concept of "Climate Empire,” which can be understood as the 
network of knowledge and communicative services that imagine, build, and 
administer the globe through a decentralized and deterritorialized apparatus of 
rule. 
In the Pacific Islands, Climate Empire upholds technical bureaucratic and 
scientific approaches to overcoming climate challenges; however, the global 
spaces in which these approaches are produced are reconnected with the 
spaces of local resistance through data collection networks and efforts to 
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relocalize knowledge. Thus, the local/global divisions found in diplomacy and 
governance in the Pacific Islands collectively produce and reform Climate Empire 
as organizations interact in the network. Further research is necessary to 
understand the extensiveness of Climate Empire, as well as to ensure the 
inclusion and empowerment of Pacific Island voices in climate governance for 
both justice and efficacy.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Transnational Climate Change Governance 
Cyclone Winston tore through the islands of the Pacific in February 2016, 
leaving incredible damage and death in its wake. As the death tolls were 
particularly high, networks of government and nonprofit agencies associated with 
disaster management began to ask the communities what happened, “Did you 
get our warnings? Did you go to the evacuation centers?” What they found was 
that words like “knots” and “Category 5,” unsurprisingly, did not mean much to 
these individuals. The communities, therefore, did not know what to expect and 
did not take precautions. In response, this network of agencies began to ask 
communities how they speak of these issues amongst themselves and to 
collaborate with them for solutions. The agencies found that communities had 
simple sayings that they utilized that could be used in weather forecasts—winds 
strong enough to blow bananas off trees or waves the height of the fales, the 
open-air buildings in which they gather and work. By speaking of storm warnings 
in this way instead of in technical terms, they might be able to save lives as local 
communities could understand their warnings and take necessary precautions.  
As they were doing this work, the agencies also noted that communities 
have proverbs that they have been using for generations that indicate the timing 
of their interactions with nature: the times for harvesting, when they can expect 
storms or droughts, and how strong disasters are expected to be. The proverbs 
are based on the nature around them, such as when the ylang-ylang plant 
flowers and then the sea urchins are ready to harvest or when frigatebirds fly 
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against the wind a storm is coming.1 While these local proverbs can increase the 
ability of islanders to read the world around them and reduce their vulnerability to 
disaster, these traditional systems that they have had in place are no longer 
entirely accurate in the midst of a changing climate. The ylang-ylang is now 
flowering at all times in Samoa. Elements of the ‘seasons’ have disappeared as 
climate change impacts weather patterns, taking with them the ability of the 
community to read their environment, predict upcoming disasters, and prepare 
for the challenges presented by living on small, somewhat isolated islands. There 
are approximately 110 permanently inhabited islands in Fiji alone. The Pitcairn 
Islands can go weeks without a passing ship. Connection to the outside world to 
even collect warnings from the weather service is limited, and climate change 
vastly exacerbates the vulnerabilities to which these islands are exposed.  
Governing the Climate 
Climate change has primarily been understood as occupying a global 
space—the global climate is changing due to the global emission of carbon that 
requires global solutions to fix the problem. While the global elements of climate 
change are vitally important to understand and to act upon the challenges ahead, 
experiences of climate change vary across scales and spaces. The way a farmer 
in the Midwestern United States experiences climactic changes will differ greatly 





decision-makers struggle to adapt to contextually changing environmental 
conditions, they must also acclimatize to governance standards and strategies 
decided upon at global levels. As Jasanoff has described, “Although the image 
[of the Earth] may have attained universal currency, the means of producing and 
reproducing [the Earth], as well as the ability to translate the mandate to ‘think 
globally’ into science and action, are unequally distributed around the world” 
(2004, p. 49). In other words, while the image of the globe may be near-
universally known, the resources necessary to know the globe are limited, better 
yet to translate that knowledge to local needs. However, global strategies still 
mandate the world to ‘think globally,’ producing tensions in multi-scalar efforts. 
This is seen as local environmental projects must now meet global project goals 
and intensive tracking requirements for the SDGs, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
and others.  
Through this dissertation, I seek to draw into discussion the local and 
global elements of climate change governance. One way in which these 
conversations are organized and oriented is through networks of climate change 
practitioners and decision-makers situated at the local, regional (or 
transnational), and global levels. States, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), private enterprises, and knowledge 
producing institutions network together, either formally or informally, to meet 
environmental challenges. While these organizations seek to collaboratively 
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achieve goals surrounding climate change, those goals and the solutions meant 
to meet them are regularly contested. These contestations are grounded in who 
has power in decision-making and practice, by what authority they have that 
power, and what knowledges are considered legitimate to create and uphold that 
authority (Barnett & Campbell, 2010; Hulme, 2010; Jasanoff, 2004; Scott, 1998).  
Networks are a useful way to explore the interactions of power, authority, 
and knowledge. Network theories assume that interactions between actors—
individuals or organizations—are grounded in the exchange of material and non-
material resources (Wasserman & Faust, 1995). These resources could be 
finances, practical information, norms, standards, or understandings of the world. 
Previous theories of networked governance have often assumed somewhat 
power-neutral interactions between actors (e.g. Glasbergen, 1995; Goldsmith & 
Eggers, 2004; O’Toole, 1997; Peters, 1998). Instead, this dissertation explores 
the way in which networks can be understood as regular interactions between 
actors who compete to secure legitimacy and viability in a complex, multi-scalar, 
and resource-constrained world. Therefore, networked governance, in this 
dissertation, is understood as a space of contested power relations where actors 
compete over decision-making capabilities (Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013). 
Case Study: Pacific Islands 
In order to provide greater insight into the power, authority, and knowledge 
inherent in networked governance, this dissertation focuses on transnational 
climate governance in the Pacific Islands. The Pacific Islands are undergoing 
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rapid biophysical transformation, which is decreasing the productivity of fisheries, 
reducing the likelihood that communities can subsist off of the land or water, and 
seeing a rapid loss of land into the ocean (Allen et al., 2014). Governance in this 
region faces challenges as many nations are small, isolated, and have had a 
long history of colonial control, which has left them lacking capacity in many ways 
(Wesley-Smith, 2013). However, Pacific Island peoples also have a long history 
of social and environmental adaptation that provides key knowledge and insights 
into these growing environmental needs (Govan, 2009), thus presenting unique 
opportunities for environmental governance. 
Who Are the Pacific Islands?  
The Pacific Islands are a collection of states located in the South Pacific 
Ocean (Figure 1). This geopolitical group includes the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu; as well as the US 
territories of American Samoa, Guam, and Northern Mariana Islands; the French 
territories and collectivities of French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis and 
Futuna; the British overseas territory of Pitcairn Islands; and the New Zealand 
territory of Tokelau.2 Notably, Australia, New Zealand, and the Southeast Asian 
																																																						
2 The territorial and collectivity status of each island is unique; however, the 
larger country is responsible for much of the governance of the islands in each 
case. Additionally, the Cook Islands and the Marshall Islands both have free 
association compacts with New Zealand and the US, respectively, but are still 
considered independent.  
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countries of the Philippines and Indonesia are not considered Pacific Islands 
under this categorization. While Australia and New Zealand play important roles 
in governance and finance in the region, they are also considered external 
parties in most arrangements (apart from their status in regional IGOs that varies 
considerably and is discussed below). Timor-Leste is considered a Pacific Island 
in some arrangements. 
Figure 1: Map of the Pacific Islands. 
 
Papua New Guinea is the largest of the islands in terms of land mass 
(462,840 km2) and economy (GDP: US$29.189 billion), with a population of over 
8 million who speak 852 known languages. The Pitcairn Islands sits on the 
opposite end of the scale, sitting at 47 km2, a GDP of USD$149,248, and a 
 7 
population of 57. While geopolitically grouped, the Pacific Islands thus vary 
significantly in terms of political and economic independence, capabilities, and 
interests.  
Pacific Island regional identity and governance has a complex relationship 
with the history of colonialism in the region, particularly with United States, 
Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand. For instance, nearly half of the 
inhabitants of Fiji are of Indian origin, brought about by the British need for labor 
in sugar cane fields in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Robertson, 2012). 
The ethnic legacy of British colonial presence has plagued inter-ethnic relations 
in Fiji for generations, leading in part to a series of coups in which the Indo-Fijian 
government was overthrown by an indigenous Fijian, the most recent of which 
was a 2006 military coup, which installed Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe (Frank) 
Bainimarama (ibid.). The economies of Pacific Island nations are often tied to 
these colonial histories, as well, as many Pacific Island nations rely on foreign aid 
for significant portions of their budgets (Atteridge & Canales, 2017). Not only are 
the Pacific Islands’ complex relations with colonial powers unique challenges for 
their governance structures, these challenges are greatly exacerbated by their 
precarious environmental state.  
Pacific Island Environmental Struggles 
In the Pacific Island nations, environmental degradation is happening at a 
rapid rate, primarily due to global climate change (Bartlett, Maltali, Petro, & 
Valentine, 2010). Climate change has had, and will continue to have, a 
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disproportionate impact on the islands. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report argues that climate change 
endangers coastal settlements, infrastructure, economic stability, and the 
ecosystem services needed to ensure the success of the Pacific Islands into the 
future (Allen et al. 2014). As Barnett and Campbell point out, however:  
The effects of climate change on islands and the communities that live on 
them are likely to be highly differentiated: not all places will experience the 
same changes; where changes are similar the magnitude and timing of 
them will likely differ; the sensitivity of ecological and social processes to 
changes differs from place to place; the capacity of social systems to 
adapt to these changes is not homogenous; and the significance of 
changes to the social systems will also differ (different communities value 
things differently). (2010, p. 22) 
While the Pacific Islands as a whole face unique challenges in the face of climate 
change due to their size and position, they also face a wide variety of island-by-
island challenges. This makes investment into adaptive environmental 
governance strategies even more crucial. However, with the capacity issues that 
Pacific Island countries face, resource-intensive adaptive governance presents 
its own set of challenges.  
Atteridge and Canales (2017) found that finance to Pacific Island countries 
in 2010–2014 specifically aimed at climate change reached a total of US$748 
million. Climate change donors tend to be similar to traditional development 
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partners (Webber, 2015), causing the spikes in funding brought about by a global 
interest in climate change to bring with them similar issues as are faced in 
traditional development practices. As these environmental (and other) challenges 
interact with small state governments and limited resources, regional efforts for 
governance have emerged in efforts to coalesce power and meet the region’s 
growing needs.  
Regional Governance Efforts in the Pacific Islands 
Efforts for collective regional governance began in 1947 under the 
guidance of colonial powers (Fry, 1997). While many Pacific Island states have 
become independent, those relationships between the Pacific and colonial 
powers are still in place today and are now embedded in the decision-making 
and funding of governance in the region. As one individual with whom I spoke 
commented, the regional intergovernmental governance represents a 
“decolonization process that warped into technical assistance.” These colonial 
relationships are particularly complex within the Council of Regional 
Organizations of the Pacific [CROP].   
The CROP agencies include 10 regional intergovernmental organizations 
tasked with different areas of governance from fisheries to tourism to power. 
While each of the 10 agencies plays some role in climate change governance 
due to the pervasive nature of the topic, three agencies are specifically tasked 
with climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts—the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (SPC), the Secretariat of the Regional Environmental 
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Programme (SPREP), and the University of the South Pacific (USP)—and the 
Pacific Island Forum (PIF) is involved with setting the broader political agenda 
around climate change. PIF represents the needs of independent nations in the 
Pacific and is the political head of the CROP agencies, tasked with the goal of 
improving functionality of regional intergovernmental governance of the Pacific 
Islands. PIF was established in 1971 under the name South Pacific Forum. The 
founding members were Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, 
Tonga, and Western Samoa (now Samoa).  
While these organizations have long histories, they are regularly evolving 
to try to meet the changing needs of the region. For instance, PIF membership 
was recently changed to include two French territories—New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia. Despite their status as French territories and collectivities, 
they are now full voting members of PIF. Additionally, recent efforts have been 
made to make the CROP agencies’ decision-making processes more inclusive 
through the Framework for Pacific Regionalism. Multiple interviewees from this 
study described the Framework for Pacific Regionalism as a “public policy 
revolution," where the ‘black box’ of regional intergovernmental prioritization has 
been opened up to public comment. However, these efforts are still very much in 
their infancy and the results of which are left to be seen (see Slatter, 2015). 
Other organizations have emerged in the Pacific to meet the needs of the 
time. One of the more recent organizations is the Pacific Islands Development 
Forum [PIDF]. The formation of PIDF began in 2012 and was led primarily by the 
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Fiji government. PIDF’s emergence reflects a complex set of factors, including 
perceived failures of the regional governance system, the requirements of global 
governance under the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and Fiji’s 
desire to regain power and legitimacy in the region. Fiji had a bloodless coup in 
2006 (and subsequent constitutional crisis) that led to their dismissal from the 
PIF governing body in 2009 (Stewart, 2016). While they were readmitted to PIF 
in 2014 after Fiji held democratic elections, Fiji’s relationship to PIF has remained 
strained. PIDF has since worked to distinguish itself from PIF by focusing on 
multi-stakeholder participation, inclusion of multiple local perspectives in 
decision-making, and not being reliant on colonial powers’ aid which they 
understand as making them accountable to those colonial powers. As an 
emerging organization, PIDF is both a product of a transforming Pacific, and an 
ardent promoter of the transformation occurring in the Pacific. 
As climate change has come to the forefront of environmental global 
governance efforts, the region has responded accordingly, seeking global funds 
and scientific support for adaptation and mitigation efforts. These funds have 
been primarily concentrated with states and IGOs, but the region has also seen 
the influx of non-state actors with their own projects. Local environmental 
governance efforts have also begun to include a climate change focus, creating a 
space where multiple actors in environmental governance are battling over 
funding, authoritative knowledge, and decision-making over governance. 
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Pacific Island Climate Change Governance Networks 
The impact of power, authority, and knowledge relations is evident in the 
socio-environmental history of the Pacific Islands’ efforts to network around and 
contest the governance of climate change adaptation and mitigation. There is no 
doubt as to the environmental impact of climate change on the Pacific Islands 
(Allen et al., 2014). Recent news articles have discussed the loss of five of 
Solomon Islands’ atolls into the ocean as sea level rise pushes onto land (“Five 
Pacific Islands,” 2016). Yet, environmental challenges have made space for a 
“problem closure,” which Hajer (1995) defines as the process of creating 
solutions to a set of well-developed unquestioned problems. In other words, it is 
the political act of limiting the options available for decision-making, thereby 
limiting the space for democratic discourse. This has restricted the Islands’ ability 
to shape their own future by not allowing them to construct what they see as the 
actual problems to be solved. Barnett and Campbell argue that scientific models 
of climate change in the Pacific, as one approach to a ‘well-defined problem,’ 
have the effect of rendering climate change as an environmental fact 
against which actors can do little but suffer. They deny the agency of 
people at risk: to define the problem in their own terms; to apply their own 
systems of knowledge; to implement the solutions that are appropriate to 
their needs and values and which accommodate uncertainty; and to make 
knowledge claims of equal value to those of science. (2010, p. 2) 
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Thus, constructions of environmental challenges have a distinct impact on 
governance within the Pacific Islands (Bartlett, Maltali, Petro, & Valentine, 2010). 
Govan (2009) and Sievanen, Gruby, and Campbell (2013) have demonstrated 
the ways in which local knowledge construction can bolster the impacts of 
governance in the region. Yet, seemingly objective discussions about the 
desirability of global policy options in the region are “significantly affect[ing] the 
parameters within which future possibilities are worked out” (Fry, 1997, p. 27). In 
other words, the way in which environmental and social challenges are spoken of 
in organizations within the Pacific is delimiting the options that are available.  
Transnational environmental governance networks in the Pacific are 
growing in prevalence and importance as organizations seek to meet 
environmental goals (Corlew, Keener, Finucane, Brewington, & Nunn-Crichton, 
2015; Gruby & Campbell, 2013; Pietri, Stevenson, & Christie, 2015). However, 
these networks struggle between the ‘global kinds of knowledge’ (Hulme, 2010) 
created by scientific and international advocacy NGOs and IGOs in the region 
and local, contextual knowledge (Lejano, Ingram, Whiteley, Torres, & Agduma, 
2007) that is a large part of the actual governance of the environmental 
challenges created by climate change. This has produced local/global struggles 
(Jasanoff & Martello, 2004) that generate contestations between different 
appeals to power, authority, and knowledge.  
In this dissertation, I explore these relations of power, authority, and 
knowledge through diplomatic efforts, as well as broader governance spaces. 
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Diplomacy in the Pacific Islands has transformed in recent years as the world has 
tuned in to the climate impacts they are experiencing. Leaders such as former 
President Anote Tong of Kiribati and the late Tony de Brum of the Marshall 
Islands captured the world’s attention by demanding that those most responsible, 
yet least impacted by climate change (developed states), demonstrate action to 
assist those least responsible, yet most impacted (developing states). They also 
demonstrated the capacity of Pacific Islanders to shape their own environmental 
future. This power was exhibited in the Conference of Parties meeting in Paris in 
2015 [COP21]. However, while presenting a relatively unified voice at COP21, 
Pacific Islanders spent much of the lead-up to the conference struggling over 
power, competing authorities, and alternative ways of knowing and 
understanding social and environmental issues (Denton, 2017). These 
contestations were created through the disjointed nature of local/global needs 
and strategies.  
As these decisions work their way into day-to-day environmental 
governance, these contestations continue in similar, yet distinct ways. 
Governance in the Pacific Islands has a long history of colonialism, external 
control, and a perceived or real lack of agency. Much of the governance moneys 
for Pacific Islands come from donors, namely Australia, New Zealand, the United 
States [US], the European Union [EU], and others. This has led to a lot of project-
based work in which locals are unable or seriously challenged to direct the flow 
of funds or make decisions on their own behalf. This dependency and lack of 
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agency has begun to slowly transform in recent years, however, in light of the 
Islands’ emphasis on local power. Similar to the diplomatic space, governance 
efforts have engaged in local/global contestations over access to power and 
authority, and the knowledges that legitimately uphold those power relations. 
While many authors have either exclusively looked at diplomatic efforts 
(e.g. Carter, 2015; Corbett & Connell, 2017) or at governance in the Pacific (e.g. 
Bartlett, Maltali, Petro, & Valentine, 2010; Sievanen, Gruby, & Campbell, 2013), 
this dissertation looks at the interplay between the two and provides insight into 
the nature of power, authority, and knowledge in multi-scalar networked relations. 
The local/global framings and strategies are produced and reproduced within 
governance and diplomacy spaces, providing a kind of feedback loop that 
reinforces and transforms the work of networked Pacific Island decision-makers 
and practitioners. This dissertation takes global diplomatic efforts and on-the-
ground governance strategies out of their respective silos and discusses the 
ways in which the decisions and actions at each level transform the options that 
are available to the other. In order to investigate these multi-scalar networked 
relations of power, authority, and knowledge, I utilized a mixed methods 
approach, described below.  
Research Strategy Overview 
 While there are number of ways to approach climate change governance, 
I use power, authority, and knowledge relations within transnational climate 
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change networks in the Pacific Islands to frame my discussion. My guiding 
research questions are:  
• How and in what ways are power relations made manifest among the Pacific 
Islands’ networked organizations?  
• To what types and sources of authority do organizations appeal to access 
sources of power? 
• What knowledges are produced and reproduced by these organizations?  
• How do these patterns of power, authority, and knowledge align with within 
the broader history of the Pacific Islands, specifically, and climate change 
governance, in general? 
  
To answer the first three questions on power, authority, and knowledge, I used a 
mixed-methods approach with Social Network Analysis [SNA] and interviews with 
Pacific Island climate change practitioners and decision-makers. First, in order to 
gain insight into the ways in which these issues play out in diplomatic spaces, a 
qualitative approach was used in which interviews and climate change 
declarations were used to form the foundation for the analysis of ‘narrative 
networks’ (Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013) in Pacific Island climate change 
diplomacy. This analysis of ‘narrative networks’ was particularly useful due to the 
ability to take a cross-sectional approach, where the outcomes of diplomatic 
negotiations could be compared at a single point in time. This allowed for a 
simple comparison of the dual constructions of hero, victim, villain, and policy 
moral (Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013) in two diplomatic spaces. I used a basic 
social network analysis to provide a qualitative visual representation for the 
engagement in diplomatic spaces of organizations in the region.  
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For an exploration of power, authority, and knowledge in climate change 
governance in the region, I used a sequential mixed-methods design, where the 
quantitative portion of analysis informed the more important qualitative element 
(quantàQUAL design; Morgan, 2013). I conducted SNA using reports from the 
Pacific Climate Change Portal to graphically visualize and quantitatively assess 
the relationships between organizations engaged in transnational climate change 
governance in the Pacific Islands. This also allowed me to draw boundaries 
around the complex space of actors involved in climate change governance in 
the region, which set the framework for the qualitative portion of the analysis. I 
used the SNA graphic visualization in interviews in the Pacific, encouraging 
participants to respond to what they saw and how they felt power, authority, and 
knowledge works within governance in the region. These responses were not 
used to confirm or deny the validity of the SNA visualization,3 but rather as a 
focal point for our discussions. 
For the qualitative analysis of approaches in both governance and 
diplomacy, I used thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2012) to analyze the 
interviews. This type of analysis uses six steps: (1) becoming familiar with the 
data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for themes, (4) reviewing themes, 
																																																						
3 Due to my use of a social constructivist approach (e.g. Porter, 1994), it would 
be challenging to say that the ‘reality’ of the interviews can confirm or deny the 
‘reality’ of what is found in the Pacific Climate Change Portal dataset as each of 
these realities is produced and reproduced independently yet in conjunction with 
one another. That being said, the interviewees generally confirmed the SNA as 
being similar to their ‘truth.’ 
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(5) defining and naming themes, and (6) producing the report. This was useful as 
both diplomacy and governance of climate change in the Pacific—particularly 
pertaining to power, authority, and knowledge as a whole—are understudied (see 
exception: Barnett & Campbell, 2010). Thematic analysis encourages recursive 
and iterative processes, where the researcher moves regularly back and forth 
between elements of the data and themes (Braun & Clark, 2012). This allowed 
me to be responsive to the lack of available literature by utilizing a more inductive 
approach, while still remaining true to my theoretical interests. As opposed to a 
rich description of the entire data set, this dissertation focused on detailed 
accounts of particular aspects of the interviews and documents associated with 
power, authority, and knowledge. A latent approach was used, going beyond the 
semantic content and looking to underlying meanings. In other words, I used 
narrative-network analysis for diplomacy (Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013) and 
discourse analysis for governance (Howarth, 2010) to situate the participants’ 
discussions in a broader social and historical context. More details on these 
methods are located in Chapters 3 and 4.  
I address my final question of how these relations of power, authority, and 
knowledge fit within broader histories of environmental governance by pulling 
from both the analysis of diplomacy and governance. Chapter 5 relies heavily on 
a theoretical overview and critical update of the concept of Empire (Hardt & 
Negri, 2000) that draws together the threads of local/global narrative and 
discourse in this dissertation.  
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Chapter Overview 
The next two chapters will provide key background information in order to 
set the stage for this research. In Chapter 2, I will provide a theoretical framework 
for the exploration of power, authority, and knowledge within transnational 
environmental governance networks in the Pacific Islands. I use threads of 
literature from international relations, network governance, and science and 
technology studies in order to form a holistic foundation for my research.  
To gather the information presented in Chapter 3, I spent time in Suva, 
Fiji, and Apia, Samoa, in August and September of 2015, a few months before 
COP21 in Paris. In this chapter, I discuss the diplomatic efforts of the Pacific 
Islands in the lead-up to COP21, particularly the declarations presented at the 
Pacific Island Forum [PIF] Summit and Pacific Islands Development Forum 
[PIDF] Summit. These declarations are explored from a narrative-network 
approach, where both representation and narrative construction differed between 
the two groups. The PIF Summit included a limited representation of states and 
IGOs, producing what I refer to as a global technical narrative that emphasizes 
the technical solutions to climate problems. Alternatively, the PIDF Summit had 
broader participation that included more states and wide variety of domestic and 
international NGOs, producing what I refer to as a local power narrative that 
advocated local decision-making and information. The consequences of these 
differing narrative-networks for diplomacy—including the COP21 agreement and 
Fiji’s leadership of COP23—are also discussed.  
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To gather the information that serves as the basis for Chapter 4, I returned 
to the Pacific Islands for a trip that included Honolulu and Hilo, Hawai’i; 
Melbourne, Australia; Suva, Fiji; Apia, Samoa; and Rarotonga, Cook Islands. 
During this 7-week trip, I spoke with climate change practitioners and decision-
makers from government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs about their work. By 
analyzing these interviews, I have seen the way in which the global/local 
contestations from diplomacy are replicated, reproduced, and contested within 
the Pacific Islands’ project-based governance efforts. I use Bäckstrand and 
Lövbrand’s (2006) three environmental discourses—green governmentality, 
ecological modernization, and civic environmentalism—to further explore the use 
of discourse in producing and reaffirming the local/global contestations over the 
power, authority, and knowledge of Pacific Island climate change governance 
efforts.  
In Chapter 5, I seek to integrate these discussions of power, authority, and 
knowledge within the local and global efforts of Pacific Islands climate change 
diplomacy and governance. Using the concept of Empire as developed by Hardt 
& Negri (2000) with a critical update by Miller (2004), this chapter analyzes the 
role of discourse in producing and reproducing Climate Empire within the Pacific 
Islands and globally. Importantly, the local and global elements of climate change 
diplomacy and governance are connected in the relocalization processes 
inherent in global knowledge (Miller, 2004). In climate change spaces, data is 
locally collected, globally analyzed, and relocalized within polices and projects. 
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Chapter 5 explores the way in which this relocalization process impacts climate 
governance and diplomacy in the Pacific Islands and globally.   
Finally, Chapter 6 will conclude by summarizing and discussing themes 
from the dissertation that will form the foundation for recommendations for 
governance in the Pacific Islands. While issues of power, authority, and 
knowledge are highlighted due to the small size and big presence of the Pacific 
Islands on the global stage, their situation is not wholly unique. This chapter 
integrates the global and local approaches to create a more systematic approach 
to understanding climate governance, while also describing the 
recommendations put forward by participants.  
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Chapter 2: Power, Authority, and Knowledge in Networked  
Governance 
Transnational environmental issues—water scarcity, sea level rise, 
biodiversity loss, and others—are pushing their way into governance priorities at 
unprecedented rates, ensuring that single states alone cannot accomplish the 
goals of governing (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012). Due to the nature of these 
environmental challenges, a decentralization of governance is occurring in which 
power and authority are distributed across multiple arenas that function between 
and outside of state boundaries (Rosenau, 2007). These polycentric governance 
spaces (Ostrom, 2010)4 include nonstate actors that face very different 
challenges than states when trying to impact governance.  
Networks are growing in prominence as one way of investigating these 
complex spheres of authority within transnational environmental governance (e.g. 
Andonova, Betsill, & Bulkeley, 2009; Hadden, 2015; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; 
Stone, 2008). Acknowledging the role of networks in international decision-
making takes the conversation away from the dyadic, behavioral, state-centric 
focus that has taken up much of the scholarship in international relations, and 
allows for a more relational and holistic view of political interactions among state 
																																																						
4 While some would argue for a heavier reliance on Ostrom’s work in this 
dissertation, I find that transnational environmental governance lacks the 
localized institutions and face-to-face interactions that are necessary for the norm 
coherence fostering collective action in Ostrom’s work. Thus, her work will not be 
dealt with directly.  
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and nonstate actors. Thus, international relations theories would benefit from a 
greater understanding of networked relations.  
At the same time, while emphasizing vital elements of relationality, many 
authors of networked governance have put forward a view of networks that is 
primarily nonhierarchical and voluntary (e.g. Glasbergen, 1995; Goldsmith & 
Eggers, 2004; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997; O’Toole, 1997; Peters, 1998). 
Under this set of assumptions, the networked organizations work toward 
collective action under a set of commonly agreed-to goals (Peters, 1998). 
However, as Eilstrup-Sangiovanni explains, “Although networks are often 
described as fundamentally flat and decentralized, in reality many social 
networks entail elements of both centralization and de facto hierarchy” (2017, p. 
692) that influence the flow of power within the network. Thus, this dissertation 
seeks to call greater attention to the power, authority, and legitimizing knowledge 
that are contested in arenas of decision-making and which create distinctly 
unequal governance structures (Davies, 2012).  
In addition to the literatures on international relations and networked 
governance, the Science, Technology, and Society (STS) literature brings key 
insights into the study of international environmental governance. STS scholars 
have explored the complex interactions between science, policy, and society 
under the lens of a power/knowledge relationship (Foucault, 1980), or the ways 
in which knowledge is interlaced with the production of power relations in the 
social order. Scholars of science have worked to open up the “black box” of 
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scientific knowledge production by questioning the construction of science, 
playing it against the political and subjective elements of knowledge creation 
(Agrawal, 2005; Bocking, 2004; Hajer, 1995; Jasanoff, 2004; Litfin, 1994). These 
authors seek to deconstruct the taken-for-granted character of normalizing, 
categorizing, and standardizing science by looking to the way that discourses, 
values, political economic drivers, and social constructions of nature impact the 
scientific process. This dissertation integrates the investigation of science and 
power found in the STS literature with questions of networked authority emerging 
in international environmental governance. 
 In this chapter, I position this dissertation within the existing literature 
regarding the various elements of power, authority, and knowledge within 
transnational environmental governance networks. First, I situate my 
understanding of transnational governance as a multi-actor space that includes 
non-state actors. Next, I explore the ways in which this understanding of multi-
actor governance is embedded in an understanding of power that is productive 
(rather than merely restrictive), relational (rather than held by a specific actor), 
and distributed throughout society (rather than exclusive to the state). I describe 
how this power is expressed through the text and practices of discourses. This 
leads to a discussion of power/knowledge—or the ways in which this productive, 
relational, and societal discursive power is heavily embedded in regimes of 
knowledge and ways of understanding the world—and is further explored through 
local and global constructions of knowledge. Next, I introduce the role of 
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networks in organizing the complexities of this dynamic, multi-actor space. 
Specifically within transnational environmental networks, I explore the ways in 
which power, authority, and knowledge are organized according to traditional, 
bureaucratic, scientific, and practical relations. These discussions set the stage 
for the investigation of climate change diplomacy and governance in the Pacific 
Islands undertaken in this dissertation.  
Transnational Governance 
 There is a growing level of acknowledgement that transnational issues, 
such as environmental degradation, security, economic processes, etc., are in 
need of transnational governance solutions. It is important to be clear that 
transnational governance differs from transnational government (Rosenau 2007), 
though the two could, theoretically, be one and the same. Governance is "the 
broader system of formal or informal institutions in which the management 
actions are embedded and which provide the essential direction, resources, and 
structure needed to meet the overarching governance goals" (Bodin & Prell, 
2011, p. 45). While many authors point to the continued strength and sovereignty 
of states (e.g. Keohane, 1982; Krasner, 1999), multi-actor governance is gaining 
authority and legitimacy on the global stage (Andonova, Betsill, & Bulkeley, 2009; 
Betsill & Corell, 2001; Biermann & Pattberg, 2012; Boström & Hallström, 2010; 
Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004; Hadden, 2015; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). These 
governance efforts are the attempt by states and other nonstate actors to create 
order amidst the disorder inherent in transnational problems.  
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Conceptualizing transnational governance in this way takes the 
conversation away from the centrality of the state, and groupings of states, and 
includes a realm of diverse organizations and mechanisms to take on the 
problems and solutions of governance. This is not to say that the territorially 
defined state does not retain certain unique privileges and authorities, but rather 
that authority can also be found, in varying degrees, in the hands of civil society 
(e.g. Wapner, 1995), powerful individual actors (e.g. Cooper, 2008), market 
forces (e.g. Cashore, 2002), and intergovernmental organizations that have a 
bureaucratic power of their own (e.g. Jinnah, 2010).  
 The state, civil society, and private entities can all be key players in efforts 
toward transnational governance. In this understanding of governance, power 
and authority is distributed across multiple arenas, or ‘spheres of authority’ 
(Rosenau, 2007, p. 88) that function between and outside of state boundaries. 
The spheres of authority, for Rosenau, are concerned with directives being 
issued and adherents complying. However, “compliance can be intentional or 
unintentional, conscious or subconscious, or immediate or halting, the result of a 
host of interactive and reinforcing dynamics” (ibid., p. 90). In other words, 
compliance is not reliant on the ability to coerce, but could be indicative of the 
diffusion of norms or standards. This latter element of compliance will be dealt 
with most extensively in this dissertation, and is directly related to the way in 
which power is understood.  
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Views on Power 
Lukes argues that power is an “essentially contested” concept (2005, p. 
63). In other words, the very act of discussing and defining power is fluid and 
rests heavily on the ontological and epistemological perspectives of the 
researcher. Due to this, conceptualizations of power have fractured in a variety of 
ways—agentic versus structural power, power held in the sovereign versus 
power held in society, power as capacity versus relational power, and others. 
This dissertation focuses on the last debate, particularly the ways in which 
Foucault’s relational ontology has transformed the study of power.  
The tradition of power as capacity began as a focus on the state, or 
sovereign power. This is a juridical power, where power is possessed as a right, 
similar to the way in which one possesses a commodity. These descriptions see 
power as embedded within the capacity to enact the sovereign will. Hobbes’ 
(1651) theories of the Leviathan, Locke’s (1689) social contract, Rousseau’s 
(1762) formation of the “general will”, and Mill’s (1896) process of utilitarianism—
while having their own set of divergences on issues of legitimacy and decision 
making—all focus on the mechanisms by which the sovereign gains, keeps, and 
uses power.  
Other theorists have expanded this definition of power further out in 
society, while still understanding power as a capacity. Waltz (1979), for instance, 
draws a distinction between the legal, sovereign authority to compel and the 
broader capacity to influence others’ behavior. Marxist tradition looks to what 
 28 
Foucault refers to as the ‘economic functionality’ of power (2003, p. 14). Power is 
structural in that it is embedded within the broader societal system, but it is still a 
capacity that is used by way of mode of production. The capitalist has power 
based on the ability to direct the flow of capital; the proletariat only has her own 
capacity for labor (Marx & Engels, 1978).  
Another key reading in regards to power as capacity is found in Lukes’ 
(2005) “three faces of power.” The first face comes from Dahl, where “A has 
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B otherwise 
would not do” (1957, 202–03). The second comes from Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962) where non-decision making or agenda setting is also considered power—
the power to enact one’s will by keeping an item off the decision-making agenda. 
The third face is a bit more ambiguous, were one enacts power through 
structuring decision, thereby impacting the preferences of others by delimiting the 
options available. Similarly, within the realist IR tradition, Krause (1991) draws on 
distinctions between states’ bargaining power (through treats of punishment 
and/or promises), structural power (by altering the range of options), and 
hegemonic power (by determining the rules of the game), while Nye (2008) 
introduces “soft power,” or the ability for states to get other states to want what 
they want through cooption rather than coercion. While Lukes, Krause, and Nye 
further expand the mechanisms of power, power is still a capacity that is held and 
enacted to change others’ actions and minds.  
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Power as capacity has a long history in political thought; however, it has 
its limitations. Understanding power as capacity assumes that given x set of traits 
and capabilities, the user will be able to exercise y power. It is a quantitative 
understanding of power that can succumb to reductionism and essentialism. 
Whether by appealing to objective interests (e.g. Rawls’ (1971) ‘primary goods’ 
or Sen’s (2009) ‘basic human capabilities’), pre-structured identities (Marx & 
Engels’ (1978) class-based interest), or constraints on decision-making (Lukes’ 
(2005) third face of power), analysis of this type of power can only occur if the 
researcher knows the true interests of the individual on the receiving end of 
power, which effectively flattens the human into a unidimensional being. In so 
doing it pays limited attention to the way that norms, identities, and relations 
constantly are shaped by and shape interactions—effectively the way that power 
fluidly moves in and through societies to construct and actively change interests, 
identities, and conditions for decision-making.  
Barnett and Duvall (2005) have called upon IR to broaden its view of 
power. Power, then, is understood through the filter of, “(1) the kinds of social 
relations through which actors’ capacities are affected (and effected); and, (2) the 
specificity of those social relations” (ibid., p. 45). They argue that that 
understandings of power need to move beyond analyses of the (still necessary) 
compulsory, institutional, and structural powers, to include productive power. 
Productive power is further explained below via the work of Michel Foucault.  
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Productive, Relational, and Societal Power 
Foucault understands power as productive—it not only constrains A from 
doing something B does not want done, it also creates new relations and 
subjectivities, or subject identities in relation to power. This includes the beliefs, 
attitudes, orientations, and understandings that a person may hold. It 
fundamentally transforms both A and B. It is not located in a person or place, but 
is rather diffused throughout all relations in society. Power “is deployed and 
exercised through a net-like organization,” suggesting that both A and B are 
wrapped up in its circulation (Foucault, 1980, p. 98). In other words, Foucault’s 
conception of power is not a capacity one has or exercises, but rather it is 
inescapable, ever present, and constantly producing new relations. Instead of 
starting with preformed subjects, interests, or material realities, Foucault starts 
with the relationship itself and asks how these particular social relations produce 
power.  
This can be seen, for example, in the way that climate change as a 
concept has formed new interests and power relations in the Pacific Islands. As 
climate change mitigation and adaptation have been taken up as a cause by the 
developed world, resources have been directed toward the scientific information, 
professional development, and capacity building deemed necessary by outside 
funders for the Pacific Islands to meet its climate change challenges (Atteridge & 
Canales, 2017).  As Foucault argues, “Power never ceases in its interrogation, its 
inquisition, its registration of truth; it institutionalizes, professionalizes, and 
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rewards its pursuit” (1980, p. 93). In the pursuit of climate ‘truths’ meant to 
govern the globe, many actors—Pacific Islanders, development partners, INGOs, 
etc.—have experienced a new form of power where global scientific knowledge 
and bureaucratic structures now govern much of their decision-making.  
These types of power are produced through the governmentality of 
everyday lives. Governmentalities are the ways of thinking about governing, or 
the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault, 2009). Governmentalities that support the 
modern administrative state do not rely solely on the juridical sovereign state—or 
the legal arm of state coercion—but rather dictate conditions of normality within 
every home, every workplace, every school, and every relation therein. 
Governmentalities are enacted through dispotif, defined as, “A thoroughly 
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much 
as the unsaid” (Foucault, 1980, p. 194). The system of relations formed under the 
dispotif produces a particular set of power apparatuses and a series of 
knowledges that transform the subjectivities of individuals (Foucault, 2009). 
Thus, looking at the full range of institutions, procedures, and tactics at work in a 
given society can give greater insight into how power is produced and upheld.  
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While the critiques lodged against Foucault are important—primarily the 
lack of attention to both agential possibilities for resistance5 and empirical 
guidelines—looking to the productive and relational power within society remains 
an important goal for, as Foucault states,  
it is interested in defining and discovering, beneath the forms of justice 
that have been instituted, the order that has been imposed, the forgotten 
past of real struggles, actual victories, and defeats which may have been 
disguised but which remain profoundly inscribed. (2003, p. 56) 
In other words, by exploring power in this way, political discourse is reopened for 
negotiation. This is important as, many times, decisions within governance can 
be presented as apolitical, or just a matter of course, when in fact their histories 
are fraught with politics, now hidden. An example of this is the scientific method: 
																																																						
5 The quote most often used to signal the agent within Foucault’s writing, and 
then to grossly critique it, is “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, 
or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power” (1984, p.95). However, while most critiques (e.g. Lukes, 2005; 
Grewal, 2008) dismiss this as positioning the choice of the agent as useless 
combat power, or as Giddens states, “Foucault’s ‘bodies’ are not agents” (1984, 
p. 154), it is important to address this quote within the field of literary studies out 
of which Foucault emerged. Saussure’s theory of language was based on the 
relational and differential conceptions of language, by which one is created in 
relation or in differentiation of the “other”.  This was further expanded by Derrida, 
breaking down binaries but imbuing linguistic rationality and difference with 
power. Coming from this genealogy, this interpretation of the role of the agent 
through resistance can easily be interpreted being constructed in relation to 
power. In other words, the form of the resistance is necessarily constructed in 
relation to the mechanisms of power employed against it, which then directly 
impact the nature of power, itself. This does not take away the power of the 
agent to resist, but rather directs resistance—and power—through their relations.  
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once debated, it is now taken for granted as the only way for true scientific 
discovery, which hides the ways in which this is productive of certain privileged 
forms of knowledge (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). Thus, it is critical to understand 
the ways in which power is produced and reproduced through the discursive 
practices of actors.   
Discursive Power 
 Discourse, as a concept within social sciences, is understood under a 
number of different frameworks. The primary split between understandings of 
discourse is whether it is narrowly defined as talk or defined a system of 
representation (Howarth, 2000). The way in which one defines ‘discourse’ is 
many times embedded in one’s theoretical home. Howarth (2000) explains that 
positivists and empiricists tend to view discourses as talk, where ‘frames,’ or 
instruments for common and strategic discussion, are the focus (e.g. McAdam, 
McCarthy, & Zald, 2006). Realists,6 on the other hand, tend to view discourses as 
objects both with their own structure and within the structure of the social world 
(e.g. Harré, 1975). The goal of these ways of knowing is to expose the ‘true’ work 
of discourse. 
While substantial work has been done understanding discourse as talk, 
this dissertation follows an understanding of discourse as a system of 
representation. Even within this categorization, there is a broad range of 
																																																						
6 This refers to scientific or critical realists, not specifically to realists of IR theory.  
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ontological approaches, as described by Howarth (2000). Marxists take the 
realist foundation and focus on the ideological systems at play within the 
processes of economic production and reproduction (e.g. Zižek, 1994). 
Additionally, there is the work of Norman Fairclough (2014) and his introduction 
of a school of thought called critical discourse analysis [CDA]. In this look at 
discourse, Fairclough and his school investigate the way in which discourse 
relates to both the linguistic (text) and non-linguistic (material practices, 
institutions, etc.) elements of social reality. Giddens’ (1984) theory of 
structuration—or the production and reproduction of social systems through both 
structure and agency—comes out of this school of thought. The goal of CDA is to 
uncover the ways in which discourse is used by the powerful to oppress and to 
give the oppressed tools to overcome their oppression.  
Finally, Howarth (2000) describes the post-structural turn of discourse. 
Under this school of thought, contingency and ambiguity are elements of an 
inherently incomplete discourse. Instead of a structured ideology of Marxist 
discourse or the hegemony of Antonio Gramsci, the power of discourse here runs 
throughout all relations in society and, while still subject to dominance, is never 
fully formed. Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal 
Mouffe form the groundwork of post-structuralist discourse. Under these 
theoretical assumptions, “discourses constitute symbolic systems and social 
orders, and the task of discourse analysis is to examine their historical and 
political construction and functioning” (Howarth, 2000, p. 5). In other words, this 
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school of thought considers the way some discourses have gained dominance in 
society, and looks to how they got to be in the position of dominance.  Within this 
camp, there are divisions between analytical styles. Foucault has produced 
archeological and genealogical analytic approaches to analyze 
power/knowledge. Laclau and Mouffe have approached the analysis of discourse 
from a post-Marxist perspective in order to draw into conversation the full range 
of political identities. As this approach assumes, “political identities are not pre-
given but constituted and re-constituted through debate in the public sphere” 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. xvii).  
This dissertation draws directly from a post-structural approach to 
discourse to understand power in transnational environmental governance. I look 
to Foucault’s genealogical approach to “entertain the claims to attention of local, 
discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claim of unitary 
body of theory which would filter, hierarchize, and order them in the name of 
some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and 
its objects” (1980, p. 83). Thus, this dissertation seeks to deconstruct, if only 
partially, the power/knowledge complexes at work in climate change governance 
in the Pacific Islands. I also pay key attention to Laclau and Mouffe’s partially 
fixed spaces of meaning, and their ability to produce dominant discourses but 
remain open for negotiation. As they put it, “The practice of articulation, therefore, 
consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the 
partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, as a 
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result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude 
of the field of discursivity” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 100, italics in original). This 
is important as I explore the plurivocity, or the space for multiple voices and 
multiple stories, at play in Pacific Islands climate change governance.7  
Discourse in Environmental Governance 
While theories of discourse can be abstract, their application to 
environmental policy can bring a certain level of concreteness. From the release 
of Maarten Hajer’s (1995) well-known book The Politics of Environmental 
Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process to today, Hajer and 
colleagues have led the way on clarifying the role of discourse in environmental 
policy. He defines discourse as, “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories 
through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is 
produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer & 
Versteeg, 2005, p. 175). Thus, in the post-structural tradition, Hajer and Versteeg 
consider discourse more broadly than a set of speech acts or a collection of 
texts, but rather emphasize way in which power is practiced throughout social 
and physical systems through discourse. They describe discourse in more detail:  
[Post-structural Discourse Theory] has an anti-essentialist ontology; it 
assumes the existence of multiple, socially constructed realities instead of 
a single reality, governed by immutable natural laws. Characteristically, 
																																																						
7 This is an admittedly limited exploration into a broad and deep history of 
discourse. For greater detail, pleases refer to Howarth (2000).  
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the approach takes a critical stance towards ‘truth’ and puts emphasis on 
the communications through which knowledge is exchanged. Because 
reality is seen as socially constructed, the analysis of meaning becomes 
central; for interpretative environmental policy research, it is not an 
environmental phenomenon in itself that is important, but the way in which 
society makes sense of this phenomenon. Dying forests do not contain in 
themselves the reason for the public attention and concern they receive. 
The fact that they do receive this attention at a specific place and time 
cannot be deduced from a natural-scientific analysis of its urgency, but 
from the symbols and experiences that govern the way people think and 
act (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, p. 176) 
This post-structural, interpretative approach to discourse in environmental policy 
thus analyses the underlying practices and knowledges that produce and 
reproduce power relations throughout society.  
The power of discourse, then, comes in the ability to both frame the 
problem and structure the 'solution' within environmental challenges through the 
production, dissemination, and legitimation of knowledge (Foucault, 1980) 
including information about processes and procedures (Barnett & Finnemore, 
1999), knowledge about the physical and social world (Miller, 2007), and the 
limits of what is considered acceptable (Hulme, 2010). While particular 
environmental discourses may gain more or less ground in a particular situation 
(Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006; Hajer, 1995; Litfin, 1994; Wesselink, 
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Buchanan, Georgiadou, & Turnhout, 2013), they are never final as they are 
always open for renegotiation (Butler, 1997; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). This 
negotiation over knowledge is further explored in the next section.  
Power and Knowledge 
A key element of environmental governance is the production and 
reproduction of scientific knowledge. Foucault discusses science as embedded in 
“regimes of truth” which designate which ideas are deemed valid or false (2010, 
p. 36). These regimes of truth are not simple reflections of the natural world, but 
rather are produced by and produce power relations within society as they 
engage with political struggles over legitimate knowledges. As Foucault (1980) 
has discussed, the cornering of a single ‘truth’ is a discursive strategy that is 
meant to stifle and delegitimize alternative ways of understanding the world. 
Thus, he advocates for an exploration into the ways in which these ‘truths’ come 
to be under particular power/knowledge complexes. He provides a number of 
examples of this, from the construction of sexuality (Foucault, 1984) to the way in 
which madness came to be understood (Foucault, 1988). With sexuality, he 
explored the way that confession—and the admission of guilt—brought about the 
existence of sexuality as a discursive object, known through efforts to surveil, 
analyze, and eventually medicalize sexuality. This lent itself to a 
power/knowledge complex that circumscribed certain sexualities as normal or 
abnormal through adherence to a particular set of knowledges.  
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Additionally, Jasanoff (2004) describes this power/knowledge relationship 
as coproduction. Coproduction, according to Jasanoff, is concerned with the 
ways in which the social and natural orders are being constructed together, 
inextricable from one another. She argues that analyzing knowledge as 
coproduced through interactions of material and social systems, “offers new 
ways of thinking about power, highlighting the often invisible role of knowledge, 
expertise, technical practices, and material objects in shaping, sustaining, 
subverting, and transforming relations of authority” (ibid., p. 4). She explains, 
“Scientific knowledge, in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of society. It both 
embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, 
discourses, instruments, and institutions” (ibid., p. 3). Thus, looking to 
power/knowledge through a coproductive lens clarifies the ways in which 
particular understandings of the world are privileged in questions of what is being 
studied, why it is being studied, and how it is being studied—through what tools 
and methodologies (Jasanoff, 2004; Porter, 1994; Scott, 1998).  
Understanding the coproduction of human/environmental relations can 
reveal the power inherent in management strategies. As Engel-Di Mauro argues, 
“Without taking into account that the biophysical also entails a social 
understanding, there will continue to be a reinforcement of socially predominant 
ideologies, a passively political act" (2014, p. 33). Choices about environmental 
use, even those perceived by many to be ‘apolitical,’ in fact have power. For 
instance, the use of scientific forestry in late eighteenth-century Germany used a 
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technical approach to produce high timber yields that allowed them to ignore the 
“vast, complex, and negotiated social uses of the forest for hunting and 
gathering, pasturage, fishing …” (Scott, 1998, p. 13). As Hull and Robertson 
articulate, “the constructs of ecological science necessarily serve double duty: 
they are both descriptive (scientific) and prescriptive (political); they are used to 
describe what is and to prescribe what ought to be” (2000, p. 98). In other words, 
understanding nature according to realist, positivist, and empiricist approaches, 
where authoritative science is simply used to find the ‘truth’ of the natural world, 
can obscure political choices that take place when understanding and studying 
the environment.  
These underlying political choices are further explored through Agrawal’s 
(2005) analysis of environmentality. Environmentality is a play on ‘environment’ 
and ‘governmentality,’ and is “an approach to studying environmental politics that 
takes seriously the conceptual building blocks of power/knowledges, institutions, 
and subjectivities” (ibid., p. 8). He argues that environmentality produces new 
subjects under the totalizing, or all-encompassing, statistical discourses of 
conservation in Indian forests, making decision-making less democratic. It also 
transforms the very individuals themselves, forcing them to appeal to statistical 
measurements to have their voices be heard. As Agrawal argues, “once precise, 
statistical, generalizing arguments are invoked in the service of polity, it is difficult 
to counter them with vague, descriptive, anecdotal evidence. It is in this 
characteristic of statistical representations…that their colonizing effects are to be 
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found” (ibid., p. 35). In other words, the authority of statistical knowledge in 
environmental governance makes it challenging to introduce other ways of 
understanding the world. This is further explored in the challenges of global and 
local knowledge divisions.   
Global and Local Knowledge  
Power/knowledge, while it takes many forms, is here explored in the 
divides between the ‘globalizing’ effects of scientific knowledge production and 
local, or situated, knowledge construction. As Hulme describes global 
knowledge,  
Knowledge about multi-scalar processes and globally-aggregated 
outcomes that is insensitive to the peculiarities of place and context opens 
the way for unitary globalised explanations and predictions of 
environmental change. Masquerading as universal truths, these assert 
themselves as the unassailable view from everywhere. (2010, p. 559)  
In other words, global types of knowledge are unconcerned with the context in 
which they are created. The geographic locales and economic statuses of 
researchers, the ontological location of the project, the priorities of funders, the 
choice of what to study and how to study it, etc., are considered to not 
considerably impact the outcome of the research. Instead, global knowledge 
produces outcomes meant to predict change across time and space, irrespective 
of the context in which it was created.  
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Global knowledge, then, creates a power/knowledge complex through 
delimiting the options that are considered legitimate in decision-making and 
governance. As Turnhout, Dewulf, and Hulme describe it, “Knowledge and power 
embrace tightly as globalized knowledge conditions the political imaginary of 
global environmental governance and vice versa: how one knows constrains how 
one governs and how one governs shapes what one needs to know” (2016, no 
page). This creates a space in which only the problems that are identified and 
solutions supported by globalized knowledge are considered legitimate. In this 
way, authoritative science—knowledge that is unanimous, quantitative, 
generalized, and conducted according to scientific process (Bocking, 2004)—is 
many times the only form of knowledge that is considered within discussion of 
environmental issues. For instance, this can be seen in many conversations 
surrounding epistemic communities (Adler & Haas, 1992; Haas, 1989). Many 
times, the negotiations between these communities are seen as the only spaces 
for dissent, as opposed to any dissent that might question the basis of globalized 
knowledge.  
 By contrast, the construction of local knowledge denies the “view from 
everywhere” (Hulme, 2010, p. 559), and rather captures the nuance of local 
situations. This type of knowledge aligns with Lejano and Ingram’s definition of 
ways of knowing: an “active process of meaning construction” within a policy 
space, where actors interact with one another and objects in ways that either 
confirm or reshape their relation to the world (2009, p. 656). These objects can 
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include scientific reports, forums, rules, etc., that are interpreted by an 
actor/organization through their own understanding of the world. Defining 
knowledge in this way opens up the conversation to understand the ways in 
which multiple knowledges besides global, authoritative science may find 
authority within decision-making spaces. While multiple ways of knowing are 
considered and discussed within this dissertation, they are not on an even 
playing field within governance, a topic further explored in subsequent chapters.  
Construction of the “local” has taken different definitional and normative 
forms. Many writers that advocate for “community” or “local” solutions tend to 
have a set of assumptions—spatial smallness, social homogeneity, and norm 
similarity (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999) or flat power dynamics and a focus on civil 
society (Mohan & Stokke, 2000)—that are not shared here. Thus, it is important 
to distinguish between an acknowledgement, inclusion, and study of the local 
through multiple ways of knowing, such as is the goal here, and a valorization of 
a static and singular “local” that is inherently normatively good (Martello & 
Jasanoff, 2004). While the term local will be used throughout this dissertation, it 
will be used along the lines of Haraway’s (1988) concept of situated knowledge. 
Situated knowledge is removed from scale, and is rather understood to be 
contextually specific and produced in-situ, impacted by the researchers’ ontology 
and experience in a specific place and time. Therefore, instead of an overly-
simplified and naïve understanding of the local, this dissertation sees local 
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knowledge as simply an approach to knowledge generation in which context and 
nuance are considered in its production.  
 This global/local distinction is especially important in the realm of 
environmental governance, and specifically climate change. Martello and 
Jasanoff (2004) have argued that while globalization has been extensively 
covered in social science research, research on the relationship between 
globalization and localization has been limited. They give a few reasons why this 
could be. First, the global and local tend to be investigated by different 
disciplines, which have little overlap. Additionally, studies tend to see the local as 
doomed from the beginning due to its being the “other” to the inevitable wave of 
globalization. Finally, the local and the global are many times presented as static 
instead of dynamic and open for reinterpretation. In light of these issues, Martello 
and Jasanoff argue that more should be done to draw the local and global into 
conversation. One way in which this can be accomplished is through the 
introduction of network approaches into the study of local and global relations.  
Network Approaches 
 Over the last three decades, social networks have been explored 
conceptually, visually, and mathematically, leading to a plethora of research 
agendas seeking to advance understanding of the social world. Social networks 
have seen a substantial increase in the last 10 years both with the uptake of 
social network theory in a variety of fields and the methodological development of 
computer technologies and analysis tools (Table 1). Instead of behavioral 
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science that seeks to analyze decision-making based on individual attributes—
age, gender, political affiliation, etc.—network studies approach analysis from a 
relational perspective (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In other words, people are 
understood to make decisions based on more than their individual attributes, but 
also based on the exchanges that take place according to their social ties to 
others.  
Table 1: Chart of publications with “social network” in the title, retrieved from Web 
of Science (19 Jan, 2017). 
 
 
Wasserman and Faust define the network as: “a finite set of actors 
connected by a set of ties” (1995, p. 20). Based on this definition, however, one 
could see networks everywhere—interactions at the bus station, shopping cart 
collisions at the grocery store, and more. In order to add specificity and rigor, 
they note the following assumptions as fundamental to the social network 
perspective: 
• Interdependence of actors and their actions; 
• Material and non-material resources can/do flow through relational ties/links; 
• Patterns of interaction produce the network structure, and this structure then 































































• Network structure has relative longevity (it may change over time, but it is 
rather stable).  
 
The boundaries that these assumptions place on the network ensure that the 
phenomena being studied are, in fact, social phenomena, rather than 
happenstance encounters.  
 Utilizing social network approaches to study transnational environmental 
governance has distinct advantages. First, with the decentralization of authority 
occurring within transnational governance, networks more accurately mirror the 
reality of these governance arrangements than other state-centric investigations. 
Networks also form a useful tool by which to analyze and visualize a complex set 
of interactions among a large number of actors. This can facilitate a greater 
understanding of the structural elements of interactions by looking to the locales 
in which various organizations are situated within the network. Additionally, the 
relational focus of networks allows for a shift away from a static, behavioral 
approach and considers the way that actors’ ways of understanding problems 
and solutions to environmental challenges can change over time according to 
their interactions with other actors.  
 Networks are also useful in capturing the multiple scales in which 
transnational environmental governance efforts work and interact. As opposed to 
single-level analyses, such as Keohane’s (1982) analysis of international 
regimes, network approaches can capture actors at multiple scales that include 
both local and global understandings of the world, and demonstrate the ways in 
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which actors in these scales link together. Thus, networks are useful theoretical 
and methodological tools for understanding relationships of power, authority, and 
knowledge within transnational environmental governance at all levels.  
Power, Authority, and Knowledge in Transnational Networks 
Traditionally, international environmental decision-making has focused on 
the power of the state to achieve state interests (e.g. Abbot & Snidal, 2000; 
Keohane, 1982; Krasner, 1999; Vaubel, 2006). However, a relational ontology of 
power provides a different set of foci, such as the ways in which nonstate actors 
shape what is possible by generating norms to which states adhere (Finnemore 
& Sikkink, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Mitchell, 1998; Rosenau, 2007), 
producing and sharing information on which decisions are based (Jasanoff, 2004, 
2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Miller, 2007; Scholte, 2004; Wapner, 1995), creating 
and maintaining processes and procedures (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999), and 
providing practical support for program implementation and on-the-ground 
legitimacy (Abers & Keck, 2013; Cooper & Vargas, 2004). For instance, Keck 
and Sikkink’s (1999) transnational advocacy networks use the boomerang effect, 
where the networks of organizations investigate perceived injustices in national 
contexts, then put pressure on other nations to force the transgressing nation to 
change its ways. This is particularly seen in humanitarian issues, but they also 
talk about it in the realm of environmental governance. Additionally, Wapner’s 
(1995) transnational environmental advocacy groups actively change state and 
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nonstate decision-making through expanding discourse, changing market 
conditions, and establishing legitimacy of environmental programs.  
This impact on decision-making is not limited to activist NGOs, either; 
power is evident in the bureaucracies and secretariats of international 
organizations (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, 2004; Jinnah, 2010), knowledge-
producing institutions (Miller, 2007; Miller & Edwards, 2001), and standard-
setting institutions (Böstrom & Hallström, 2010; Cashore, 2002), all of which take 
part in and form the networks of environmental governance. These organizations 
produce new ways of knowing about environmental issues including information 
about processes and procedures, knowledge about the physical and social world, 
and the limits of what is considered acceptable. These things can help to 
facilitate cooperation and shared understanding among network members, and at 
times the global polity; however, as with all power, there are risks. Hulme (2010) 
gives the example of the way in which the 2° limit on global warming has been 
used by the IPCC to stabilize normative goals around the climate and delimit the 
storyline on which the public’s imagination must be built. However, he argues 
that this framing may damage local communities as they seek to write their own 
narratives and seek their own futures.  
The primary challenges around issues of power and authority within 
networked environmental governance are due to the potential for undemocratic 
governance. These multiple and diffuse authorities have implications as powerful 
actors in networks can potentially be less transparent and accountable than the 
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state (Biermann & Gupta, 2011; Vaubel, 2006). Transnational governance is 
semi-private or quasi-public and dispersed through restricted sites, where 
boundaries are “indeterminate and opaque” (Stone, 2008, p. 22). Networks are at 
times used to mobilize dominant liberal ideology at the expense of other value 
systems (Friedrichs, 2005) or to stifle the voice of the global South (Glenn, 2008). 
In other words, the power and authority held by nonstate actors that work in and 
through transnational environmental governance networks can shift power away 
from the public. 
This challenge to accountability extends to the knowledge utilized within 
decision spaces as well. The control over technical expertise and information 
creates a situation in which these networked organizations, especially when 
working in transnational space, can leave local communities out of environmental 
decisions that impact their lives, thereby breaking down democratic processes. In 
an aptly titled book, Conservation is Our Government Now, West (2006) provides 
a vivid example of the ways in which conservation efforts transformed the power 
relationships and ways of life in local communities within Papua New Guinea. 
West argued, "Local historic subsistence practices were curtailed or were to be 
curtailed so that the local people, who through these practices were a threat to 
biodiversity, could engage in economic and subsistence practices sanctioned by 
conservation biologists and development practitioners as environmentally 
appropriate" (ibid., p. 35). The use of expertise to put the conservation of nature 
outside of and above human interactions of the lands seriously damaged the 
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opportunities for a more public participation, as well as the resilience of these 
communities. 
Additionally, Sievanen, Gruby, and Campbell (2013) look at the way that 
the Fijian marine protected areas put in to meet the needs of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity have slowly pushed the management practices of those 
areas from serving the local population to excluding them through standard 
practices. These authors demonstrate the ways in which expertise, bureaucratic 
frameworks, and universalizing standards set by transnational and global 
environmental organizations that work in and through governance networks can 
shift power away from local communities, and even democratic states, and into 
the hands of nonstate actors.  
Within networks of environmental governance, organizations appeal to 
various types of authority and ways of knowing to legitimize their power position. 
The power, authority, and knowledge relations tend to organize in particular 
ways, each with their own facilitative and restrictive elements. Below I explore 
elements of traditional, bureaucratic, scientific, and practical power, authority, 
and knowledge relations (Table 2).  
Typology of Power, Authority, and Knowledge Relations 
Sovereign power is grounded in the authority of the state or those to 
whom the state delegates that authority. With the state-centric concentration of 
international relations, much of the focus in understanding decision-making and 
action has been on traditional authority, such as the sovereignty of the state 
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(Krasner, 1999), juridical or disciplinary power (Foucault, 1980), or the appeal to 
delegated authority by intergovernmental actors (Jinnah, 2010). Under a 
traditional framework of power, authority, and knowledge, the state and those to 
whom the state has delegated power appeal to knowledges that produce and 
uphold the sovereign. However, in an era of networked governance relations, 
these knowledges are many times delegated to nonstate actors for their 
production. While sovereign power has potential advantages on issues of 
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of environmental governance as it is 
open to democratic procedures in most Pacific Island states, current trends in 
both global governance (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012) and decentralization into 
networks (Bodin & Prell, 2011) are expected to limit the scope of sovereign 
power. This is not to say that states and those to whom states delegate authority 
do not have a premiere role to play in transnational environmental governance, 
but rather that governance trends are making space for other organizations to 
play key roles in environmental decision-making, such as bureaucratic, scientific, 
and functional relations. 
Networked relations call to attention the multiple different types of 
authority that are employed by organizations in transnational environmental 
governance. In addition to sovereign power, bureaucratic power is found in 
rational-legal authority and the authority gained through control over technical 
expertise and information by organizations outside the state (Barnett & 
Finnemore, 1999, 2004). This authority is “invested in legalities, procedures, and 
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rules and thus rendered impersonal” through bureaucratization in the 
classification, fixing of meanings, and diffusion of norms (Barnett & Finnemore, 
1999, p. 707). While the process of creating procedures and seemingly 
depoliticizing decisions can streamline the broader governance process, access 
to bureaucratic authority and knowledge of legalities and procedures can be 
inaccessible to the broader public. Barnett and Finnemore argue, “The irony in … 
these features of authority is that they make bureaucracies powerful precisely by 
creating the appearance of depoliticization” (1999, p. 708). In other words, as 
decisions are focused on the legalities, procedures, and rules of governance, 
deep political divisions are washed over or ignored. While streamlining some 
processes bureaucratic governance mechanisms can increase efficiency, there 
are tradeoffs as democratic access to these spaces of decision-making is limited.   
Additionally, contestations over authority within environmental governance 
are intertwined with the scientific power gained through the control of legitimate 
knowledge, or expert authority. One of the primary divides within climate 
governance comes in the local and global strategies and knowledges and their 
struggles to be authoritative (Jasanoff & Martello, 2004; Hulme, 2010). In this 
space, authoritative science (Bocking, 2004) meets the challenges of scaling 
knowledge to a global level by collapsing the nuance of local conditions. The 
objectivity of scientific procedure is used as a strategy to gain authority for 
decision-making, thus giving scientific knowledge, and those who employ it, the 
power to shape decision-making. While standardization and expert-driven 
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knowledge creation can create significant innovations and technological 
successes, it has risks. Scientific information is costly, both in terms of finances 
and time resources, and can delegitimize other forms of knowledge (Agrawal, 
2005; Bocking, 2004; Hulme, 2010; Jasanoff, 2005; Jasanoff & Martello, 2004; 
Miller & Edwards, 2001). As Porter reminds us, “the form of life epitomized by 
quantification depends on the art of forgetting” (1994, p. 396). Forgetting local 
and contextual knowledge can create governance that is ill-fitting for the nuances 
of the social and environmental system in which it is being employed. Therefore, 
expertise can provide key insight into environmental realities, but can be cost-
prohibitive and be used to delegitimize other forms of knowledge for decision-
making if not properly considered. 
A final understanding of authority is found in the appeal to functional 
power through practical authority. Abers and Keck define practical authority as 
“a kind of power in which the capabilities to solve problems and recognition by 
others allows an actor to make decisions that others follow” (2013, p. 7). This 
authority is not based solely on delegation from the state, positionality, or on 
externally defined expertise. Instead, this authority is found in the capability to 
provide tangible recommendations that are borne out through practice. Cooper 
and Vargas (2004) take a similar approach when analyzing the implementation of 
sustainable development, focusing on feasibility requirements, such as technical 
and administrative capacity, legal frameworks, political acceptance, and more. 
Appeals to functional authority tend to shift away from authoritative science by 
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appealing strongly to the contextual nature of knowledge production (Haraway, 
1988; Lejano & Ingram, 2009). Functional power through access to practical 
authority and local, contextual knowledge relies on governance that is entrusted 
to those who have shown themselves to be capable and knowledgeable. 
However, gaining this type of authority is challenging on a transnational scale, as 
it is grounded in reputations, relationships, and experience with particular locales 
(Abers & Keck, 2014). Building those foundational elements of functional power 
are challenging even at the local level, better yet when governance is concerned 
with environmental challenges crossing state borders. Finding ways to connect 
the local/global elements of power, authority, and knowledge, however, could 
provide insights into possibilities for environmental governance. 
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These multiple appeals to authority and legitimizing knowledges—
traditional, bureaucratic, scientific, and functional—can bring about 
consequences for governance. Using the Pacific Islands as a case study, I will 
further explore the interactions between power, authority, and knowledge in 
transnational environmental governance.  
Conclusion 
The role of transnational governance in mitigating the effects of climate 
change and environmental degradation is complex, fraught with contradictions, 
and yet vitally necessary in order to avoid both environmental and social 
catastrophe. States have traditionally been defined as the supreme legal 
authority over a territory; however, while states may still play central roles in 
decision-making and regulatory mechanisms, the territorially limited state is no 
longer sufficient to meet the growing need for governance across state borders. 
Transnational governance, then, has developed as an outgrowth of the 
inadequacy of the state in dealing with transnational problems. 
Understanding governance in a multi-actor space, inclusive of the 
bureaucracies and secretariats of international organizations (Barnett & 
Finnemore, 1999, 2004; Jinnah, 2010), knowledge-producing institutions (Miller, 
2007; Miller & Edwards, 2001), standard-setting institutions (Böstrom & 
Hallström, 2010; Cashore, 2002), and others, requires an understanding of 
power, authority, and knowledge that is broad enough to include the various 
facets of governing that these organizations bring to the table. Thus, 
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understanding power as productive, relational, and distributed throughout society 
through networks of discursive practices can bring to light the less visible 
elements of power.  
Specifically, the authority of various power/knowledge complexes—such 
as authoritative science regimes—can create challenges between local and 
global ways of knowing the earth. This makes it vitally important to explore the 
ways in which power, authority, and knowledge are organized. These 
discussions set the stage for the investigation of climate change diplomacy and 
governance in the Pacific Islands undertaken in this dissertation.   
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Chapter 3: Narrative-Networks in Diplomatic Spaces 
What I will tell my daughter 
 
They say there are no mountains 
in the Marshalls – our island 
that is so close 
to an expiration date 
 
But I will tell you there were mountains 
who were men 
giants who walked across the sea 
sounding the call for the world 
to hear our story. 
 
-Kathy Jetñil-Kijiner, Marshallese Poet 
Introduction 
 Transboundary environmental problems have been on the forefront of the 
agenda since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, where the UNFCCC was 
adopted. Parties to the convention have met yearly at the Conferences of the 
Parties [COP], which has led to the 1992 Kyoto Protocol, the 2010 Cancún 
agreements, and the 2012 Doha Amendment. These agreements have held 
varying degrees of weight in the international sphere, but none have shown a 
significant commitment to address the immediate and long-term impacts of 
climate change (Ivanova, 2016).  
This chapter discusses the Pacific Islands’ diplomatic efforts in the lead up 
to the 2015 Paris COP (otherwise known as COP21). COP21 produced the 
strongest climate change agreement thus far. As Ivanova describes it:  
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[The Paris Agreement] meets the core criteria for effectiveness of an 
international treaty as outlined by scholars, researchers, and the UN 
Secretary-General: universal participation, significant emission reduction 
commitments, transparency and accountability, finance, and high 
compliance rates…The agreement is ambitious and universal; it 
possesses a binding, yet flexible legal nature, clear procedures for 
accountability, and a credible financial structure. (2016, p. 412) 
While still having room for improvement,8 the Paris Agreement represented a 
dramatic shift in the international commitment to reducing the causes and 
impacts of climate change. The ability to accomplish this agreement did not occur 
overnight, but rather was a product of a long history of contestation around 
transnational environmental governance. Whether through delineations among 
developed vs. developing countries, producers vs. consumers of climate 
challenges, the wealthy vs. the poor, negotiations around climate change have 
drawn a series of lines that define who should be “for” or “against” climate 
strategies, although these lines shift through time. One element of this process is 
the narrative utilized by individuals as they network with others.  
 The narrative of a network is the shared story it tells when working to 
shape and accomplish its goals—the heroes, villains, and victims, both human 
																																																						
8 For instance, the Paris Agreement did not address compensation for loss and 
damages, actionable discussion of indigenous participation, or a call to end fossil 
fuel extraction, and also lacks sanctions for those who do not meet their goals. 
Also, the Trump administration has vowed to withdraw from the accord. 
 60 
and nonhuman, that form the basis of the larger fabula, or tale of the issue at 
hand (Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013). Narrative does productive work within 
the process of governance in a variety of ways—it determines the goals and 
problems to be solved, identifies tools to solve the problem, distributes the 
benefits and burdens of policy and implementation, creates rules for inclusion 
and exclusion, and generates rationales that legitimate these choices (McBeth, 
Jones, & Shanahan, 2014). In other words, narrative not only limits what is 
possible within governance, it also works to create the possible. Identifying the 
role of narrative provides key insights into the ways in which networks emerge 
and establish their authority for governance. As networks work across 
local/global divides, the power of narrative is both a strategy of negotiation in this 
multi-scalar space and a product of this negotiation. In other words, narrative is 
used to bolster the authority of networks of organizations as organizations 
transform the narrative to meet their own ends, and is also a durable product of 
that negotiation that has been institutionalized into dominant discourses. 
Therefore, it is informative to study the way in which various actors are 
employing narratives, as well as how those narratives came to be.  
During the COP21 climate change negotiation preparation, two dominant 
narratives were employed in the Pacific Islands that distinguished two network 
constructions for negotiation stances. Using a narrative-network approach 
(Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013), this chapter will further explore what I call the 
global technical narrative employed by many regional intergovernmental 
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organizations that manifested in the Pacific Islands Forum [PIF] Summit’s Pacific 
Islands Forum Leaders Declaration on Climate Change, alongside the local 
power narrative employed by local NGOs during the writing of the Pacific Island 
Development Forum [PIDF] Summit’s Suva Declaration on Climate Change. 
Through this chapter, I will consider the way in which international climate 
networks are emerging and establishing authority in transnational environmental 
governance. I will then look to the way that, as organizations network around 
environmental issues, struggles over local and global knowledges work through 
the narrative used by these networks. Finally, I will consider the implications of 
these narrative-networks for climate change governance in the Pacific Islands 
and in future diplomatic efforts. 
Scientific Authority in Multi-Scalar Space 
Contestations over authority within environmental governance are 
intertwined with what is considered legitimate knowledge. One of the primary 
divides within climate governance comes in the local and global strategies and 
knowledges and their struggles to be authoritative (Jasanoff & Martello, 2004; 
Hulme, 2010). Global knowledges tend to emulate what Bocking (2004) refers to 
as authoritative science—knowledge gained through procedures that are 
unanimous, quantitative, generalized, and conducted according to scientific 
process. This type of knowledge meets the challenges of scaling knowledge to a 
global level by collapsing the nuance of local conditions. The objectivity of 
scientific procedure is used as a strategy to gain authority for decision-making, 
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thus giving scientific knowledge, and those who employ it, the power to shape 
decision-making. As Turnhout, Dewulf, and Hulme describe it, “Knowledge and 
power embrace tightly as globalized knowledge conditions the political imaginary 
of global environmental governance and vice versa: how one knows constrains 
how one governs and how one governs shapes what one needs to know” (2016, 
no page). In other words, the use of global, objective, authoritative science can 
shape what is perceived as possible within transnational environmental 
governance.  
This type of global scientific knowledge plays a vitally important role in the 
governance of the climate due to the nature of global atmospheric change. By 
appealing to authoritative science, however, transnational environmental 
networks can leave local communities out of environmental decisions that impact 
their lives, thereby breaking down democratic processes. As Hulme describes it, 
this type of science makes ‘global kinds of knowledge,’ or “knowledge which 
erases geographical and cultural difference and in which scale collapses to the 
global” (2010, p. 559). He gives the example of the way in which the 2°C 
[Celsius] limit on global warming has been used by the IPCC to stabilize 
normative goals around the climate and delimit the storyline on which the public’s 
imagination must be built. He argues that this globalizing knowledge may 
damage local communities as they seek to write their own narratives and pursue 
their own futures.  
 63 
With these challenges presented by global, objective, authoritative science 
in transnational environmental governance, many environmental governance 
scholars are exploring the authority of local, practical, contextual knowledge. 
Bocking argues, “tacit prescriptive commitments embedded in scientific 
knowledge, especially relating to controlling and transforming nature, may fit 
poorly with local attitudes that emphasize adaptation and coexistence” (2004, p. 
28). In this way, Bocking argues that authoritative science can be used in efforts 
to reform nature that may be in contrast to the adaptive and coproduced values 
of local communities in regards to nature. Instead, Lejano, Ingram, Whiteley, 
Torres, and Agduma (2007) provide an argument for how particular 
environmental governance efforts may need to undergo contextualization in order 
to have institutional coherence with the everyday patterns and practices of 
localities. In other words, governance is to be adaptive to both the environmental 
and social contexts in which it is being embedded. However, in climate change 
governance, this local knowledge must compete for legitimacy with global ways 
of knowing. This struggle over the authority of knowledge in local and global 
space is played out in the narrative employed by networks of environmental 
organizations.  
Narrative-Networks 
Authority within the network can be created and bolstered through the use 
of narrative strategies, such as is found in advocating the use of global scientific 
knowledge production and the need for local input. Struggles between the 
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authorities of global and local knowledge production play themselves out through 
narrative-networks. Previous discussions of networks have focused primarily on 
evidence of interactions between actors, but how those interactions shaped the 
actors in the network and how actors shape interactions in the network have 
been left “black boxed” in much of the literature. Instead, narrative-networks, as 
discussed by Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram (2013) form as actors write themselves 
into the larger story of the environmental issue. In a narrative-network, network 
actors and network narratives are mutually constituted. In other words, a 
narrative-network is created by the common use of a narrative by actors in the 
network, and the narrative-network is made possible by the existence of a 
community that fosters the narrative. This allows for narrative-networks to be 
understood as produced by both the actors and the narrative.  
In the analysis of policy, narrative is the basic underlying storyline on 
which the legitimation of decision-making relies. Policy narratives incorporate 
identity, trust, and alterity—or the creation of the “other” that the network must be 
working against. The use of characterization—heroes, villains, and victims, both 
human and nonhuman—lends itself to an “us” and “them” that works to 
strengthen organizational ties to the network. It also prescribes policy morals, 
where ‘solutions’ are given to the problems at hand based on who is considered 
the hero, villain, and victim. Additionally, gaps in the conventional narrative are 
employed by some narrative-networks to offer alternatives to the dominant 
network. This allows narrative-networks to bridge, integrate, translate, and 
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generate knowledge across various sources and value perspectives, while also 
allowing for their own narrative to be employed. While nonhumans’ roles in the 
network are also important to understanding the narrative-network, this chapter 
will focus on the human elements of the network.  
Evaluating emergent climate networks as narrative-networks can provide 
opportunities to trace their narratives throughout the policy process. As they work 
to impact diplomacy at a transnational level, the narratives of various networks 
struggle to be represented. Looking to the impact of networks’ use of heroes, 
victims, and villains on transnational policies, one can see where voices were 
heard, and where they were underrepresented. In the case of the Pacific Islands, 
these struggles are playing out as local and global voices are being made the 
hero or villainized to meet particular ends.  
Narrative-Networks in the Pacific Islands  
In order to combat the growing threat of environmental degradation, 
transnational environmental diplomatic networks are emerging that include the 
Pacific Island nations, regional intergovernmental organizations, civil society, 
private sector participants, and states that are external to the region (Corlew, 
Keener, Finucane, Brewington, & Nunn-Crichton, 2015; Gruby & Campbell, 2013; 
Pietri, Stevenson, & Christie, 2015). These networks struggle between the ‘global 
kinds of knowledge’ (Hulme, 2010) created by agencies in the region and local, 
contextual knowledge (Lejano, Ingram, Whiteley, Torres, & Agduma, 2007) that 
is a large part of climate change adaptation and mitigation. Battles over climate 
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change negotiation stances, the use of traditional knowledges and 
methodologies, and the inclusion or exclusion of particular voices have caused 
networks in the region to work to establish their own narrative strategies for 
authority.  
Particularly when it comes to climate change diplomacy, dominant 
scientific narratives have worked to set the parameters of decision-making under 
a “problem closure,” which Hajer (1995) defines as the process of creating 
solutions to a set of unquestioned, well-developed problems. Thus, narrative 
constructions of the challenges presented by climate change—including the 
scientific models, classifications, and regulations—impact climate change 
diplomacy and governance within the Pacific Islands by producing problem 
closure. Even as scientific narrative constructions have gained dominance within 
transnational climate diplomacy in the region, networks of organizations that 
favor local constructions of knowledge are resisting the narrative hegemony of 
this problem closure. While Govan (2009) and Sievanen, Gruby, and Campbell 
(2013) have demonstrated the ways in which local knowledge construction can 
bolster the impacts of governance in the region, more should be done to explore 
these narrative-networks of global/local knowledge and governance within the 
Pacific Islands. This chapter seeks to investigate these narrative-networks as 
they manifested in climate change diplomacy surrounding the 2015 PIF and PIDF 
Summits leading up to the COP21.  
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Pacific Islands Climate Change Diplomacy 
The Pacific Islands—through governments, intergovernmental 
organizations, or civil society organizations—were some of the most highly vocal 
proponents of a climate change mitigation agreement at COP21 (Carter, 2015). 
At the United Nations Third Small Islands Developing States Conference in 2014, 
Enele Sopoaga, Prime Minister of Tuvalu, stated “Pacific negotiators need to be 
in sync at the UNFCCC”; Tony de Brum, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Marshall 
Islands, asserted that “there has been a failure of traditional diplomacy at the UN 
… we need a new brand of diplomacy … one voice diplomacy”; and President 
Anote Tong of Kiribati argued “we need to establish alliances that are non-
traditional, that serve our best interest” (as cited in Carter, 2015). Efforts to speak 
with one voice were also evident through the 3rd Annual PIDF Summit, with civil 
society and government leaders emphasizing the “one family” of the Pacific 
Islands, stating “our lives and our destinies are intertwined,” and encouraging 
one another to be “singing together the same song.” These pledges of 
collaboration ran throughout the meeting. However, even with these long-
standing efforts to speak with one voice, the multiple climate change declarations 
that came out of the Pacific during the final months leading up to COP21 showed 
important differences. This chapter further explores the opportunities and 




Materials and Methods 
While the Pacific Islands have a diverse and comprehensive network of 
state and nonstate actors (as is demonstrated in the next chapter of this 
dissertation), this chapter focuses on this simplified network of transnational 
organizations that participated in the PIF and PIDF Summits to demonstrate the 
differentiation of narrative within climate change negotiation stances. In order to 
gain information on the process of transnational environmental diplomacy in the 
Pacific Islands, I conducted interviews with 22 key regional players (interview 
guide in Appendix A); attended 3rd Annual PIDF Summit, 1–4 September, 2015, 
that was attended by delegates from 15 of the Pacific Islands including heads of 
state; and collected grey papers and other archival data on regional 
environmental work in the Pacific in both Apia, Samoa, and Suva, Fiji. I then 
compared the interviews to participation in the PIF and PIDF Summits, and to 
their respective outcomes in the form of declarations. Participation in the PIF and 
PIDF Summits was visualized using a basic qualitative network for further clarity. 
The methods are further described below.  
Thematic and Narrative Analysis of Interviews 
For the analysis of the interviews, I used thematic analysis (Braun & 
Clarke, 2012). This type of analysis uses six steps: (1) becoming familiar with the 
data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for themes, (4) reviewing themes, 
(5) defining and naming themes, and (6) producing the report. I began by 
organizing the data around themes generally following the topics of power, 
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authority, and knowledge that run throughout this dissertation, then working 
toward more specific thematic areas. These included agenda-setting, capacity 
opportunities and challenges, knowledge use, and collaboration strategies. There 
was a notable distinction between the language used by organizations in two 
groups, which aligned closely with the participation in the PIF and PIDF Summits.  
In order to further analyze this division, I then organized the interview 
responses based on participation in the PIF and PIDF Summits. For interviewees 
that were part of organizations that attended both summits, their interviews were 
associated with the summit for which their organization’s participation was 
weighted more heavily. For instance, a CROP agency that participated in both 
summits would be associated with the PIF summit due to their heightened role in 
that network. No state leader was interviewed for this study; however, statements 
made by state leaders at the PIDF Summit were included in the PIDF network, as 
their statements were associated with that event. As the interviews were 
conducted under the assurance of anonymity, all individual and organizational 
identifiers have been removed. Those statements made at the PIDF Summit, as 
they were made in a public forum, may be attributed to their speaker.  
The findings from the thematic analysis were then compared to the 
wording seen in the Summit Declarations—the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders 
Declaration on Climate Change Action and the Suva Declaration on Climate 
Change—and found to have distinct similarities. While the thematic analysis 
highlighted the differences between the two groups and their respective 
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declarations in regards to perceptions of power, authority, and knowledge, their 
differences remained rather vague. Narrative analysis, particularly through 
characterization—or the act of determining the hero, victim, and villain—brought 
clarity to these differences. Successful characterization, according to Lejano, 
Ingram, and Ingram (2013) involves simultaneous individuation and 
categorization, where the character is both uniquely believable and archetypically 
recognizable. Thus, while the characterization presented in this chapter is 
organized categorically, the actual language used by participants included 
individual nuance that is not fully captured in this type of analysis. In other words, 
each participant brought their own unique perspectives to the overall story told by 
the narrative-networks. It should be noted here that, although I borrow heavily 
from Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram’s (2013) work, this analysis does not deal with 
the depth of their nuance with narrative-networks. Future work would benefit from 
a more complete use of their framework.  
Network Visualization 
For the qualitative visualization of the network in the Pacific Islands, I used 
a simple affiliation network of attendance at the PIF Summit and the PIDF 
Summit in the months leading up to the COP21 negotiations in Paris in 
December 2015. I accomplished this using what is known as a bipartite network, 
where the organizations are connected to the event that they attended and not to 
each other (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This can make it clear which 
organizations participated in only one summit or both summits. The level of 
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participation in the summit was also weighted to demonstrate the level of impact 
an organization could be expected to have on the summit. This is described 
below.  
Participation was weighted using a classification system generated by PIF 
and PIDF. For PIF, the independent and self-governing states of the Pacific 
Islands, along with Australia and New Zealand, held central positions in the 
Summit, along with the CROP agencies, of which PIF is the political head. Thus, 
these states’ and agencies’ tie to the PIF Summit received a weighting of 3 for 
their central role in decision- making. The territory and collectivities in 
attendance—French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Tokelau—are described as 
“associate members” due to their secondary involvement, and thus their tie to the 
PIF Summit is given a 2 weighting. A number of intergovernmental organizations 
and Timor-Leste are listed as “observers” for their background involvement in the 
Summit, and thus their tie to the PIF Summit receives a 1 weighting. This is 
reflected in the weight, or thickness, of the lines associated with these actors’ 
connection to the PIF Summit node.  
For the PIDF Summit, all Pacific Island states that were in attendance and 
involved in discussions around the Suva Declaration on Climate change received 
a 3 weighting for their tie to the PIDF Summit. Organizations that have signed 
memoranda of understanding of cooperation with PIDF—the Secretariat for the 
Pacific Community, the Melanesian Spearhead Group Secretariat, the University 
of the South Pacific, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, and the 
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World Wide Fund for Nature—received a 2 weighting for their tie to the PIDF 
Summit due to their heightened engagement in decision-making in the summit. 
Other nonprofits and non-Pacific Island states in attendance were given a 1 
weighting for their tie to the PIDF Summit. Attendance and level of participation 
of state and nonstate actors in each of these summits is represented below (Fig. 
2).   
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Figure 2: Network of attendance at the PIF Summit and PIDF Summit.  
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Organization Key:  
 
n Pacific Island States  n Intergovernmental Organizations 
n CROP Agencies   n International Organizations 
n Local NGOs    n Non-Pacific Island States  
n Pacific Island Territories and Collectivities 
 
Looking at the attendance and participation in the PIF Summit, decision-
making was limited to governments and to CROP agencies, with some other 
international organizations in attendance. Also of note is the strength of 
participation of Australia and New Zealand—who are considered core 
members—as well as the lower levels of participation among French Polynesia, 
New Caledonia, and Tokelau—who are only associate members due to their 
status as territories and collectivities. The PIDF Summit, in contrast, included 
representatives from 14 domestic NGOs and 7 international NGOs alongside 
numerous governmental and intergovernmental organization representatives. 
Private citizens and university personnel from the Pacific Islands also played key 
roles in deliberations. While these organizations did not have a vote on the final 
declaration, their participation was largely considered in transforming the PIDF 
Summit’s final declaration. Australia and New Zealand were in attendance, but 
not given membership in PIDF, whereas French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and 
Tokelau were given full membership. 
The next sections will explore this cross-section of the narrative-networks 
in the Pacific Islands in more detail, paying particular attention to the 
characterization used by the two networks. While, again, this network is a 
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simplified representation of much larger networks of organizations surrounding 
transnational environmental diplomacy in the Pacific Islands, participation in the 
PIF and PIDF Summits is a useful differentiation for exploring the divergence of 
narrative-networks in the Pacific Islands surrounding climate change strategies. 
Pacific Island Forum Summit Narrative 
Based on interviews and analysis of archival data, those in leadership 
positions at the PIF Summit follow what I refer to as a global technical narrative. 
These regional environmental organizations discuss the limited funding, project-
based management, and high levels of bureaucracy in transnational governance. 
In this narrative, the Pacific Island states are the victim of environmental or social 
disaster, and are primarily powerless without the aid of colonial powers. Lack of 
capacity, resources, and scientific information play the villain, causing efforts to 
achieve sustainability—environmental, social, and economic—to fail. Regional 
environmental organizations are thus poised to write themselves in as the hero, 
where better science, more resources, and standardized procedural mechanisms 
are necessary to overcome capacity deficits. This creates a policy moral, or 
policy-driven solution, that pushes for greater regional functionality in the form of 
increased resources, greater access to information, and greater decision-making 
capability in the hands of the regional environmental organizations. 
Through this narrative, the regional organizations privilege global kinds of 
knowledge (Hulme, 2010) and authoritative science (Bocking, 2004). Multiple 
individuals working in the major regional organizations with whom I spoke 
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emphasized their role in controlling knowledge within the network. They 
discussed their efforts to “manag[e] the flow of information,” “interpret proposals,” 
act as “gatekeepers” and a “clearinghouse for information,” in order to ensure 
“quality control of information.” One of the participants in the PIF Summit stated 
during an interview: 
It's that informal authority with the countries, because we have no 
authority at all. They have authority over us, but we have a lot of informal 
authority over them. And respect because we hold so much expertise. And 
we’re a pathway to other sources of help, funding, and success. 
The control over authoritative science and resources is seen as giving regional 
organizations their authority to hold some power over states. These regional 
organizations, particularly those involved in climate governance (SPC, SPREP, 
USP, and PIFs) can thus be described as boundary organizations (Cash et al., 
2006), or organizations that mediate and facilitate the coproduction of 
knowledge. As one interviewee stated:  
I think one of the challenges, though, with opening up all of these alliances 
and stakeholder consultation groups is that you still need to have some 
quality control of information. So, if you open up these things, and you 
open up the door, and you just accept information, there is a risk that that 
information is wrong. And that’s where I think really the role of the CROP 
agencies as the regional technical experts have a role in scrutinizing 
information, too. To say, “well, this advice came from stakeholders, and 
 77 
it’s great to get different views, but actually these are maybe some points 
of clarification.” Because that open door can bring in some interesting 
ideas. #laughs# … It’s just a risk, but I think it’s a manageable risk within 
our regional architecture. And that’s really what the role of the CROP 
agencies are selected to be. These are the technical advisory bodies for 
the region. 
They act as scientific authorities, judging the legitimacy of funding proposals and 
managing the quality and flow of information. Their role as boundary 
organizations is also tied to the role of colonial states as external funders. Due to 
their perceived low levels of capacity, they rely on colonial states for resources 
and in turn provide a space for them in decision-making. 
While these boundary organizations can serve important efficiency 
functions within regional environmental diplomacy and governance, these can 
also serve to stifle, delegitimize, and displace certain forms of knowledge (Lejano 
& Ingram, 2009), including the local practical knowledge of populations who 
actively use environmental goods in the Pacific Islands. These regional boundary 
organizations make these decisions about inclusion and exclusion through non-
transparent processes, such as the selection of particular sciences for 
management strategies, the recommendations made to decision makers, and the 
streamlining of funders to approved scientific endeavors. One interviewee 
described the limitations of local knowledge as, “people know all the high-level 
jargon, but understanding the basic underlying issues is a challenge . . . there are 
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serious knowledge gaps.” In order to mitigate for these perceived limitations, 
interviewees from regional organizations discussed how they would ‘steer’ 
funders toward proposals that use “replicable data.” These decisions are typically 
not open to democratic accountability measures, and the decisions may not be 
representative of the needs and desires of local populations. This is not to say 
that other forms of knowledge, such as indigenous or practical understandings of 
the natural world, are left unconsidered, nor that these proposals with replicable 
data are necessarily in conflict with these ways of knowing. However, the 
participants from regional organizations in the Pacific Islands emphasized the 
challenges in capturing, recording, and scaling these knowledge sources, and, at 
times, used these justifications to exclude alternative conceptions of the world 
from many of their final decisions. 
At the 2015 PIF Leaders’ Meeting, the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders 
Declaration on Climate Change Action was created through deliberations among 
Pacific Island leaders, regional organization leaders, and leaders of colonial 
powers. Table 3 shows a selection of the demands made in the PIF declaration. 
Those phrases that highlight the global technical narrative are in bold.  
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Table 3: Narrative analysis of the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Declaration on 











































The PIF Summit declaration focused heavily on the global technical 
narrative reflected in interview statements and archives. The vulnerability of the 
Pacific Islands was emphasized, establishing their victimhood to the villain of low 
governance capacity and environmental instability. While the PIF narrative-
network would acknowledge that prominent greenhouse gas emitters case the 
environmental instability, systemic issues are downplayed in this declaration. The 
regional organizations underscored their role as the hero in this narrative by 
providing authoritative science to inform decision-making. The policy moral, then, 
demands that regional organizations increase their functionality to accelerate and 
intensify effective adaptation and mitigation actions through technology, science, 
and finance. Through this, the global technical narrative that privileges the global 
over the local is reflected in the PIF Declaration on Climate Action. 
While not as heavily emphasized, it is important to note that impacts on 
marginalized populations were also considered. The PIF Summit declaration 
discussed the “recognition of the disproportionate impact of climate change on 
women, youth, the elderly, disabled, indigenous peoples and other vulnerable 
and marginalised groups” and the “acknowledgment of the crucial role women 
will play in a global solution to climate change.” However, the PIF Declaration on 
Climate Action focused primarily on increased capacity for scientific knowledge 
and governance, along with heightened functionality of regional organizations. 
This is in contrast to the PIDF Summit narrative. 
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Pacific Islands Development Forum Summit Narrative 
Those organizations that are highly involved in the PIDF network employ 
what I refer to as a local power narrative, or a storyline that puts local 
communities at the forefront of decision-making on climate activities. In this 
narrative, Pacific Island states are the victims of environmental and social 
disaster—similar to other regional organizations’ narrative—and yet they have 
the power to adapt both their environmental and social strategies to achieve 
change. They see colonial powers, through funding and positions of power in 
other regional environmental organizations’ decision-making structures, as being 
just as much the villain as their environmental vulnerability, due to colonial 
powers’ ability to take the decision-making authority out of the hands of Pacific 
Island peoples. Instead, the local power narrative advocates for the Pacific Island 
peoples’ engagement in their own decision-making to act as the hero. This left 
the participants of the PIDF Summit with a policy moral of local inclusion in 
decision-making and governance. This establishes a process for the Pacific 
Island peoples to regain power in determining their own environmental futures. 
This is not to say that the PIDF Summit narrative dismisses the role of global 
decision-making around climate change, such as would be present at COP21. 
Rather, it calls for more voices to take part in the on-the-ground decision-making 
that would empower local communities to take part in their own climate futures. 
Through this narrative, interviewees and PIDF participants were interested 
in highlighting their own power. They emphasized the importance of shifting 
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perceptions of their status from “Small Island States” to “Large Ocean States,” 
discussing the “hammer” of regulation that they could bring down on illegal 
fishing and poor use of their ocean’s Exclusive Economic Zones. They desired to 
be “subjects, not objects” of climate change discussions, and resisted being 
“regulated to the sidelines,” as they felt they had been in previous decision-
making experiences. As the Republic of the Marshall Islands Foreign Minister 
Tony de Brum stated:  
This year has been an apocalyptic year for the Pacific, and climate change 
is the culprit. From Nangka to Dolphin to Maysak, our region is starting to 
feel like a war zone. People have died, homes have been destroyed, and 
economies left in ruins. But while our boat has been rocked, our resolve to 
weather the storm and turn the tide has grown stronger. As I have said 
before, while some like to dismiss us as small island nations, we are in 
fact large ocean nations. … The world must know that the Pacific Islands 
are leaders, and not simply bystanders to the unsustainable path the world 
is currently headed on. Too often we let our big brothers in the Pacific 
family dictate our policies to us, rather than seeking to engage them in a 
discussion about what really matters to our shared region. Sometimes we 
need to be frank and fearless in telling them that enough is enough: you 
are talking about our survival here in a way you would not tolerate others 
doing to you. If Australia and New Zealand genuinely want to be 
considered Pacific powers then this means not only projecting their 
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presence, but protecting ours. This must not be a debate over semantics–
it is a debate for regional security and for our survival. 
This type of powerful language was used throughout the PIDF Summit, and in 
discussions with those who were highly involved in the PIDF Summit network. 
PIDF’s Suva Declaration on Climate Change, in contrast to the PIF 
declaration, was created through an open, participatory process. During the PIDF 
Summit prior to COP21, political contestation took place among states, nonstate 
actors, and private individuals to position the Pacific Islands on a variety of 
climate change issues. Not only was the strength of language debated—legally 
binding mandates and deep-decarbonization tactics—but also the level of 
representation the declaration exhibited was discussed. Civil society 
organizations representing youth, women, and more were given space to 
express their voices directly to Pacific Island leaders, and were able to advise on 
how the Pacific Islands should be positioned in upcoming COP21 negotiations. 
There was not total agreement about what should hold primary importance, 
allowing stances to be negotiated and discussed (otherwise known as plurivocity 
in the network; Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013). The goal of the PIDF Summit 
was described as “providing the space to provide our voices to provide a 
collaborative solution." Table 4 shows a selection of the demands made in the 
PIDF declaration. In bold are the phrases that demonstrate the commitment to 
the local power narrative of the PIDF narrative-network. 
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The PIDF’s Suva Declaration on Climate Change reflects the local power 
narrative, or the desire to put decision-making about local climate actions into the 
hands of local communities. While this narrative agrees that the Pacific Islands is 
the victim of environmental disaster, they are not painted as a powerless, 
vulnerable victim. In this narrative, the Pacific Islands are set in place to begin ‘a 
new global dialog’ that focuses on deep-decarbonization of the global economy 
and positions the Pacific Islands to be a leader in environmental innovation. This 
highlights the power of Pacific Island nations to make a change in their own 
climate futures. While this narrative also features the need for technological 
innovation and scientific knowledge, the focus is on these innovations coming 
from the Pacific, itself. Additionally, local voices are discussed as vital to climate 
governance, with a focus on equality of partnership of nonstate actors through 
making climate governance legible to local communities. This is made possible 
through making knowledge accessible via both formal and non-formal education, 
language translation, and others. In other words, the goal is not a central, 
authoritative science standing alone, but rather a distributed, contextual 
knowledge that can be bolstered through inclusion of local communities. 
Returning again to Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram (2013) analysis of 
narrative-networks, the narrative in the PIDF Suva Declaration on Climate 
Change is attempting to bridge, integrate, translate, and generate knowledge to 
fill in the gaps of the dominant global technical knowledge narrative with 
discussions of local power. PIDF participants consistently discussed the break 
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from colonial powers seeking to control their climate change agenda (otherwise 
known as alterity in the network, where actors present an alternative to the 
dominant narrative; Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013). Fijian Prime Minister 
Bainimarama9 stated at the beginning of the PIDF Summit, “It is time for Australia 
to stop trying to undermine PIDF by urging regional leaders not to attend…Step 
back from the table and allow us to make our own decisions.” Others rejected the 
“interference from outsiders” and “undue influences” of colonial powers, and 
decried the “ambition gap” exhibited by climate emitters such as the US, 
Australia, and New Zealand in not doing enough to save them from the effects of 
climate change. PIDF is thus poised to increase the level of inclusion of voices in 
climate governance in the Pacific Islands, as well as to incorporate a range of 
knowledge that includes local, contextual knowledge. This is not to deny the 
need for broader knowledge about climate issues, as scientific evidence and 
formal education is also valued, but rather to make space for gaps in the 
conventional narrative to be filled by local voices. 
Narrative Comparisons of PIF and PIDF Summit Declarations 
The contrast between the effects of the global technical narrative and the 
local power narrative is evident in both the participation of actors in decision-
making in these summits, as well as the final statements of these documents. 
While the PIF Summit did not focus on the inclusion of nonstate actors in climate 
																																																						
9	As discussed in Chapter 1, Prime Minister Bainimarama was installed following 
a 2006 military coup.	
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governance, the PIDF Summit emphasized the equal partnership and high levels 
of involvement that marginalized groups should have in the climate governance 
process. Additionally, the PIDF declaration speaks of “violations of human rights” 
and “inequality and discrimination,” terms that hold a much stronger connotation 
than the claim of the “disproportionate impact” on the Pacific Islands seen in 
PIF’s declaration. By discussing human rights, inequality, and discrimination, 
those engaged with the PIDF declaration were able to connect the 
disproportionate impacts of climate change to larger, systemic challenges faced 
by marginalized populations. While interviews with PIF also brought up the 
villainization of the states that are sizeable greenhouse gas emitters, this was 
less evident in their final declaration, potentially due to the role of Australia and 
New Zealand in their negotiations. Finally, the discussion of “non-formal 
education” and the use of “national languages” in the PIDF declaration shows 
that civil society was active in working to ensure that these decision-making 
processes were open to all—a sentiment not carried by PIF’s call for “capacity 
building, technology transfer, knowledge and information sharing, and improved 
access to climate change finance,” that is indicative of the strength of the global 
technical narrative. 
While these are relatively subtle differences, they have powerful 
implications for future environmental governance. PIF’s declaration leaves the 
power for decision-making primarily in the hands of governmental and scientific 
elites within the region. Alternatively, by engaging civil society as equal partners 
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in the battle against systemic challenges through the use of accessible 
information, the local power narrative of the PIDF declaration brings the authority 
for decision-making into the hands of Pacific Island peoples. The local power 
narrative is thus more capable of meeting the democratic needs for 
representation and accountability, while the global technocratic narrative 
employed by PIF and other regional environmental organizations is less capable 
of meeting these needs. 
Interestingly, Pacific Island states utilize the narrative of both of these 
networks in the process of navigating transnational decision-making space. 
States employ their status as network bridges to strategically employ these 
narratives to meet their own ends. Again, while discussions of unity and family 
among Pacific Island nations was evident in the COP21 negotiations, this 
emphasis on unity can hide deep disagreements about climate change 
negotiation stances, the use of scientific or traditional knowledges and 
methodologies, and the role of particular voices, including civil society and 
colonial powers like Australia and New Zealand. The emergence of the PIDF 
Summit network demonstrates attempts by state and nonstate actors to provide a 
space by which to contest the dominant global technocratic narrative of PIF, 
colonial powers, and other regional intergovernmental organizations with their 
own local power narrative. However, the details of states’ navigation of multiple 
narrative-networks in this case leaves more to be explored at a future date. 
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Implications for Climate Governance 
The narratives of the networks surrounding the PIF and PIDF Summits 
draw attention to the global and local dimensions of knowledge production and 
decision-making surrounding climate change. Struggles in the Pacific Islands 
within climate change diplomacy reflect larger questions about the role of states 
in shaping their own futures, especially as many of these states are reliant on 
traditional donor partners (external states) for project funding. Additionally, 
contestation between narrative-networks in the Pacific Islands is evident in the 
struggles over the authority to “know” the Pacific. The procedural closure of 
environmental decision-making through adherence to objectivity and 
generalizability can leave much of the political process to the side. The global 
technical narrative presents scientific research as benignly objective and correct, 
thus ignoring the situatedness and power inherent in knowledge production 
(Haraway, 1988; Lejano & Ingram, 2009; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). One NGO 
worker that I spoke with discussed the lack of space for dialog surrounding 
environmental issues, arguing that any space that did emerge was usually 
policed by regional organizations. She encouraged me to remember that 
“engagement is not neutral . . . it's about power." This description is an overt 
reminder of the ways in which power can shape the spaces in which decisions 
are being made, particularly in international governance (Stone, 2008). Authority 
to speak in those spaces is directly related to who has power to share their voice. 
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This procedural exclusion through the global technocratic narrative mirrors 
Barnett and Finnemore’s (1999) discussion of the ways in which 
bureaucratization within international organizations maintains hidden power 
through classification, fixing of meanings, and diffusion of norms. The global 
technical narrative classifies authoritative science as a normative good, 
privileging ‘objective’ scientific knowledge over localized and practical knowledge 
sources that the Pacific Island peoples have identified as valued. In other words, 
the decisions about what is best for climate change action in the region are made 
outside of any public input and hidden within the bureaucratic structure, 
excluding much of the knowledges of Pacific Island peoples. 
Alternatively, the local power narrative emerging through the network 
surrounding the PIDF Summit is evidence of resistance to the dominant global 
technical narrative. The PIDF Summit narrative-network pushed against the 
prevalence of colonial powers in decision-making in the PIF Summit (alterity), as 
well as the use of scientific information to dismiss the multiple ways of knowing 
including indigenous knowledge and contextualized, practical knowledge 
(encouraging plurivocity, instead), by setting up local Pacific Islanders as the 
hero. The local power narrative demonstrates efforts being made to contextualize 
knowledge in a place, as well as to put power in the hands of Pacific Islanders to 
transform their climate futures. By writing Pacific Islanders into the position of 
hero within the narrative, decision-making and governance is opened up to 
include multiple voices and knowledges. 
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Pacific Islands’ Role in the Paris Agreement 
 While the Paris Agreement is a product of long-term negotiations between 
UN states, Pacific Island nations played a significant role in formulating the final 
agreement through the High Ambition Coalition (Burleson, 2016). This is due to 
the pressure that Pacific Island representatives put on global emitters related to 
the loss of their atoll islands under high emission scenarios. However, it was not 
just the scientific conversation of the global technical narrative that brought about 
this change in targets, although that played a role in demonstrating the need for 
lower warming targets to save the atoll islands. Instead, the local power narrative 
was evident throughout negotiations as Pacific Island leaders emphasized their 
authoritative role in climate change governance. As Honorable Henry Puna, 
Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, stated during COP21: 
Now that is leadership. Although we are victims to the effects of climate 
change, we are showing the rest of the polluting world that we are doing 
something to improve our situation not just for us but for the planet. We 
are not just environment victims, we are environment leaders. 
Through this quote, and others like it, the leaders of the Pacific Islands 
demonstrated their commitment to the tenants of the local power narrative. This 
mirrored a transformation in COP narratives from challenges to opportunities, or 
‘shame and blame’ to ‘name and acclaim’ (Ivanova, 2016). Pacific Islanders, 
while still demonstrating their understanding of victimhood in the climate 
narrative, also demonstrate that they understand their power through their moral 
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leadership, and the ability to receive acclamation for their leadership. However, 
while the local power narrative held on to its authority in the COP21 negotiations, 
things shifted for COP23.  
COP23 and the Fijian Presidency 
 In 2017 at COP23 in Bonn, Germany, Fiji became the first Small Island 
Developing State to hold the position of the presidency. COP23 was separated 
into two zones: the Bula Zone run by the Fijian delegates for government 
deliberation, and the Bonn Zone open to all sectors. This was a technical COP 
focused on the implementation of the COP21 agreement. In other words, instead 
of openly political negotiations, COP23 was characterized by negotiations on 
how carbon emissions should be measured, how they should be reported, and 
what accountability measures were in place, as well as bold moves by the private 
sector (particularly in the absence of the US’s full participation).  
While Fiji stood as an ardent advocate for the local power narrative during 
COP21 negotiations, this was less evident during their COP23 presidency. In the 
opening speech of COP23, Fijian Prime Minister Bainimarama stood beside the 
Pacific Island’s collective commitment to 1.5°C warming and to “meet our 
commitments in full, not back away from them.” However, while the lead-up to 
COP21 included such strong statements as “Those industrialised nations which 
are putting the welfare of their carbon polluting industries and their workers 
before our welfare and survival as Pacific Islanders,” Prime Minister 
Bainimarama shifted to a more neutral tone during COP23 opening statements:  
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We hope to infuse these negotiations with the Pacific Talanoa Spirit of 
understanding and respect. Because the only way for every nation to put 
itself first is to lock arms with all other nations and move forward together. 
… We are all in the same canoe, which is why we have Drua–a Fijian 
ocean- going canoe–in the foyer. To remind us of our duty to fill its sail 
with a collective determination to achieve our mission. 
The opening statement exhibited a universalism that was careful not to villainize 
industrialized states—as Prime Minister Bainimarama did during the lead up to 
COP21—but rather to simply present greater cooperation as the hero. In this 
way, Fiji’s narrative surrounding COP23 experienced bureaucratization (Barnett 
& Finnemore, 1999) and depoliticization of climate change through it being a 
‘technical COP,’ ignoring the contextual elements of knowledge production 
(Shapin & Schaffer, 1985) and the local power narrative elements that were 
emphasized during COP21. This could also reflect Fiji’s stance as a diplomatic 
leader to represent their role in the UN rather than represent the Pacific Island 
states, specifically. While I present only a brief investigation into this change, this 
period of diplomacy for the Pacific would benefit greatly from further study.  
Challenges in Future Governance 
While progress is being made to open up regional climate change 
diplomacy in the Pacific Islands to more democratic processes, there is still much 
to be done. Many of the employees of regional environmental organizations that I 
interviewed discussed how they felt that they wanted more public involvement in 
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regional environmental decision-making, but that by doing so they risked 
problems of accidental exclusion or being in a situation in which they would not 
have the time or resources to implement programs. With the series of challenges 
that the Pacific Islands face, increased levels of inclusion and accountability can 
have serious tradeoffs in the efficiency of governance in the region. If time and 
effort is spent ensuring full public participation in decisions, many interviewees 
felt there would be limited time and resources left for achieving climate change 
adaptation and mitigation goals. However, while the global technical narrative, 
the use of boundary organizations, and the privileging of authoritative science 
may increase efficiency within the network, this efficiency comes at a cost that 
must be considered. Alternative understandings of the world and goals of 
environmental governance are dismissed through procedural mechanisms 
without the approval of the public. Without addressing the needs, knowledges, 
and capacities of local people, environmental governance efforts are likely to lose 
their effectiveness, credibility, and authority. The inclusion of nonstate actors, 
while producing challenges that must be addressed, can help to produce a more 
inclusive, representative, and accountable environmental governance.   
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Chapter 4: Discursive Strategies of Climate Governance 
Introduction 
Two years ago, we wrote: “The year 2014 was Earth’s warmest in 134 
years of records.” Last year we wrote: “2015 was the warmest year ever 
recorded on Earth, and it was not even close.” This year, we are running 
out of ways to say it. In 2016, surface temperatures on Earth were the 
warmest that they have been since modern recordkeeping began in 1880. 
(NASA Earth Observatory, 2017) 
 As the earth experiences its hottest year on record for the third year in a 
row, the environmental vulnerabilities experienced by the Pacific Islands continue 
to escalate. Rising seas wear away low-lying atolls, threaten fresh water 
supplies, erode coastlines and coral reefs, increase the prevalence and strength 
of storms, and jeopardize food security both through agriculture and fishing 
(Keener, Marra, Finucane, Spooner, & Smith, 2012). As the earth becomes 
hotter and hotter, the Pacific Islands are less able to adapt at the rate necessary 
to meet these growing environmental challenges. While Islanders have 
transformed their practices for thousands of years to deal with environmental 
shifts (Barnett & Campbell, 2010), they no longer have the luxury of time to deal 
with changing conditions. In order to meet the needs of rapidly shifting 
environmental conditions, the Pacific Islands have been a target of large-scale 
research projects, resource-intensive environmental interventions funded by 
external states and agencies, and a general global interest. This makes the 
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Pacific Islands a space of contention where local needs and global requirements 
are negotiated.  
Due to the multi-scalar nature of climate change, Pacific Islands climate 
governance does not occur in a bubble, but rather is impacted by global efforts. 
During COP21 in 2015, states from around the globe took serious steps forward 
in acknowledging and acting upon the changing climate through the Paris 
Agreement. As with any global decision, however, there were multiple ways of 
understanding the problem and the solution. Within the Pacific, specifically, 
competing narratives prior to COP21 played themselves out surrounding 
local/global power within the climate change space (Denton, 2017). Different 
constructions of power, authority, and knowledge were advocated by various 
actors in attempt to secure legitimacy and resources.  
This chapter looks to the post-COP21 governance space to see the way in 
which these local/global power relations are ensuing in regional efforts to adapt 
to and mitigate for climate change. First, I will explore the ideas of networks and 
discourse, and their relation to environmental governance efforts. Specifically 
using Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s (2006) three environmental discourses—green 
governmentality, ecological modernization, and civic environmentalism—I frame 
how discourses around environmental governance influence the direction of 
governance. Using social network analysis [SNA] of reports, project summaries, 
and research projects from the Pacific Climate Change Portal and interviews with 
climate change governance decision-makers and practitioners, I analyze the 
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specific nature of local/global discourse around climate change governance in 
the Pacific. Finally, I position these discourses in relations of power, authority, 
and knowledge within the Pacific Islands climate change governance efforts.  
Discourse and Networks 
Networks are a useful way to explore the interactions of power, authority, 
and knowledge. Network theories assume that interactions between actors—
individuals or organizations—are grounded in the exchange of material and non-
material resources (Wasserman & Faust, 1995). These resources could be 
finances, practical information, norms, standards, or understandings of the world. 
By exchanging resources in a relatively stable pattern, actors develop and 
maintain routine discourses. Discourse10 is understood here as “an ensemble of 
ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and 
physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an 
identifiable set of practices” (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, p. 175). In other words, 
discourse is not only what actors say, it is also about the activities and institutions 
produced and upheld through their interactions with each other and the world 
around them. These practices can include governance operations, knowledge 
																																																						
10 Following Howarth’s (2000) division of theoretical frames, this approach to 
discourse is in contrast to the positivist, realist, or Marxist discourse approaches, 
due to the centrality of human meaning and understanding in explaining the 
social world. Instead, it builds on critical discourse analysis by emphasizing the 
contingent nature of these social constructions. This puts it within the post-
structuralist frame, drawing in the broader field of practices that shape/are 
shaped by language. This is dealt with more in-depth in Chapter 2.  
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production, decision-making procedures, and others. The narratives that were 
explored in the previous chapter can form some of the building blocks for 
discourses; however, discourse includes a broader and deeper history of the way 
things come to be spoken of in a particular way.   
Networks can be seen as a space to perform and normalize power 
relations through regular discursive practices, or ways of speaking about, 
categorizing, normalizing, and standardizing the production of environmental and 
social systems. The power to shift environmental policy runs throughout the 
network, as actors seek to both frame the problem and structure the solution 
(Hajer, 1995; Litfin, 1994; Wesselink, Buchanan, Georgiadou, & Turnhout, 2013). 
This power to shape the problem and the solution comes through the production 
of knowledge (Foucault, 1980), including information about processes and 
procedures (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999), knowledge about the physical and 
social world (Miller, 2007), and the limits of what is considered acceptable 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). These things can help to facilitate cooperation and 
shared understanding among network members, and at times the global polity 
(Andonova, Betsill, and Bulkeley, 2009); however, the privileging of particular 
knowledges can create spaces where some voices can be promoted at the 
expense of others (Agrawal, 2005).  
Additionally, while many rational choice theorists work off the assumption 
that actors have a stable set of preferences that persist through time and can be 
fully understood by the researcher (e.g. Downs, 1957; Kahneman & Tversky, 
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1979; Marx & Engels, 1978; Olson, 1965), studying the discourse within networks 
can assume that actors’ preferences are formed through exchanges between 
network actors (Howarth, 2000; Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram, 2013). In other 
words, actors’ viewpoints change as they interact and negotiate with other actors 
in the network. While similar standards, norms, and narratives become 
commonplace within networked relations (Grewal, 2008; Lejano, Ingram, & 
Ingram, 2013), they are never final as they are always open for renegotiation 
(Butler, 1997; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). This takes the study of decision-making 
away from an objective, singular, totalizing—or all-encompassing—approach and 
toward an approach that allows for the dynamic nature of network exchanges. 
This is evident through the study of discourses of environmental governance.  
Discourses of Environmental Governance  
Governance here refers broadly to the designation of rules, standards, 
and norms according to which other actors make decisions (Bakker, 2010). In 
other words, governance is not limited to government, although the latter can 
play a crucial role in the former. Governance, instead, encompasses the breadth 
of institutions and ideologies that impact decision-making within a given society.11 
In this dissertation, I do not look to “network governance” as a structure, distinct 
																																																						
11 This understanding of governance addresses issues of power, unlike 
definitions where governance is seen as a process through which collective 
interests are defined and pursued (e.g. Pierre & Peters, 2000). Instead of 
defining governance as actors working toward pre-defined, collective goals, this 
more general definition of governance allows the formation of goals to be 
questioned, as well.  
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from governance in the form of hierarchies, markets, or communities (Pierre & 
Peters, 2000). Instead, I view networks as a representation of relations 
throughout society that have a variety of purposes, of which governance is but 
one. Through this I avoid looking only to spaces designated as “networked 
governance” for networks, and instead I see the way that power is constructed in 
and through networks more broadly (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2017; Grewal, 2008).  
Governance of the environment is fraught with challenges as actors vie for 
power within existing and transforming political, financial, environmental, social, 
and technical systems (Grabowski, Denton, Rozance, Matsler, & Kidd, 2017). 
The underlying foundation for these contestations is who has power in decision-
making and practice, by what authority they have that power, and what 
knowledges are considered legitimate to create and uphold that authority 
(Barnett & Campbell, 2010; Hulme, 2010; Jasanoff, 2004; Scott, 1998). These 
relations of power, authority, and knowledge both shape and are shaped by 
discourses that run in and through them (Agrawal, 2005; Hajer, 1995; Litfin, 
1994).  
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s Three Environmental Discourses 
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) have provided key insights into the ways 
in which environmental governance is spoken of and practiced, through three 
environmental discourses: green governmentality, ecological modernization, and 
civic environmentalism (Table 5). They present each of these discourses with a 
weak and strong version, described here. Green governmentality “epitomizes a 
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global form of power tied to the modern administrative state, mega-science and 
big business” (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, p. 53-4). Following the work of 
Michel Foucault, this discourse entails the use of knowledge and expertise to 
regulate all aspects of human and nonhuman life through biopolitical12 fostering 
or management. This discourse is typified through the use of “eco-knowledges” 
(Luke, 1999, p. 104) that extend government control to the entire planet. As 
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand discuss, the weak version of this discourse is elitist 
and totalizing, while the strong version allows for humility and self-reflexivity in 
which scientific knowledge is made legible to the public.  
The IPCC, for example, is a manifestation of the effects of the green 
governmentality discourse in that it surveils, accumulates global scientific 
knowledge, and sets standards for the climate (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006). 
While for a long time it has set itself up as the ultimate authority on climate 
change, it has recently begun to become more self-reflexive in response to public 
criticism (Beck et al., 2014). Thus, IPCC’s expression of the green 
governmentality discourse has shifted from a weaker to a stronger version by 
focusing on public trust in the form of representation, accountability, and political 
relevance, though more work is still necessary (ibid.).   
Ecological modernization is focused on the “compatibility of economic 
growth and environmental protection, a liberal market order and sustainable 
																																																						
12 Biopolitics, according to Foucault (2003, 2009, 2010), is the state’s use of 
scientific knowledge to classify, standardize, and normalize populations. 
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development” (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, p. 52). While the green 
governmentality discourse focuses on scientific knowledge and governmental 
control of the globe, ecological modernization is concerned with economic 
approaches and interventions at a multitude of levels. The ecological 
modernization approach works to neutralize the contradictions and crises of 
capitalist development by emphasizing the availability of flexible, cost-effective, 
decentralized, and market-driven solutions to climate challenges that focus on 
‘win-win’ scenarios (Hajer, 1995). According to Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, the 
weak form of ecological modernization is technocratic and neoliberal, while the 
strong or “reflexive” form allows for a bit more critique of dominant policy 
paradigms and encourages greater levels of “ecological democracy” (Barry, 
1999, p. 113; Dryzek, 2000). 
Forestry programs where developing countries are allowed to continue 
emitting by paying developed countries for carbon sinks are some preferred 
climate mitigation policy tools of the ecological modernization discourse 
(Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006). Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation [REDD] is a global example, where multi-scalar efforts allow 
developed countries to ‘win’ by mitigating their carbon emissions and developing 
countries to ‘win’ through poverty alleviation (Pagiola, Arcenas, & Platais 2005). 
The weak ecological modernization discourse of the REDD program was 
challenged, however, due to technocratic decision-making that denied 
developing countries’ access to the forestry products on which they were reliant, 
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particularly in areas of tenuous land tenure practices (Ghazoul, Butler, Mateo-
Vega, & Koh, 2010; Ziegler et al., 2012). Adaptations have been made to 
strengthen the program, including issues of good governance, equity, and the 
roles of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities, shifting the 
program to be called REDD+. REDD+ is an example of strong ecological 
modernization discourse at work, where market solutions are highlighted but 
democratic input is also valued.  
Finally, civic environmentalism posits that “in order to build more effective 
environmental multilateralism, groups who are affected by environmental 
problems, or have a legitimate interest or stake, should have a voice in finding 
solutions” (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, p. 55). Civic environmentalism is 
primarily concerned with contesting the predominance of government- and 
market-driven problem/solution constructions. Still, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 
determine that this discourse at times aligns with the strong forms of green 
governmentality and ecological modernization through its “reform-oriented” 
iteration that emphasizes the participation of civil society organizations and the 
democratization of decision-making. It also has a radical iteration that draws on 
the anarchist work of Antonio Gramsci to advocate for a restructuring of global 
environmental governance to a more just and eco-centric world order.  
Civic environmentalism is exemplified by indigenous movements across 
the globe. The shift to a more inclusive REDD+ discussed above was based on 
the pressure put on by organized indigenous groups using the weak civic 
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environmentalism discourse to increase participation in the existing REDD 
institution. Strong civic environmentalism, however, seeks to upend existing 
power structures—such as sovereignty, capitalism, and patriarchy—through a 
radical ecology perspective reflected in the “Indigenous Peoples’ Seattle 
Declaration,” presented at the 1999 Seattle WTO protests.  
As Bäckstrand and Lövbrand describe their work, “Discourses as 
‘knowledge regimes’ brings us squarely to the role of science. In expert-driven 
global environmental change research, scientific knowledge, techniques, 
practices, and institutions enable the production and maintenance of discourses” 
(2006, p. 52). Therefore, each of these discourses is embedded in relations of 
power, authority, and knowledge. Green governmentality privileges large-scale 
monitoring, tracking, and scientific knowledge production. Ecological 
modernization utilizes evidence-based cost-benefit analyses, certifications, and 
standards. Civic environmentalism is primarily associated with context and the 
democratization of knowledge to include local understandings.  
Local/Global Elements of Environmental Discourse 
The structure of environmental discourse used by Bäckstrand and 
Lövbrand engages with the local/global contestations in climate change 
governance seen in the negotiations leading up to COP21 (Denton, 2017; Table 
5). Green governmentality presents a global view, where elite scientific 
constructions of the social and environmental context are privileged. As Hulme 
argues, “Knowledge about multi-scalar processes and globally-aggregated 
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outcomes that is insensitive to the peculiarities of place and context opens the 
way for unitary globalized explanations and predictions of environmental change. 
Masquerading as universal truths, these assert themselves as the unassailable 
view from everywhere” (2010, p. 559, italics added). Thus, the “view from 
everywhere” rhetoric of the green governmentality discourse mirrors the global 
technical narrative of climate change diplomacy in the Pacific (Denton, 2017). 
Civic environmentalism, on the other end of the spectrum, prioritizes place and 
context through local prioritization. Under this discourse, knowledge is tied to the 
space in which it was created (Haraway, 1988), and mirrors the local power 
narrative of climate change diplomacy in the Pacific (Denton, 2017). Ecological 
modernization discourse, alternatively, exists at multiple levels and thus contains 
both local and global elements. Under weak ecological modernization discourse, 
technocratic solutions require more of a global gaze, while the strong version 
requires broader participation.  
Table 5: Chart of environmental discourses in relation to local/global strategies. 
Adapted from Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006). 
 
Global Gaze  Local Prioritization 
Green Governmentality Ecological Modernization Civic Environmentalism 
Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong 
Elite Self-reflexive Technocratic Democratic Reforming Radical 
 
While the discourses presented by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand differ 
substantially in practice, their practices are also interrelated. The private sector 
requires long-term regulatory frameworks to secure their investments, so as the 
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private sector uses weak ecological modernization discourse it often requires the 
support of a weak green governmentality discourse from the public sector 
(Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006). Additionally, while strong civic environmentalism 
many times is presented as an alternative to green governmentality and 
ecological modernization, weak civic environmentalism aligns with strong 
ecological modernization in its emphasis on the involvement of civil society 
organizations.  
Implications of the Discourses for Climate Change Governance 
Each of these discourses—green governmentality, ecological 
modernization, and civic environmentalism—can bring about particular 
consequences within climate change governance practices. Green 
governmentality, while providing key insight into the global transformations of 
climate change and necessary actions from sovereign states, can also produce 
challenging power relations within climate change governance. As Agrawal 
(2005) has discussed in his investigation of the environmentality13 of 
conservation practices in Indian forests, “Once precise, statistical, generalizing 
arguments are invoked in the service of polity, it is difficult to counter them with 
vague, descriptive, anecdotal evidence. It is in this characteristic of statistical 
representations … that their colonizing effects are to be found” (Agrawal, 2005, 
																																																						
13 Agrawal uses environmentality as a play on “environment” and 
“governmentality,” and provides a similar discursive frame as green 
governmentality here.  
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p. 35). The use of models, statistics, and forecasts can have the effect of 
foregoing political conversation around what can and should be valued, while 
producing a one-size-fits-all solution. The strong version of green 
governmentality can help to broaden participation into these decisions, but many 
times brings in the public after primary decisions about knowledge and 
governance have already been made.  
Ecological modernization can also have the effect of depoliticizing 
decision-making through focusing on streamlining, mainstreaming, and 
efficiency. While these efforts can produce cost-savings and imply a ‘win-win’ 
approach to decision-making in a space focused on sustainable development, it 
can also create a “problem closure” or defining solutions for a set of well-
developed problems through apolitical measures (Hajer, 1995, p. 22). In other 
words, by portraying a ‘win-win’ approach, it makes it more challenging for those 
who do not see themselves as winning or who question the values being 
highlighted in the ‘win’ to put forward an alternative view that will be considered. 
The strong version of ecological modernization can allow for input from the 
broader civil society space, but still presents the time for participation as after the 
agenda has been set.  
Civic environmentalism, in its weak form, can shift the levels of 
participation from input to agenda-setting. While this can assist the development 
of quality and effective outcomes in line with local needs, it is a costlier way of 
working in terms of time and other resources. It can reduce the efficiency and 
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expediency of needed climate action. Strong civic environmentalism presents 
challenges to the existing system that can bring about broad social change. 
While achieving justice and equity targets that would be otherwise inconceivable, 
this form of civic environmentalism contests all other discourses, making it 
challenging to achieve change within the needed timeframe, the existing system, 
and in concert with appropriate partners.  
It is also important to note that even in the strong versions of green 
governmentality and ecological modernization and in all forms of civic 
environmentalism, there are still power relations that create uneven spaces. As 
Schattschneider stated, “All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of 
the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because 
organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics 
while others are organized out” (1960, p. 71). A careful exploration of the 
mobilization of bias is necessary to better understand whose voice is being heard 
in a governance arrangement that fosters any of these discourses. In other 
words, while it may be tempting to venerate the inclusivity of civic 
environmentalism, or strong green governmentality and ecological modernization 
for that matter, a critical approach is key to demonstrating where issues are 
“organized out.” This will be taken up more thoroughly in the next chapter.  
These discourses can be seen in all manner of global environmental 
governance efforts. Green governmentality is prevalent in efforts to measure, 
normalize, and control levels of species biodiversity (Denton, forthcoming). 
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Ecological modernization is utilized in arguments that present environmental 
pollution as merely a product of economic inefficiencies (Hajer, 1997). Civic 
environmentalism is prevalent as an element of environmental justice campaigns 
across the world. While these discourses take on a variety of forms and subject 
matters, they are particularly apparent in the Pacific Islands’ climate change 
efforts. The next section describes my mode of investigation to look into these 
discourses in the Pacific Islands—a combination of social network analysis and 
qualitative methods.  
Social Network Analysis Methods 
 In Pacific Islands climate change governance, states, NGOs, IGOs, IOs, 
private enterprises, and knowledge producing institutions at the local, national, 
regional, and global level are all working to meet environmental challenges. 
These organizations form connections through interactions with varying degrees 
of formality—e.g. designated networks of actors devoted to a particular cause, 
partnerships for projects and research efforts, and informal interactions among 
acquaintances. While SNA cannot capture all aspects of all relationships, it is a 
useful tool in understanding the form and structure of interactions among a large 
number of actors, thus making it a useful tool for understanding this broad range 
of multi-scalar organizations.  
The Pacific Climate Change Portal [PCCP] was used as the source of 
data for this analysis. The PCCP is a central information location online that has 
gathered over 1,400 articles, reports, event participation lists, and more, relating 
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to climate change governance in the Pacific Islands. The PCCP was instigated 
and is maintained by the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental 
Programme [SPREP]. The PCCP is not a complete source of all climate change 
programming in the region. It is also colored by SPREP leadership as SPREP 
has a vested interest in ensuring that its projects and reports, and those of its 
collaborator organizations, make their way into the portal, while other 
organizations may not see that type of documentation as vitally important. 
However, PCCP is the best collection of data on climate change programming in 
the Pacific Islands to date. The data was evaluated to identify when any two 
organizations:14  
• worked together on a project, 
• shared financial or other resources for a project,  
• shared scientific or local knowledge for a project15,  
• produced a scientific or policy paper together, or  
• attended an event together.  
 
Websites, grey papers (technical reports, programmatic information, etc.), 
newspapers, blogs, environmental reports, and financial statements were used to 
determine when these resource exchanges occurred. This limited the analysis to 
formal exchanges, missing the important yet hidden informal exchanges that 
occur regularly in the network, which is why the SNA was supported by 
interviews.  
																																																						
14 Data was limited to the past 10 years [2006-2016] prior to analysis due to the 
availability of data for that period.  
15 As with the other measures listed here, this is limited to sharing that is 
evidenced in papers provided about projects. 
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For the SNA, I focused on exploring the relative power positions of various 
organizations in the network. This served three distinct functions. First, it allowed 
me to select organizations that held greater or lesser power positions within the 
network as interview participants to ensure that multiple perspectives were 
considered in the findings. Additionally, the power positions were visualized in a 
map that was used as an interview tool to support participants’ discussion of the 
power of other organizations in the network—either affirming or rejecting their 
status in the visualization (Appendix B). Finally, it allowed me to place the 
interview findings in context according to how embedded in the network 
participants’ organizations appeared through the SNA, and what they thought of 
other organizations in greater or lesser power positions. In other words, it let me 
put the interviews in context according to how they viewed organizations at 
similar and different power positions.  
For the SNA visualization, I looked at measures of how central 
organizations were to the network—in-degree, out-degree, and betweenness 
centrality—to determine the organizations that held more or less powerful 
positions. As Eilstrup-Sangiovanni explains, “network centralization does not 
concentrate formal authority in a single location, nor does it vest authority in a 
single actor that is empowered to define or enforce collective rules” (2017, p. 
692). Instead, centralization is an informal and fluid measure of power. In-degree 
centrality refers to the number of incoming links a node has, which in this case 
demonstrates that they received financing, co-led a project, or simply 
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participated. Out-degree centrality refers to the number of outgoing links a node 
has, which in this case demonstrates that they gave out funding or were a co-
leader in a project. Betweenness centrality, on the other hand, measures the 
number of times a node is located on the shortest path between two other nodes. 
This is a measure of how central the organization is to the network as a whole. 
In-degree and out-degree centrality captures the power to influence projects 
through financing, leadership, or participation, while betweenness centrality 
captures influence over flows of knowledge, information, and resources in the 
network as a whole. After applying an average of these measures, I divided 
organizations into the core, semi-periphery, and periphery of the network. In 
other words, I distinguished between those organizations with many connections 
in all types of centrality (core), those with a moderate number of connections 
(semi-periphery), and those with only a few connections to others (periphery).  
Interview Methods 
While the SNA can provide some insight into the structure of relationships 
between organizations working on climate change in the Pacific, it does little to 
provide feedback on why they have that power, if that power is considered 
legitimate by network participants, and what sources of knowledge they use to 
create and uphold that power. In other words, while SNA can give some insight 
as to where power might be located in the network, it is not definitive on that 
power nor does it demonstrate the authority or knowledge employed by 
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organizations in relative power positions. Thus, I conducted interviews in order to 
provide insight into these elements of climate change governance.  
Interviews for this portion of the dissertation took place in March and April 
of 2017, a little over a year after COP21 in December, 2015. Participants for 
these interviews came from Fiji, Samoa, the Cook Islands, Australia, and the 
Hawai’i Islands of the United States. Organizations were selected using a 
convenience sample from the categories of core, semi-periphery, and periphery 
(see description above) and distributed across various sectors—Pacific Island 
and external states, domestic and international NGOs, and IGOs. In this 
dissertation, I assumed that centrality and organizational type would impact 
perceptions of the authority and knowledge used by other members in the 
network (and that perceptions impact the creation and maintenance of ties), thus 
making it important to capture multiple types of organizations at various 
centralities. The individuals selected from these organizations generally had 
extensive knowledge of the organization’s transnational environmental efforts 
and collaboration with other organizations, but their exact title may vary from 
organization to organization, e.g. Climate Change Advisor, Climate Services 
Director, Project Coordinator, etc.  
The interviews covered topics related to power, authority, and knowledge 
within climate change governance in the Pacific. A copy of the interview guide is 
located in Appendix C. The interviews were semi-structured and centered around 
the visualization produced through SNA (see Appendix B), where I asked for 
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participants’ perspectives on what power, authority, and knowledge were brought 
by both central and peripheral organizations. I interviewed 30 individuals 
representing 21 organizations/government departments primarily in one-on-one 
settings, with 5 interviews taking place in groups of 2-3. The interviews ranged 
from 30 minutes to 3 hours (organizations and interview times are listed in 
Appendix D). Sixteen interviews were recorded and transcribed, and 5 were 
limited to notes only for a variety of reasons, including limitations of the meeting 
space and participant desires to not be recorded. The interviews were 
supplemented with reports, news articles, and studies to contextualize the 
interviews.  
The interviews were transcribed, and then coded using thematic analysis 
(Braun & Clark, 2012). This uses six steps: (1) becoming familiar with the data, 
(2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for themes, (4) reviewing themes, (5) 
defining and naming themes, and (6) producing the report. As opposed to a rich 
description of the entire data set, this dissertation focused on detailed accounts 
of particular aspects of the interviews and documents associated with power, 
authority, and knowledge. Thematic areas included agenda-setting, capacity 
opportunities and challenges, knowledge use, and collaboration strategies, all 
separated according to their existing and idealized forms as presented by 
participants. 
These findings from the thematic analysis of interviews with Pacific Island 
practitioners were situated among broader understandings of climate change 
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governance at the transnational and global scale using critical discourse 
analysis. As Howarth describes, discourse analysis places "investigated 
practices and logics in larger historical and social contexts, so that they may 
acquire a different significance and provide the basis for a possible critique and 
transformation of existing practices and social meanings" (2000, p. 129). In other 
words, this type of analysis deals with more than what was said by interviewees, 
but goes further to examine how those ways of speaking came to be.  
Similar Chapter 3’s division between the network that used the local power 
narrative and the network that used the global technical narrative, the 
interviewees’ expression of the themes had a local and global expression. 
However, unlike the previous chapter, not all of the participants adhered to the 
either/or of global technical or local power approaches. Instead, there was a third 
category of participants that advocated for global agenda-setting and local 
implementation. This led me to the work of Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006), 
described above. The global technical narrative of the previous chapter was 
similar to the green governmentality discourse, while the civic environmental 
discourse captured much of the tenets of the local power narrative. The 
ecological modernization discourse aligned closely with the participants who fell 
somewhat in the middle with global agenda-setting and local implementation. 
While Bäckstrand and Lövbrand provide a useful set of discourses to utilize for 
this discussion, the fit is not perfect. Thus, in each section of the results below, I 
also provide challenges to the discourse discussed, allowing for a more nuanced 
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engagement with the discourses that mirrors the flexible nature of discourses, in 
general.  
Results 
 While participants put forward complex and varying views of climate 
change governance in the Pacific, distinctions in goals and strategies of 
governance showed similar patterns as in the discourses of green 
governmentality, ecological modernization, and civic environmentalism in both 
their strong and weak forms (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006). This section 
examines climate change governance in the Pacific in light of this categorization 
of discourses. I present the ways in which organizations expressed these 
discourses, along with where the discourses experienced challenges. While the 
interviews provided the foundation for this discussion, the SNA findings are also 
used when participants are discussed as being central, semi-peripheral, or 
peripheral to the network. While I anticipated a greater degree of distinction 
between the discourses used at each of these levels, there was a loose pattern 
that is useful for demonstrating the degree to which a particular discourse is 
embedded in the network.  
Global Governance of Science and Control 
 Green governmentality discourse was prevalent throughout many of the 
more central organizations in the network (see Fig. 3). Primarily composed of 
IGOs and states, these agencies were concerned with building and maintaining a 
“view from everywhere” (Hulme, 2010, p. 559) through the modern administrative 
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state. Measurement, analysis, and technical information were primary features of 
the discussion, as well as looking to organize decision-making through the use of 
expertise. Scientific knowledge was seen as an important missing element to 
achieving these goals within the Pacific Islands. As one participant discussed the 
knowledge situation in the Pacific:  
It’s gotta be said, we are still talking about a relatively small number of 
skilled professional in the Pacific, and as I just said, they will probably 
always be probably dependent on Western nations not only for funding, 
but also for capability. I mean [large organizations working outside the 
Pacific Islands] have got access to credible computing infrastructure that 
some Pacific Islanders could only dream of, and that’s just the harsh 
reality. 
Capacity challenges were framed as a lack of scientific knowledge and 
technological capabilities that could be corrected through greater access to 
resources devoted to monitoring, experiments, models, and surveys. Due to the 
high cost of these endeavors, these agencies tended to speak of competition 
over mandates, resources, and (occasionally) ownership of information.  
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Figure 3: Pacific Island climate change network core.  
 
 
 Additionally, the green governmentality discourse is characterized by the 
use of technical expertise to delimit options within climate change governance 
discussions. One organization spoke of the findings of technical analysis as “the 
only solution.” Others felt that opening up decisions to political discussion 
complicated what could be a streamlined decision processes. As one participant 
stated: 
So, we sat down and came up with this … a list was developed and 
without saying it, decided it should be this island. Just absolutely this one. 
#laughs# It took the government almost a year to decide on that island.  
In this quote, the course of action is normatively intertwined with the output of a 
technical process. While sovereignty is a key element of green governmentality 
in the Pacific Islands, this desire to optimize technical expertise in decision-
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making practices is embedded in the discourse. While monitoring, experiments, 
models, and surveys can be complex in and of themselves, the use of technical 
solutions simplifies decision-making by delimiting options that are available for 
discussion to those highlighted by experts.  
These elements of green governmentality tend to foster a solution to 
climate change governance in which the participants’ own organizations are 
highly valued. All but one central organization with whom I spoke primarily used 
the green governmentality discourse and had a technical/scientific component 
that is needed to overcome the capacity challenges described in the discourse. 
While weak green governmentality has previously been used to produce and 
uphold the legitimacy of these organizations, there has recently been pressure to 
make the practices of these organizations more democratically responsive. Thus, 
participants shifted between weak and strong iterations of green governmentality, 
as they struggled between the need to make knowledge accessible to the public 
to allow for accountability and self-reflexivity, and a clean, elite understanding of 
the world. As one interviewee described some data he had been working on for 
public consumption:   
It’s not as scientifically accurate as we would like but it does get the 
message across and the loss in scientific integrity, if you want to call it 
that, is acceptable … somewhat acceptable. And we realize that we’re just 
not gonna breeze in information that’s 100% scientifically acceptable to 
the media and to the public. Compromises have to be made both ways, I 
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guess. And that’s interesting because there’s been a big shift in that 
direction in the last few years. When I began in climatology it was all about 
getting information that was 100% scientifically accurate, we did not care 
what it looked like. And quite often, we spent a horrendous amount of time 
showing your clients how to interpret our product. But that’s quickly 
changing. It’s going the other way, and it’s forcing us to think about the 
way we deliver information, and that’s resulted in communication 
specialists being employed at significant numbers at the bureau of 
meteorology. So, we’ve gotten to a point now where we can’t release 
anything to the public unless it’s been through a communications expert. 
Which is challenging, but we see the need for it. We like to work with 
them. 
Multiple participants with whom I spoke echoed this ongoing struggle within the 
green governmentality discourse. On the one hand, scientific rigor provides the 
most important solution options to growing global challenges. On the other, the 
communication and distribution of knowledge to the larger population is seen as 
a valuable new frontier for climate change governance. Most participants spoke 
of knowledge communication as an exciting opportunity to be relevant to 
decision-makers and the public, but there was also some hesitation in regards to 
the potential loss of accuracy, efficiency, and opportunity for technical information 
to be ignored.  
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Challenges to the green governmentality discourse. 
Technology plays a key role in green governmentality by providing the 
ability to surveil, gather and examine large amounts of data, and run simulations 
of potential control efforts. While traditional donors including the US, Australia, 
New Zealand, France, Germany, and others have provided access to advanced 
technologies, the fragmented nature of project-based development in the region 
has limited the capabilities of Pacific Islands states to streamline their data inputs 
to achieve control. As one individual who had worked both within Pacific Island 
states and externally described the situation:   
you may have New Zealand select a particular brand of automatic weather 
station and install it in multiple countries. Then you have another donor 
that says “No, I prefer to go with instrumentation that comes from my 
country.” So, you’ve got a bit of a mismatch … which creates 
complications in reference to having to train people at the national MET 
(Meteorological) services. National MET services having to service 
different sort of equipment. And I thought to myself, “You know, perhaps 
you could have an agency like SPREP sort of saying, like setting the rules 
to some extent or providing guidance with reference to how aid might be 
provided in the Pacific.” You would be careful, because you can’t say to a 
donor, “Yes we’d be happy to take money from you and we will tell you 
what, or we’ll give you a list of something we want from you but we won’t 
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necessarily accept something from your country.” You know what I mean. 
It's a complicated space. Very complicated space. 
This “complicated space” challenges the authority of Pacific Island state agencies 
in their efforts to control the knowledge space in their own countries. Capacity 
challenges can already be overwhelming for SIDS and LDCs due to their small 
populations and economies. One interviewee pointed out the challenges states 
face in just paying their employees from month to month. However, these 
capacity challenges are vastly exacerbated by state agents having to learn 
multiple technologies, reporting mechanisms, etc., in efforts to meet donor 
requirements.  
This lack of control over the technological space is only one piece of a 
broader challenge surrounding state control in the Pacific. Many participants 
expressed their feelings that outside donors (primarily, but not limited to, colonial 
states) were leading much of the agenda of the region. As one participant 
argued:  
Interviewee: The problem with the countries is they keep receiving the 
money, they are not in a position to just stand up and tell them, “Guys, 
listen, this is the way we should do it,” because they feel like by doing that, 
you upset the government, and therefore you will not get the money that 
you want to get. But the reality is on the ground, despite the many 
fundings for climate change coming through the region, you hardly see 
any tangible output or outcome. 
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Interviewer: Why do you think that is? 
Interviewee: It’s dictated by the donor. Projects are being implemented 
according to their terms and conditions.  
Therefore, under this power relationship where external states can dictate much 
of the policy agenda, as well as the technologies of environmental measurement, 
Pacific Island states struggle to place themselves in positions of power within the 
green governmentality discourse.16 Thus, while central IGOs and external states 
utilize green governmentality to justify their financial and resource investments 
into scientific programming, they are forced to broaden their discourse to 
maintain legitimacy. One way in which they do this is by also including aspects of 
other discourses, including ecological modernization. 
Mixed Governance of Sustainable Development and the ‘Win-Win’ 
 The ecological modernization discourse was primarily utilized by 
participants from organizations in the semi-periphery of the network (Fig. 4) that 
were engaged in local/regional implementation of agendas set in regional/global 
networks. One central organization with whom I spoke used the ecological 
modernization discourse primarily, while other central organizations used it 
sparingly in conjunction with the green governmentality discourse. The ecological 
modernization discourse is expressed in the Pacific primarily through efforts to 
																																																						
16 While this still holds true, Pacific Island states have begun exerting their 
influence more assertively recently. This topic will be taken up in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
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mainstream climate change into all sectors, especially sustainable development 
and disaster risk reduction. The regional governance surrounding climate change 
in the Pacific has shifted from the Pacific Islands Framework for Action on 
Climate Change [PIFACC] (2006-2015) to the Framework for Resilient 
Development in the Pacific [FRDP] (2017–2030). FRDP sees climate change as 
more of a variable impacting development than the independent concept evident 
in PIFACC. As the executive summary describes the framework:  
The FRDP advocates for the adoption of integrated approaches, 
whenever possible, for coping with and managing climate change and 
disaster risks, in order to make more efficient use of resources, to 
rationalise multiple sources of funding which address similar needs, and 
for more effective mainstreaming of risks into development planning and 
budgets. (FRDP, 2016, p. 2) 
FRDP is meant to streamline funding mechanisms and activities, increase 
efficiency and effectiveness toward the goals laid out in the document, and 
mainstream governance mechanisms for risk, broadly defined. Resilient, 
sustainable development practices are the principle goal of the practices put 
forward by the framework.  
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Figure 4: Pacific Island climate change network semi-periphery.  
 
 
The goal of the ecological modernization approach of the FRDP is to 
ensure that piecemeal planning and governance is replaced by a more 
centralized mechanism for development decision-making. As one individual 
pointed out: 
You can have all climate change project funded, doing nice things, cutting 
ribbons, but in the end of the day you get development going on that is not 
resilient to disasters. So, you are just gonna keep building disasters, 
basically, unless these things are incorporated into the regular 
development decision-making processes. So, that is why we stepped 
outside of the box and tried to get inside regular development.  
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In light of this view, the relegation of climate change to one of a list of variables is 
seen as justified for the sake of making sure that resilient, sustainable 
development stays a priority. Participants espousing ecological modernization 
use equivalencies—climate change is really the same as disasters, which all 
impact development, which can actually be sustainable development—to 
mainstream climate change funding and action. Under this understanding, 
competition between organizations and government sectors is unnecessary and 
instead there can be a ‘win-win,’ where resilience to climate-influenced disasters 
is met while the region continues to engage in rapid aid-based development. 
 The ecological modernization discourse was primarily concerned with the 
need to improve reporting to regional and global entities, to meet funding 
requirements, and to integrate risk into existing governance mechanisms. Thus, 
participants using the ecological modernization discourse were concerned 
primarily with the lack of capacity needed to meet external requirements. These 
capacity needs are described by one participant: 
So, how these stakeholders can use, integrate this risk template, or use 
this risk template when they implement projects; and secondly, how they 
assess funds or grants to implement these projects ... And also, there’s 
one other capacity building of this community groups or committee groups 
to use the government templates to access funds because government 
also has funding for projects that comes into their office. 
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Participants like this one regularly discussed the challenges countries and 
communities faced when attempting to implement donor-led projects, access 
financing, and meet external evaluation requirements. While this has some 
similarities to the green governmentality discourse in regards to reporting, here 
bureaucratic expertise is considered more of an immediate need than scientific 
expertise. The two can, however, be intertwined, as donors require both 
bureaucratic and scientific inputs. As one participant described the process:  
when countries are trying to apply for GCF or Adaptation Fund or what 
have you, there’s lots of things that they need to provide—cost benefit 
analysis, gender analysis, economic and social safety guards, EIA, and 
stuff. Some countries have the capacity to do that, others don’t. So, we … 
help with those types of crucial studies needed to get over the line for 
funding. 
In this way, technocratic reporting mechanisms cause the separation between 
the green governmentality discourse and ecological modernization discourse to 
become blurred in efforts to meet donor requirements. 
Ecological modernization in the Pacific includes a range of local/global 
scales in order to implement the strategies laid out in the FRDP. As one 
organization described the governance setup:  
they have to align because it all leads from the global frameworks to the 
regional frameworks and then align it to the framework at the national 
level. That’s the logic of how it should work. Then it goes down to the line 
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ministries and relevant areas and then down to the community level where 
they pilot. Whether it is a climate change adaptation project, a coastal 
adaptation project, some disaster risk reduction, some of the resilience 
work, some agricultural work, and then to the technical areas. 
In other words, the agenda is set at the global level, which provides a framework 
for regional and national actions, which then trickles down to the community 
level. Most participants that used the weak version of ecological modernization 
saw local/global strategies and decision-making processes as working in concert 
across multiple scales, primarily through a top-down flow. As one participant 
described the situation, “I don’t think there should be any reason for tensions, 
because the strategies are determined by the national representatives that sit on 
these regional discussions.” Those using a strong version of ecological 
modernization, alternatively, emphasized the need for greater community 
participation and input. However, community engagement was primarily limited to 
project implementation, not agenda-setting. 
Challenges to the ecological modernization discourse. 
Ecological modernization is the underlying logic behind many projects in 
the region. Approximately 86% of the US$748 million of bilateral and multilateral 
funds given to the Pacific Islands for climate change in 2010-2014 was in the 
form of project support, and around 42% was devoted to enabling environments, 
or “activities to mainstream climate change into sector policies, planning and 
management (including in the energy, forestry and water sectors)” (Atteridge & 
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Canales, 2017, p. 17). This is compared to approximately 1% directed toward 
general budget support and 9% devoted exclusively to research (ibid.). As 
funding is directed toward development and mainstreaming activities within the 
Pacific Islands, the ecological modernization discourse, with its emphasis on 
economic solutions, is highlighted. This produces a situation in which many of the 
central organizations that primarily utilize green governmentality to legitimize 
their own work also discuss projects in terms of ecological modernization for 
funding reasons. As previously discussed, this ‘discourse mixing’ comes primarily 
by arguing for the need for operational capacity to implement scientific findings.  
There is still a formidable amount of resistance, however, to the ecological 
modernization discourse. In the initial discussions on the FRDP, some decision-
makers argued that a technocratic focus on development and disaster hid the 
political arguments surrounding climate change. For instance, the FRDP limits 
the abilities of the Pacific Islands to engage heavily with the shame-and-blame 
tactics that have categorized some of Pacific Island climate change diplomatic 
efforts (Denton, 2017) due to the ‘win-win’ approach between development and 
climate issues that is reliant on consensus. Some participants, therefore, felt that 
the FRDP was inadequate in addressing the more contentious, global issues of 
climate change, such as GHG emissions by developed countries.  
Additionally, organizations using the ecological modernization discourse, 
again, are primarily implementing agencies in the region that are responding to 
global conventions and networks. This creates an inside/outside tension where, 
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in meeting global requirements and channeling outside funding, organizations 
must carve out a space for themselves on the ground. One participant described 
the situation like this:  
From our perspective, [it] is that ability to convene, to facilitate and to be 
seen as a neutral player, because of our global status. Absolutely we are 
engaging the region, but we are not of the region, per se … We may only 
have a couple of junior local staff headed by Pacific Islanders and the bulk 
of our staff is a few expatriates like me, but that’s who we are in this 
region. So, I think we fit into a space there and that shows through our 
ability to bring together Pacific Island leaders and decision makers through 
our leadership programs and through the summits that we have held. 
Highlighting the organization’s capabilities as “neutral facilitators” that is a direct 
part of ecological modernization, the participant pointed out the need to open up 
facilitation to allow regional involvement:  
We ask what other countries want to do, and I guess that’s the big thing. 
It’s gotta be less about us coming in with ‘here’s our great regional 
framework or global theme’ and much more about the countries saying, 
‘We’ve already got our priorities set, we know what we want to do, and we 
just want to help.’ I guess that’s the creative tension it should be. 
This feeling of being “not of the region, per se” was shared by many 
organizations who engaged with ecological modernization, but it was also tied 
with a desire to address regional issues in ways that put more power back in the 
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hands of regional players. With these challenges, both green governmentality 
and ecological modernization have incorporated some elements of civic 
environmentalism.  
Local Governance of Traditional Knowledge and Participation  
 Civic environmentalism is prevalent throughout the organizations at the 
periphery of the network who also tend to work more locally within the Pacific 
Islands (Fig. 5). This discourse fosters local constructions of climate challenges 
and solutions that utilize the capacity of Pacific Islanders. This capacity can 
include traditional knowledges, community governance structure, and the 
importance of proximity to climate change impacts for the ability to understand 
and develop solutions. Instead of fostering a “view from everywhere” (Hulme, 
2010, p. 559), participants utilizing the civic environmentalism discourse were 
concerned with integrating climate and disaster risk management into the local 
context with actions already being taken by communities:  
They already know how to do their work, but we are just adding on what 
they already know. We are not bringing something new but we are just 
adding on to what they already know, in terms of the work that they are 
doing. And then for them to know the importance of integration or 
importance of climate change, disaster risk how it a main … it’s a main 
thing that we are looking at in the best way right now in terms of what we 
are fighting for, what we’ve been facing. 
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As opposed to the work of ecological modernization to mainstream climate 
change and disaster into government planning and development, the goal with 
civic environmentalism is to directly support communities’ existing efforts. There 
is a sense that communities are already working to make positive changes 
surrounding the environmental ramifications of a shifting climate, and that their 
work should be supported by outside organizations. Their capacity is highlighted, 
while acknowledging that more can be done to integrate their knowledge into 
governance practices and support their existing efforts.  
Figure 5: Pacific Island climate change network periphery.  
 
 Instead of a centralized decision-making model, civic environmentalism 
promotes participation by the broader community. The participants emphasized 
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that local capacity and knowledge are valuable and should be taken into 
consideration during decision-making. As one participant noted: 
It has to be more holistic and it has to be driven by what the community 
wants to learn about, what’s important to them and not just pay lip service, 
but actually do it properly. 
Additionally, one participant focused on building a bottom-up approach:  
So, our role is to build this model up because the existing model is top-
down. That means we build the bottom-up approach so that the 
community can influence the policy by understanding what are the issues 
affecting them and what is the priority to them. 
As opposed to a weak engagement model that might be used to draw community 
members in after the agenda is set, civic environmentalism argues for community 
participation in agenda-setting and policy-making from the beginning. Thus, 
community knowledge is valued and highlighted, but it is not venerated. The 
need to integrate scientific knowledge is seen as a critical element of 
governance. As one participant stated, “We are adding onto their current 
traditional knowledge that they have, and try and marry that to the scientific 
knowledge of climate change and disaster risk.” The need for both types of 
knowledge to act in concert is a key element of the use of civic environmentalism 
in the Pacific Islands. 
When the organizations put forward a weak version of the civic 
environmentalism discourse, they tended to be impact-oriented, looking to the 
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way that projects could be reformed to be more useful to their participants. These 
conversations were particularly pitted against the project challenges brought 
about through organizations using the weak ecological modernization discourse: 
I know like [a specific central organization], oh my god, their monitoring 
and evaluation frameworks and stuff like that, they are very rigid, they are 
very detailed, and all that stuff. And then it’s like, well, then what. Once 
you get past that, past ticking your boxes, and past crossing your Ts and 
dotting your I’s, then what are you left with? What is the big impact? … 
Doing something is not achieving something or having results or having 
impact for those people that need it most. And until that happens it’s same 
of the same thing over and over again. Unfortunately. 
Thus, the weak version of the discourse was concerned with the efficacy of 
projects to meet the needs of local community members, and the way that 
previous projects had failed to meet that goal. As it is a reform-oriented 
approach, most advocated for a tweak of the existing system into a more 
inclusive version the fostered respect for local knowledge. While some Pacific 
Islanders did engage with a strong version of the civic environmentalism 
discourse that was radically anti-development and democratic, the sample of 
those using radical civic environmentalism was too small to fully develop insights 




Challenges to the civic environmentalism discourse. 
 While presented as an alternative to the more dominant green 
governmentality and ecological modernization discourses, the reformist civic 
environmentalism primarily utilized in the Pacific Islands is intertwined with the 
status quo. Development pathways where funding is distributed from countries in 
the Global North to the developing countries of the Pacific is discussed only in 
terms of broader inclusion rather than changing the mold. One particularly 
straightforward interviewee stated:  
Interviewee: The problem is [major Pacific organizations] still depend on 
outside funding. So, they wanna impress the donor more than achieve 
tangible outcomes on the ground. It’s keeping the donor happy though is 
the priority so that they can keep getting more funds.  
Interviewer: Which donors are the cranky ones? 
Interviewee: Almost all of them. #laugh# They have been doing nothing. 
Development funding is not intended on bringing about tangible change, 
it’s about the country’s interest. And that’s the problem. The best approach 
will be to listen to the recipient, but unfortunately, that’s not happening. 
They dictate how it’s delivered, in what way, in what form, and that’s the 
reality we just have to live with. Although many reports are coming through 
that it’s not working, this modality, and yet nobody listen to it. So, you start 
wondering whether, are they are really yielding tangible outcomes or it’s 
just something to fulfill their interest, to keep you in their pocket. 
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While this shows considerable distaste with the current state of funding models, 
civic environmentalism in the region did not present a tangible alternative. More, 
this participant just wanted to bolster the capacity of the region to deal with these 
challenges, and wanted some avenues of support to lend themselves to that end. 
This participant additionally stated: 
For example, now we are in the process of developing a course on multi-
lateral reporting and that’s a great deal for the countries. They are all 
struggling with all this reporting on climate out of the different conventions. 
Now we have the Sustainable Development Goals. So, countries are so 
overwhelmed with little capacity. Most of the time they rely on foreign 
consultants coming to do their reporting for them, but they say it’s about 
time we build our capacity in the region.  
Thus, while there is strong resistance to the form of the donor-recipient model, 
the participants utilizing civic environmentalism struggle to put forward an 
alternative that is substantively different from the basic operational capacity-
building tactics of ecological modernization.  
Additionally, while there is a lot of hope in that community involvement has 
seen a rise among project requirements, many peripheral organizations that 
utilize the civic environmentalism discourse are skeptical, at best, as to the 
impact on communities’ lives. One participant stated:  
I think consultation is actually really important, if done effectively, it can 
actually lead to better outcomes … I’ve seen those consultations happen 
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and I’m judging from an outsider’s perspective and I’m just thinking like 
this just sounds … it doesn’t sound genuine. I’m left thinking, “What now?” 
I’ve been left thinking that, and I wonder as a community member if you’re 
like, “Oh this is just what we’ll have to do to get our next bit of funding for 
the project,” rather than actually feeling they really matter in that 
discussion. I don’t know, I can’t speak on behalf of communities’ 
experiences, but it’d be very interesting to go and ask them. And they will 
definitely say, “We’re thankful to our donors.” And yes, you are for your 
money, but do you really feel your needs are being met and the project is 
structured the way you want and monitored the way you want, and all 
these things that can actually give the community a voice? It’s very 
difficult. 
There was an apparent struggle among many participants who felt as if 
developments within the status quo might be hopeful, but did not go nearly far 
enough in their current form. In other words, while civic environmentalism is 
growing in strength, somewhat, it still felt to many as a peripheral discourse that 
was perfunctory rather than impactful.  
Three Environmental Discourses in Conversation 
 In the space of Pacific Island climate change governance, these three 
discourses—green governmentality, ecological modernization, and civic 
environmentalism in both their strong and weak forms—appealed to different 
constructions of power, authority, and knowledge (Table 6). Green 
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governmentality, in both its strong and weak forms, appealed to expert authority 
and scientific knowledge to produce and uphold its power. The expertise was 
grounded in the ability to produce global types of scientific knowledge. Power 
was located in knowledge institutions and the administrative state for the weak 
form of the discourse, while the strong form moved power slightly out to the 
public through knowledge communication.  
Additionally, ecological modernization was focused on the rational-legal 
authority (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999) embedded in an operational knowledge of 
development. This authority is “invested in legalities, procedures, and rules” 
through bureaucratization in the classification, fixing of meanings, and diffusion of 
norms (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 707). In other words, this authority came 
through the operational elements of development—the frameworks, standards, 
and conventions to follow—in global, regional, and local funding and project 
requirements. Under a weak, technocratic version of the discourse, development 
partners that fund and set the criteria for development practices had power, 
along with those implementing government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs that 
carried out the projects on the ground. For the strong, more democratic version 
of ecological modernization, civil society organizations were brought in as a 
structured public participation mechanism for implementation.  
Finally, civic environmentalism appealed to practical authority and 
contextual knowledge in both its strong and weak forms. According to Abers and 
Keck, “Practical authority is a kind of power in which the capabilities to solve 
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problems and recognition by others allows an actor to make decisions that others 
follow” (2013, p. 7). This type of authority occurs with regular, successful 
engagement in the network, sustained by knowledge of the local context. The 
desired location of power in the weak form was in institutionalized civil society, 
while the strong form called for a more complete decentralization that denies the 
predominance of development.  
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Table 6: Power, authority, and knowledge in environmental discourses.  
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While they are presented here as being distinct, there was overlap in the 
participants’ discussions of climate change in the Pacific (Fig. 6). Central 
organizations that primarily engaged with green governmentality also utilized 
elements of ecological modernization by discussing the need to support 
operational capacity to implement their scientific findings. Correspondingly, the 
central and semi-peripheral organizations that used ecological modernization 
also appealed to scientific knowledge as it was needed to obtain funding. Civic 
environmentalism made its way into green governmentality and ecological 
modernization in similar ways—green governmentality focused on the increased 
communication of science, while ecological modernization emphasized the need 
for local inclusion for project implementation. Civic environmentalism took on 
elements of green governmentality by including the need for scientific knowledge 
in decision-making and ecological modernization by also discussing local 
involvement in development project implementation.  
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Figure 6: The relationship between green governmentality, ecological 
modernization, and civic environmental discourses.  
 
 
While there is some overlap amongst participants using each of the three 
discourses, the degree of integration varied. Green governmentality and 
ecological modernization upheld each other through regular and sustained 
engagement between organizations that fostered shared discursive 
constructions. Due to the fact that civic environmentalism is utilized primarily by 
organizations toward the periphery of the network, it has experienced a more 
limited uptake by other central and semi-peripheral organizations. In fact, the 
integration of civic environmentalism into green governmentality and ecological 
modernization is a relatively new phenomenon, according to participants. As one 
participant from a central organization described the shift:  
we are hoping we would set up a whole new engagement with the NGOs 
to align with their work, and the NGOS typically don’t … one of the 
reasons that we haven’t worked with them is because we’re climate 
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scientists and we do climate science. They most do climate adaptation, 
disaster risk management, and so forth with their work. And we sort of just 
said, “Oh, well, they’ll get the science along with everybody, and they’ll do 
something with it.” Now we’re realizing that if we work more closely with 
them right from the onset … because they’ve got connections and 
credibility with stakeholders that we can’t even begin to dream about, and 
we want those same people to have a better understanding of the science 
is saying about the climate and climate change in particular. It seems 
logical now that we would start talking to NGOs to help work with them to 
actually try to get our message across to the subnational scale. This is like 
the provincial governments, local community, and so forth. So, we haven’t 
done much in the past but we would definitely see NGOs as an emerging 
sort of stakeholder for us as science providers.  
While still strongly identifying with the scientific knowledge production elements 
of green governmentality, this participant demonstrated the recent shift of more 
central organizations toward acknowledging the need for broader inclusion in 
decision-making and governance. While still limited, it is considered a growing 
field of discussion and practice in the Pacific.  
 Part of the reason for this shift could be a degree of disappointment with 
the impacts of top-down governance. Participants from central organizations 
were aware of the feelings of disgruntlement held by communities over the top-
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down governance efforts that had previously been the norm. As one participant 
stated:  
We got some communities now and we say we are here from [central 
organization], and they are like, “That’s impressive.” But not anymore, no 
one cares anymore. It’s, “You are here to waste our time some more. You 
are here to talk about your big fancy sweet potatoes that can withstand 
salty soils and water-logged soils, but at the end of the three-year period 
you are gone, and we never hear from you again.” So, I think people in the 
community have been quite adversely affected by projects. 
This sense of short, one-off projects was shared by other peripheral 
organizations, as well. One participant from a peripheral organization put it this 
way:  
Because there are a lot of piloting, piloting of models and projects. After 
that, that’s it. Another funding comes, let’s pilot it again. And when you go 
to the community, then there’s, “Oh, we’re here to do a baseline survey on 
…” “Oh! We are over-surveyed. Where’s all the information that was 
collected? The same information that you wanted the Ministry of Health, or 
the local NGO, or the government came and collected it. Where’s that 
information? So, you guys aren’t coordinating.” And I think one of the 
lessons we’ve learned is that we’re too focused on piloting, piloting, 
piloting. And I think some of the funding coming in are too regional so you 
could have 90% of the funding stuck at the regional and national level. 
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The focus was on building the resilience of community, but they only get 
10% of that funding, which is just loose change. So that means you don’t 
really have that impact. 
This acute understanding of the challenges in current governance structures and 
mechanisms could be bolstering the uptake of democratization of knowledge and 
agenda-setting in governance priorities, either through stronger green 
governmentality and ecological modernization discourses or through more civic 
environmentalism in the network. In other words, the vocal assertion of 
disenfranchisement by communities could be pushing organization to localize 
their practices. Additionally, the success of the local power narrative in COP21 
negotiations (Denton, 2017) could be seen as producing and produced by this 
local shift in governance priorities. This idea will be taken up more fully in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Climate Empire 
Introduction  
A participant shared with me an interesting perspective on the challenges 
of power within the Pacific. First, he drew a picture of a Fijian in traditional attire. 
He said, “See, they are half-naked.” He then drew a missionary in a suit and tie, 
and he said, “See, here they come in, and they are very clothed.” He then drew 
another suited figure, and stated, “So, the Fijians followed the way of the 
missionary, they dressed up, and they wore their suits.” He then vaguely drew 
another figure. 
And now, we have all these people in the movies and around. And they 
are half-naked again! And what do Fijians do? They have started to be 
half-naked. So, these people from the outside, they have influence. And if 
they take away climate change, then don’t you think things will go back to 
the way they were before? 
This participant discussed the dramatic transformations surrounding the global 
emphasis on climate change on Pacific Island society, finance, and the 
environment, itself. He expressed a deep concern that at some point climate 
change would no longer capture the global imagination, and the Pacific Islands 
would be left with the repercussions.  
 Governance of the climate has reshaped global pathways of power in 
numerous ways. Practitioners and decision-makers are networking together on 
issues of climate change at local and global levels in ways that shape both the 
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global and the local spaces in remarkable ways. The networks I have visualized 
so far in this dissertation have been presented as static, representing a cross-
section of spaces and ideas at a particular point in time. However, the networks 
that these static visualizations represent are, in reality, constantly shifting and 
reacting to the spaces in which they exist. They shift and change as 
organizations vie for power in the form of funding, control over rules and 
standards, and influence in decision-making spaces (Grewal, 2008; Hadden, 
2015). While the histories of these networks influence their trajectory (similar to 
path dependence (Pierson, 2000)), the networks are not fixed. As Miller and 
Edwards have argued, “global environmental governance…functions by means 
of new, complex, hybrid forms of knowledge and power still being forged—and 
therefore still fragile, negotiable, and worthy of our most careful and creative 
attention” (2004, p. 6). 
This chapter works to better understand the structure and fluidity of global 
environmental governance in the Pacific Islands. First, I conceptualize the impact 
of what I call Climate Empire on the social and environmental realities of the 
Pacific Islands. Climate Empire builds on the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri (2000) along with a reconsideration taken on briefly by Clark Miller (2004) 
to explore the way in which the global systems of information and communication 
are restructuring the way the earth is governed. I then look specifically at Climate 
Empire within the Pacific Islands, paying particular attention to the way in which 
Climate Empire has been built through the legitimation of global knowledge, 
 148 
funding practices, and regionalism. Additionally, I explore the implications of 
Climate Empire for the way in which nature is constructed and governed within 
the Pacific Islands. Finally, I look to the relationship between local and global 
elements of climate knowledge and its impact on the production of Climate 
Empire. 
Empire 
The concept of empire has been used by scholars of anthropology, 
literature, history, and political science through a variety of lenses and settings 
throughout the years.17 While showing the ways in which empire has been used 
across the disciplines, Pitt’s (2010) extensive review of the concept of empire 
demonstrates its wide-ranging uses and definitional challenges, yet emphasizes 
the social stratification and the inherent inequalities embedded in empire. Doyle, 
alternatively, provides a usefully straightforward definition: “Empires are 
relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the 
effective sovereignty of other political societies” (1986, p. 19).  
While empires have a long history—Persian, Turkish, Mongolian, and 
others—much of the recent work in empire has dealt specifically with the 









expansions (Pitts, 2010). European empire and liberalism are in many ways 
“mutually constitutive” (Armitage 2004a, p. 602, as cited in Pitts, 2010), where 
the tenets of self-government, economic growth and stability, and moral 
individualism are incorporated into exported forms of Western modernity. While 
cultural divides and differing ideas for governance brought substantial challenges 
to Western expansionism, in many ways, compliance with empire was brought 
about through non-Western elites’ professionalization and internalization of 
universalist values (Bull & Watson, 1984). This final understanding of the role of 
elites in building and maintaining an empire provides a sort of bridge to 
understanding the way in which empire is explored in this dissertation.  
While states play a vital role in the governance of the globe, Hardt and 
Negri (2000) present a different, less state-centric understanding of Empire in 
their work by the same name. Hardt and Negri argue that the sovereignty of 
states has declined post-World War II, and its place has been taken by the 
governmentality, or logic of rule, that they call Empire. “Our basic hypothesis is 
that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and 
supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form 
of sovereignty is what we call Empire” (ibid., p. xii). These ‘organisms’ go beyond 
traditional spaces of authority to include multinational corporations and 
supranational organizations (e.g. the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
United Nations, the G8, etc.) that police economic production and set themselves 
above space, time, and the social order. In other words, they move fluidly 
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throughout global territories, presenting an ahistorical and apolitical approach to 
governing. 
Less than a state or set of states imposing their will, this understanding of 
Empire functions as an “imperial machine” shaping and pushing networks of 
information and communication. Empire works in and through a master narrative 
of universality and inclusivity that, following Foucault’s biopower (2003, 2009, 
2010),18 is interested in populations rather than people. In other words, instead of 
policing individual bodies and actions, it deals with efforts to classify, standardize, 
and normalize whole populations. “Power, as it produces, organizes; as it 
organizes, it speaks and expresses itself as authority. Language, as it 
communicates, produces commodities but moreover creates subjectivities, puts 
them in relation, and orders them” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 33). Empire is less 
concerned with the impact of traditional forms of sovereign authority, and more 
with the forms of language, knowledge, and categorization that influence the 
internal realities of people across the globe.  
 One of the primary ways that the production of Empire is made possible, 
according to Hardt and Negri, is through informatization, or the transfer of the 
economy from the disciplinary factory to knowledge, communication, and 
affective services. Through this transfer, an information economy has emerged 
that is reliant on networks of cooperation and communication imbedded in 
																																																						
18 Foucault’s biopower, however, does differ substantially. See Dean (2003) for a 
critique of Hardt and Negri’s usage.  
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systems of immaterial labor. The global networks that construct the information 
economy form a decentered and deterritorialized apparatus of rule that runs 
throughout all spaces of production. This stands in stark contrast to the material 
forms of labor and production highlighted in Karl Marx’s work (1978), thus 
requiring new forms of administration.  
While this network works in and through all spaces of production, Hardt 
and Negri also argue, “[t]he decentralization and global dispersal of productive 
processes and sites, which is characteristic of the postmodernization or 
informatization of the economy, provokes a corresponding centralization of the 
control over production” through a virtual panopticon of monitoring and regulation 
(2000, p. 297). In other words, in response to the dispersal of spaces of 
production, Empire exerts a corresponding centralization of efforts to police these 
networks. It is through this constant expansion and contraction that Empire 
creates its own crises. However, due to the inevitability of micro-conflicts in the 
networks that form Empire, Hardt and Negri refer instead to “corruption” (ibid., p. 
202), which they see as more representative of the continual state of disruption 
than a central crisis. 
While Empire could be understood as a bleak prognosis, Hardt and Negri 
also emphasize that the networks of information and communication made to 
service Empire also function to create a new political constituency, the 
“multitude.” The multitude’s collective power is made possible through the new 
global pathways shaped by the sovereign. In other words, the connectivity that is 
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necessary for Empire’s rule also means that constituents can form relationships 
with one another and create new forms of democratic rule. Their power extends 
democratic possibilities through and beyond traditional state boundaries to 
encircle the globe.  
Colonial Histories and Empire 
 While Hardt and Negri devote little time to discussing Empire’s relation to 
colonialism, the use of the Pacific Islands as a case study in this dissertation 
makes this a particularly compelling relationship. Colonial rule existed with a 
single point of domination and resistance: the administrative state as the arm of 
imperial power in the colonies (Storey, 1997). This space was governed in part 
through the alternating forces of coercion and threat of revolt. Alternatively, the 
power within Empire is deterritorialized, scattered across multiple spaces. 
Instead of letting pressure build to where coercion is required, Empire is able to 
keep coercion at a minimum by virtue of its deterritorialized and decentered 
nature. 
 An interesting analogy for these different forms of crises would be in the 
differences between tomato sauce and broth when boiling. The viscosity of 
tomato sauce means that, even with only moderate heat, large bubbles tend to 
form and erupt. It is thus necessary to constantly stir the sauce in order to pop 
the bubbles before they get to the surface. If left alone, boiling tomato sauce 
makes a mess. Similarly, the tension created in the tight form of control with the 
colonial state meant that, without constant attention, the pressure built in 
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resistance was quite large and caused eruptions that required coercion to 
contain. Thus, the crises of colonialism were acute. Alternatively, with similar 
heat, boiling broth creates smaller bubbles. These smaller bubbles can let out air 
a little at a time, making it less likely the bubbles will ever build large enough to, 
at the point of eruption, make a mess. The governmentality of Empire creates an 
unending number of spaces at which pressure can build and be released without 
the need for (as much) coercion. Thus, the corruption of Empire is less damaging 
to its overall structure. This is, admittedly, a bit simplified. Colonial governments 
have long relied on science and technology within their colonies to shore up their 
power in ways that have similarities to the efforts put forward by Empire 
(Anderson, 2006). However, this differentiation will be discussed in more detail 
when discussing the Pacific Islands as a case study. 
Furthering Empire  
The critiques to Hardt and Negri are noteworthy (Passavant & Dean, 
2004; Sprague, 2011). First, their limited attention to the continued role of the 
state limits their applicability to modern day forms of governance (Sprague, 
2011). Although some argue that governance is now “post-sovereign” 
(Karkkainen, 2004), this may be an overstatement. The transformation of 
sovereignty in an age of global relations is not solely a state-constraining force, it 
is also enabling (Weiss, 2005). New relations of ‘entwinement’ with other global 
power networks at transnational and supranational levels that can actually 
reinforce, while admittedly transforming, the role of domestic institutions in 
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upholding global power relations. As Jessop (2004) argues, deterritorialization is 
not causing states to cede sovereignty, but rather it is encouraging them to 
increase their efforts toward metagovernance: redesigning markets, 
constitutional change and juridical re-regulation of organizational forms and 
objectives, organizing conditions for self-organization, and collibration, or using 
the tension between two social groups to achieve policy aims. “What we are 
witnessing is the rescaling of the complexities of governance, rather than the 
rescaling of the sovereign state or the emergence of just one more arena in 
which national states pursue national interests” (Jessop, 2004, p. 67). 
Understanding state sovereignty in this way, while a conceptual break from Hardt 
and Negri, can help to better frame issues at play within international 
governance, particularly within postcolonial spaces like the Pacific Islands.  
When looking to the Global South, Empire faces further challenges. Hardt 
and Negri’s attestation of the “smoothness” and “immanence” of Empire not 
applicable under the fractured and incomplete nature of governance in the Global 
South (Dunn, 2004). Specifically, Empire relies on the groundwork of modern 
sovereignty—where “the nation sustains the sovereign by claiming to precede it” 
(Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 101)—to build their new postmodern sovereign in 
Empire. In other words, Empire as post-sovereign is borne out of a stable and 
somewhat universal understanding of the sovereignty of the nation-state. The 
challenge is that, with the colonial histories of many developing nations, modern 
sovereignty was never fully established such that it must ‘give way’ to a post-
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modern sovereignty (see Dunn (2004) regarding Africa). Thus, it is important to 
avoid the pitfalls of a Eurocentric Empire by allowing for a “multiple and shifting 
construction of sovereignty” (Dunn, 2004, p. 146) that takes seriously the 
histories of spaces and does not succumb to a totalizing “smooth” post-
sovereignty.  
With these critiques in mind, I seek in this dissertation to build on the 
concept of Empire, rather than take it as presented. One particularly useful 
perspective by which to further the concept of Empire comes from Clark Miller. In 
taking Hardt and Negri’s work beyond the realm of economic production, Miller 
argues that their work could be improved by paying attention to the science and 
technology that creates and upholds the rules of the machine. He states:  
Contra Hardt and Negri, if Empire exists, its power relies in the 
construction of new systems for classifying, standardizing, organizing, and 
ordering knowledge and people on a worldwide basis. These systems—at 
once scientific, technological, social, and political—link together the 
inhabitants of far flung networks, structuring the production and 
reproduction of identities, values, and bodies (Bowker & Star, 1999). This 
was the fundamental insight of Foucault’s work on the normalizing, 
disciplinary technologies of the prison and the sanitarium and the experts 
who designed their practices and architecture (see, e.g., Foucault, 1973). 
Thus, as we seek to understand the constitutional foundations of global 
governance, we must not turn to the United Nations General Assembly—
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or even the Security Council—but rather to the Specialized Agencies, and 
to the growing array of public and private, formal and informal institutions 
of scientific, technical, and technological production and harmonization 
that lie outside the UN. It is in these institutions that Empire’s regulatory 
and normative armature is being forged. (Miller, 2004, p. 81) 
This understanding of Empire allows for a deeper analysis into the knowledges at 
play in producing and reproducing Empire. He argues that this global order 
resides in:  
first, the growing tendency of people all over the world to frame policy 
problems in specifically global terms; and, second, the casting of actions 
in specifically technical terms as a strategy for bypassing traditional 
concerns with sovereignty in the world system. (ibid., p. 82) 
In seeking to understand the globalism at the heart of this Empire, Miller looks 
less at material flows (Keohane & Nye, 2001) and more to role of building a 
global imaginary (e.g. orientalism (Said, 1978) and the making of the nation 
(Anderson, 2006)). This global imaginary makes knowledge of the earth feasible 
by organizing systems to produce and reproduce the globe (Miller & Edwards, 
2001). Technical assistance is the practice of power that bolsters the authority of 
these global governance institutions.  
Miller’s attention to the full range of systems at work in the Empire—
scientific, technological, social, and political—along with his emphasis on the 
practices of power can make the concept of Empire more useful for analyzing the 
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current system of governance. This expansion allows for greater nuance than the 
“smooth” and “global” Empire, and takes seriously the fragmentation that occurs 
in the reproduction of Empire in multiple spaces. In other words, by taking 
seriously the rules of the imperial machine, it becomes easier to see the way in 
which those rules shift, change, and are differently interpreted in multiple spaces. 
This is particularly evident within the global systems of climate change 
governance. 
Climate Empire 
In this section, I explore the processes occurring globally and within the 
Pacific Islands regarding climate change governance under the concept of 
Climate Empire. Climate Empire is the network of knowledge and communicative 
services that imagine, build, and administer the globe. This includes the 
scientific, technological, social, and political systems that make the climate 
legible and governable. Following Miller, Climate Empire includes the “public and 
private, formal and informal institutions of scientific, technical, and technological 
production and harmonization” (2004, p. 81) that produce the technical and 
bureaucratic knowledge and procedures meant to control anthropogenic climate 
change.  
These networks of communicative and knowledge-producing institutions 
are not free-flowing, but rather are grounded by the “regulatory and normative 
armature” (Miller, 2004, p. 81) of global climate change governance. The 
regulatory armature is found in the ability of institutions to deem what is and is 
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not deemed authoritative knowledge for work in the Climate Empire. The master 
narrative of universality and inclusivity within Empire produces a normative drive 
toward biopolitical control over the earth and its inhabitants. State sovereignty is, 
thus, transformed by the governmentality of Climate Empire.  
In this understanding, power is less about the disciplinary or juridical 
power of governments over constituents. Instead, power “is deployed and 
exercised through a net-like organization” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98), where the 
entire network of climate change practitioners and decision-makers is wrapped 
up in the circulation of power. This does not assume that Climate Empire is a 
post-sovereign space, nor that it is smooth. Rather, it is a space of both 
domination and renegotiation among multiple actors.  
In the same way as Empire is the “non-place” of power in relations of 
production (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 190), Climate Empire encompasses the 
whole globe as its ‘territory.’ Climate Empire has set itself as a policing force 
above space, time, and the social order. The climate itself is constructed as a 
global and globalizing force (Jasanoff & Martello, 2004; Miller & Edwards, 2001), 
thus providing space for Climate Empire to cross sovereign boundaries through a 
deterritorialized and decentered apparatus of rule. In other words, because 
climactic changes are unable to be studied and solved on a state-by-state basis, 
global networks of climate knowledge and communication are necessary to meet 
the challenge of climate change, as presented by Climate Empire.  
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Climate Empire gains authority by exploiting an apolitical discourse, as the 
purveyors of instrumental solutions to global, technical problems (Demeritt, 
2001). In other words, the authority of Climate Empire is fostered by the 
expectation that decisions should defer to scientific expertise and bureaucratic 
structures. Scientific, technological, social, and political systems form the 
“engineering rules” of the imperial machine that is Climate Empire. In other 
words, the scientific view of the earth, the technologies we use to measure it, the 
social ways in which we relate to it and one another, and the political systems by 
which we seek to govern it all work to produce and reproduce the Climate 
Empire. 
Efforts to know the earth rely on a global imaginary that is created and 
upheld through networks of climate communication. In order to police the climate 
multitude, Climate Empire’s panopticon comes through authoritative science 
(Bocking, 2004), and its ability to monitor, evaluate, and regulate knowledge 
production according to the standards of unanimous, quantitative, generalized, 
and conducted according to scientific process. As Bocking has described, “The 
authority of science … is not simply self-evident; it is a phenomenon embedded 
within environmental politics, constructed and asserted whenever participants in 
environmental politics require it to support their positions” (ibid., p. 10). It is 
upheld through administrative rationalism, or the process of “seeking, with the 
guidance of technical expertise, rational and efficient solutions to the problems of 
society, translating the authority of science into political power” (ibid., p. 21). 
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Climate Empire thus polices what is considered authoritative knowledge. It does 
this by using administrative rationalism to not only require authoritative science 
for its own activities, but also to legitimize the use of authoritative science as the 
final say in decision-making in its subjects’ eyes. As Agrawal has pointed out, 
“[M]odern forms of power and regulation achieve their full effects not by forcing 
people toward state-mandated goals but by turning them into accomplices” 
(2005, p. 217). Forms of climate knowledge are thus taken up by people as they 
seek to meet global requirements for resources and eventually become 
internalized as legitimate ways of knowing the earth.  
This is not to say that the Climate Empire is somehow outside or distinct 
from the productive machine of the Empire. In fact, governance of the earth is 
tightly interwoven with the professionalization, economization, and overall 
neoliberalization of productive systems throughout the earth (Bakker, 2010; 
Castree, 2008). Specifically viewing climate change diplomacy and governance 
as functioning under a Climate Empire, however, can provide a different 
perspective on the ways in which the imperial machine of Empire governs the 
globe.  
Local and Global Construction of Climate Empire 
Globally, climate information flows through networks that are primarily 
dominated by a relatively closed group of white, male climate change scientists 
and practitioners from industrialized nations (Barnett & Campbell, 2010). This 
allows for relative ease within these spaces to police the types of knowledge 
 161 
considered legitimate and maintain the authority of Climate Empire (an exception 
being the “climate deniers” that many times come from these same spaces). 
However, knowledge cannot stay at this global level and be useful for 
overcoming climate change challenges. While Climate Empire can be seen 
purely in global terms, the local and global actually work together in producing 
and reproducing the Climate Empire. This is primarily accomplished through the 
relocalization of information that is a necessary component of climate knowledge. 
As described by Miller:  
Technical assistance works as a two-way street. Data collection networks 
developed by these institutions provide detailed information for 
increasingly sophisticated models of global systems and processes. At the 
same time, these networks help relocalize global knowledge in a variety of 
ways: (1) translating and extrapolating the outputs of global models into 
locally relevant information; (2) transmitting and transplanting this locally 
relevant information from sites of production to sites of consumption; and 
(3) helping recipients interpret and make sense of information in relation to 
local or national policy. (2004, p. 83) 
The relocalization of knowledge, then, occurs as the outputs of global technical 
models are reintegrated into the spaces from which their inputs came (Fig. 7). 
The relocalization of knowledge reconstructs local categories and 
representations by working to meet global requirements. The local also plays an 
 162 
important role in reshaping these spaces, as knowledge is gathered through data 
collection networks and incorporated into global models.19  
Figure 7: Diagram illustrating the knowledge transfer within Climate Empire.  
 
Thus, the local and global are not pitted against each other at ends of the 
spectrum, but rather are co-constituted as data is locally collected, globally 
analyzed, and relocalized within polices and projects. As Hardt and Negri 
describe it, “In many characterizations the problem rests on a false dichotomy 
between the global and the local, assuming that the global entails 
homogenization and undifferentiated identity whereas the local preserves 
heterogeneity and difference” (2000, p. 44). They call instead for a more nuanced 
																																																						
19 Miller’s work deals with the transformation of the global by the local limitedly, 
but this topic is taken up more in the “Relocalization of Knowledge and 
Reshaping the Climate Empire” section of this chapter. 
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understanding of the relation between the two. This chapter seeks to do just that. 
While the previous chapters of this dissertation have presented local and global 
as positioned on opposite ends of the spectrum, this chapter works to reconsider 
the creation of both the local and the global under a network of relations. The 
next section is concerned with the way in which Climate Empire is structured 
within the Pacific Islands. I will then look to the way in which relocalizing 
knowledge impacts Climate Empire in ways that have been heretofore 
underexplored.  
Building the Pacific Island Climate Empire 
 The colonial legacies of the Pacific Islands are still palpable within 
governance in the region. An emphasis on vulnerability, lack of capacity, and 
powerlessness is evident in the speech and practices of actors, particularly those 
external to the region. Climate change governance in the region is ripe with 
“assumptions about scale (large global forces literally and metaphorically 
drowning small islands); power (social-ecological drivers of vulnerability which 
overwhelm weak local systems); and knowledge (models and indexes are a sine 
qua non for decision making)” (Barnett & Campbell, 2010; p. 2). While these 
views are challenged by some (a topic taken up later in this chapter), they 
directly impact what is understood as possible and desirable in the region.  
These views of power, authority, and knowledge are mirrored in the global 
elements of the narratives and discourses in Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation. In Chapter 3, the villain of the global technical narrative was lack of 
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capacity, resources, and scientific information. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
organizations that used the green governmentality discourse framed capacity 
challenges as a lack of scientific knowledge and technical capabilities, while 
organizations that used ecological modernization discourse were concerned with 
the lack of bureaucratic capacity necessary to meet external donor funding 
requirements. While focused on slightly different operational elements of climate 
change governance, these ways of speaking all share the view that legitimate 
decision-making occurs through the use of scientific and bureaucratic knowledge, 
and that a lack of those particular types of capacity is the foundation of the 
problem in the Pacific. 
These ways of speaking about and governing climate change have, over 
time, built Climate Empire. Climate Empire in the Pacific Islands has come about 
through three main processes. First, informatization of the climate has ensured 
that the scientific and technical expertise remains at the forefront of decision-
making. Second, financing for climate change governance has cemented colonial 
legacies and ensured that Western logics of rule remain pertinent to Pacific 
Island decision-making. Finally, regionalism within the Pacific Islands has 
fostered a focal point for these logics of rule, fortifying the networks of knowledge 
and communication, while also deepening the policing capabilities for Climate 





Informatization, again, is the process behind the production of the 
information economy through knowledge, communication, and affective services. 
Within Pacific Island Climate Empire, knowledge networks work to gather local 
climate information, deliver it to global information processing spaces, and 
relocalize it. In these spaces, scientific and technocratic understandings of the 
climate and its inhabitants are required in order to ensure efficiency across the 
dispersed transnational and global spaces in which the nodes of the network are 
situated. In other words, due to the multi-scalar and distributed production of 
climate knowledge—both regionally within the Pacific Islands and globally—
authoritative science is privileged for its ease of translation and scalability.  
By forming climate change governance around these models and indexes 
that accompany authoritative science, efforts to boost scientific, bureaucratic, 
and technical capacity have been pushed to the forefront of governance, while 
the adaptive capacity of community interventions has been largely ignored 
(Barnett & Campbell, 2010). This has left many of the central Pacific Island 
climate practitioners privileging bureaucratic and scientific knowledges over local 
constructions of climate vulnerability in order to meet the capacity constraints 
produced by informatization.  
Additionally, global requirements have pushed governance in the region to 
form in particular ways due to the ill-adaptive ways of informatization. As one 
participant stated:  
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[UNFCCC] demand[s] countries to put in place frameworks, national and 
regional frameworks on climate change, national adaptation plans on 
climate change, national policies on climate change. So that that’s an 
outside-driven problem. So, when countries follow those instructions, they 
silo climate change as a sector, which in fact is not a sector. 
In other words, UNFCCC’s drive for clear bureaucratic structures pushes 
countries to consider climate change as external to the other issues and 
challenges being faced as a region. This silo-ing effect of outside influence was 
criticized by many of the participants with whom I spoke. Many participants 
stated that an integrated approach was the only way they could see climate 
change issues actually being addressed. However, the high levels of expertise 
required by the informatization of climate change in the Pacific stood as a 
formidable barrier to greater levels of integration.  
Financing 
Climate Empire in the Pacific Islands is, in many ways, built by the flows of 
resources in the region. While the discursive practices upholding the scientific 
and bureaucratic authority do considerable work to legitimize the Climate Empire, 
they gain much of their power through financial backing. The transformative 
impact of global financing on governance in the region was discussed by many 
participants, particularly within government agencies, but also in regional 
organizations more broadly. One participant described the impact of GCF’s 
globally regulated funding as follows:  
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there was a GCF project approved Vanuatu that is like 40 million USD for 
the MET office. I’ve worked with the MET office, and it’s like there’s 
probably 5 people in the climate section. I just can’t imagine how that’s 
gonna distort the MET office compared to other government departments. 
How that’s gonna exacerbate the differences between … well anyway, I 
guess this is all part and parcel of the climate change space.  
This individual also stated:  
In relation to the funding, again, what I’m interested in is some of these 
projects are so … they almost reinforce the silo-ing of climate change 
ministries and create empire-building within the countries themselves, 
within the climate change ministries. 
Funneling unprecedented quantities of money into government departments 
bolsters the ability of Climate Empire to shape Pacific Islands governance 
according to its own image.  
In the Pacific Islands, global and regional organizations discuss the need 
for states to be at the forefront of decision-making. In practice, however, states’ 
interests are many times dictated by the requirements of funding. Traditional 
donor partners—including post-colonial states—along with global bodies such as 
the UN agencies, the Global Environment Facility [GEF], and others, provide 
much of the funding for the region through a variety of bilateral, multilateral, and 
regional funding mechanisms (Atteridge & Canales, 2017). While donors’ 
activities vary considerably, many funding requirements tax the capabilities and 
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capacities of Pacific Islanders in ways that can limit access. One participant 
described a project in this way:  
Fiji was the first one to get approved, the Green Climate Fund project. So, 
overall that was a $200 million project that the Green Climate Fund was 
gonna put in 40 million, because it’s in phases and the first phase cost 40 
million. We did some calculation with the others whose work contributed to 
this, and we reckoned it was 2 million for all the things that went down 
[cost benefit analysis, gender analysis, economic and social safety 
guards, environmental impact assessment, etc.]. 2 million in from 200 
million up, not bad. But nobody in the region has 2 million lying around to 
do that in the first place. 
In other words, while there was a formidable amount of funding on the table, 
GCF required $2 million of upfront investment in research to access the funds 
that they may or may not receive in the end, a considerable barrier for many 
Pacific Island countries. Participants regularly discussed this type of issue. The 
series of bureaucratic, scientific, and technical boxes needing to be checked off 
in order to receive financing took up valuable time and energy, while ensuring 
that Western logics of rule remain pertinent to Pacific Island decision-making. 
 The bureaucratic, scientific, and technical conditions to be met for 
financing sediments the imperial power of Climate Empire. Funders from external 
to the region gain dominance over decision-making spaces by holding the keys 
necessary to access resources. They determine the rules of the game, ensuring 
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their requirements are met through administrative functions and the production 
and policing of authoritative knowledge. While there are conversations about 
changing these forms of funding (as one participant stated, “This absolute 
appetite for rethinking [the donor-recipient] relationship in the Pacific.”), there 
remains a power imbalance between funder requirements and the ability of 
Pacific Island states to determine their own climate futures. This is reinforced 
through efforts toward regionalism. 
Regionalism 
 
Much of the informatization and financing within the Pacific Islands occurs 
through regional governance efforts, particularly through CROP agencies. As 
many states are small, regional agencies concentrate the capacity of the region 
by drawing top Pacific Island and international talent into their organizations. 
Repeating again from the introduction of this dissertation, CROP agencies were 
described by one participant as a “decolonization process that warped into 
technical assistance.” This relationship to the colonial histories of the Pacific 
Islands impacts the current governance efforts. While CROP agencies are 
mandated to receive instructions from states, the colonial legacies within CROP 
agencies is evident in the partial or full participation of states such as Australia, 
New Zealand, and others. This is not to say that outside states control these 
decision-making spaces, but rather they make for complicated and, at times, 
contentious relationships.  
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CROP agencies gain much of their regional power by being a funnel for 
climate financing in the region. The bureaucratic structures that form the rules for 
finances within the Pacific put pressure on the limited bureaucratic capacities of 
organizations, thus privileging the CROP agencies’ ability to pool the region’s 
resources. For instance, the process to become an Accredited Entity for Green 
Climate Fund [GCF] funding is challenging, expensive in terms of time and 
resources, and yet it is necessary to access the billions in global financing 
available through GCF. SPREP was the first regional entity able to commit the 
time and resources to achieve this accreditation. This put this CROP agency in a 
unique position to determine what projects would and would not receive this 
financing.  
Colonial legacies and control over finances have also placed CROP 
agencies in the position to lead the data collection networks (Miller, 2004) that 
serve to push locally gathered information into global climate models. This is 
accomplished through technical assistance programs that work to increase the 
capacity of states and local knowledge producers. The technical assistance 
provided by CROP agencies to connect the global and the local plays a large role 
in policing knowledge. As discussed in Chapter 3, CROP agencies many times 
serve as ‘boundary organizations’ in the Pacific. They play this role by lending or 
taking away authority from different ways of knowing. This is not to say that they 
work at the boundary of the network, but rather that they form a boundary 
between different portions of the network. CROP agencies hold central positions 
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within the Pacific Islands climate change network (Chapter 4), but also serve 
significant brokerage functions in the network. For instance, SPREP and SPC, 
two of the CROP agencies most focused on climate change, have gatekeeper20 
scores approximately 3.5 times larger than any other organization in the network. 
The brokerage scores allow regional entities to form a boundary between the 
local community information and strategies and the global donor bodies that 
allows them to be a gatekeeper for the type of knowledge that is deemed 
acceptable.  
 CROP agencies could thus be understood as agents of Climate Empire, 
functioning at a regional level to institutionalize the global technical logic of rule. 
Through bureaucratic and technical expertise, CROP agencies reinforce the 
requirements for particular types of knowledge and capacity that have authority in 
global intergovernmental organizations and post-colonial states. This type of 
decision-making can impact the sovereignty of states through subtle means. As 
one participant described the role of CROP agencies:  
a lot of outcome documents and communiqués are written by the agencies 
for themselves, it seems. Just to justify their ongoing work, rather than a 
proper discussion and debate on a hard decision that needs to be made,  
 
																																																						
20 Gatekeeper scores are determined by the number of instances of BàAàA, 
where A and B are separate groups in the network and the middle position is the 
broker. For instance, AustraliaàSPREPà 
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and what that means for the countries to make that decision. That kind of 
conversation. It seems to be about just agencies justifying their existence. 
The decision-making within the region, thus, tends to more heavily reside in the 
activities of these agencies, rather than the countries’ informed decisions.  
What makes this procedural control interesting in light of Climate Empire is 
the ability to both extend the network and centralize control. Regionalization 
makes for easier policing of the logics of rule at work within Climate Empire, as 
CROP agencies can work as a focal point for multiple projects in multiple locales 
simultaneously. The brokerage scores discussed earlier in this section 
demonstrate their role in finance, where they channel funding from global actors 
to local projects. Their connection to global financial flows, along with their work 
on the ground, allows them to monitor the local representations of climate 
change projects, thus extending the Climate Empire’s panopticon to multiple 
levels. These elements of the Climate Empire impact both the social and 
environmental realities of climate change governance in the Pacific Islands. 
Climate Empire and Nature in the Pacific Islands 
The discussion of immaterial labor formed through knowledge networks in 
Climate Empire can leave behind the material realities relevant to production 
(Sprague, 2011), particularly when considering production of the environment. 
Another way in which this investigation of Climate Empire can shift away from 
Hardt and Negri’s Empire is through a careful consideration of the material 
elements of constructing and governing the climate.  
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One example of this material relationship with nature comes in the form of 
pigs. Pigs pay an interesting role in the social and environmental histories of the 
Pacific. Products of migration as early as the fourth century A.D., pigs have 
played an integral role in the survival of Polynesians.  The pua’a (Polynesian 
pig), was small, free-roaming, and relatively domesticated. As Maly, Pang, and 
Burrows discuss:  
Clearly, domesticated pua‘a carried strong cultural value in traditional 
Hawai‘i. Aside from being an important possession and food source, an 
oral tradition describes the adventures of Kamapua‘a (the pig child), a 
powerful demi-god who ranged over the islands and into the sea. Even the 
name of the traditional land management system, ahupua’a, refers directly 
to the pua‘a and highlights the animal’s importance among the variety of 
resources that were collected and offered during the annual mahakiki 
tributes. (2013, p.2) 
However, the modern pig shares little with the pua’a beloved by fourth century 
Polynesians. The modern pig is a product of European immigration and is much 
larger and feral, gradually moving further away from humans and into “pristine 
upland forests” (ibid.). Conservation efforts have recently explored options to 
remove these feral pigs from the land due to their non-native status along with 
the environmental challenges they pose (East Maui Watershed Partnership, 
n.d.). This is made even more relevant as climate change impacts the forests’ 
ability to recover from disturbances like the pig.  
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One individual I spoke with, however, shared a different view. Luau feasts 
that include kālua pigs cooked in an imu, or underground oven, are a critical part 
of native Hawai’ian social connectivity. They provide a space to get together and 
share abundance, and have served a variety of purposes throughout the 
Polynesian history on the islands. During the collapse of the sugar cane industry, 
native Hawai’ians were hit with high levels of unemployment, a particularly 
vulnerable position with limited employment options. However, this period also 
saw an increase in luaus, made possible by hunting the feral pigs around the 
islands. The pigs thus offered an opportunity for the community to feed itself, 
check in and reconnect, and make sure that everyone was getting the support 
they needed to get through this challenging period. Additionally, the pig 
represented the connectivity of the community—it had to be passed around to be 
slaughtered, butchered, cooked, then passed out to the community. It served a 
role as both the catalyst for the network and a practice of the network at the 
same time.  
While this story is specific to the US Hawai’ian islands, the sentiment was 
shared by others I spoke with throughout the Pacific Islands. The individual who 
shared this story was concerned with the inextricability of the social and 
environmental networks. He discussed how any environmental management 
actions had to be placed within their social contexts in order to capture potential 
unintended consequences.  
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As environmental concerns are subjugated to scientific and bureaucratic 
expertise, nature becomes an ‘other’ (Scott, 1998) to be oriented in service of the 
Climate Empire. In other words, instead of understanding nonhuman nature as a 
player in governance networks through its activities and efforts for survival 
(Latour, 2005; Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013), Climate Empire makes nature 
into an object that can be “terraform[ed],” where “nature is approached as a 
terrestrial infrastructure subject to state protection, management and domination” 
(Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, p. 55). The construction of nature as separate 
and controllable as opposed to integrated and fluid creates challenges for climate 
change governance. While Climate Empire works to create a “terraform” project, 
exerting control through governmentality onto social and environmental systems, 
local constructions of nature in the Pacific Islands introduce fluidity, adaptability, 
and responsiveness to governance of these systems. These competing 
discourses and their resulting practices can have tangible impacts on social and 
environmental governance. This misalignment is evident as knowledge is locally 
collected, globally analyzed, and relocalized in the Pacific Islands under Climate 
Empire.  
Relocalization of Knowledge and Reshaping the Climate Empire 
Following Judith Butler’s (1997) work, Agrawal argues, “although it is fair 
to suggest that development discourses colonize subjects, surely they do not 
colonize all subjects” (2005, p. 225). This is also true of Climate Empire’s efforts 
within the Pacific Islands. Local and regional organizations in the Pacific Islands 
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have made efforts to reframe power, opening up the climate change space to 
include local strategies for governance (see Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation). The split in the narrative of climate diplomacy mirrors a larger trend 
of localization within environmental governance (Agrawal, 2005). Environmental 
loss to recuperation, appropriation to resistance, these stories of a new 
environmental governance mirror the post-colonial trend in discourse among 
developing nations from domination to freedom and subjugation to power. They 
are stories of liberation from the rigidity of the colonial master to the agency of 
the ‘local,’ in whatever form that takes. However, the Pacific Islands’ localism still 
struggles against the discourses of powerlessness embedded in colonial 
legacies, focus on technical and bureaucratic capacities, and reliance on external 
funding.  
While Climate Empire works in and through global strategies to produce 
and uphold their technical bureaucratic and scientific authorities, these global 
spaces are pushed into contact with these local challenges through data 
collection networks and efforts to relocalize knowledge. Data collection networks 
gather local information in order to globally analyze it. The relocalization of 
knowledge occurs within Climate Empire as climate information is communicated 
throughout the network. Again, this is done through:  
(1) translating and extrapolating the outputs of global models into locally 
relevant information; (2) transmitting and transplanting this locally relevant 
information from sites of production to sites of consumption; and (3) 
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helping recipients interpret and make sense of information in relation to 
local or national policy. (Miller, 2004, p. 83) 
In the Pacific Islands, information on sea level rise, weather patterns, ocean 
temperatures, marine species, etc., is meticulously gathered through data 
collection networks, like the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS). GCOS 
was established in 1992 in order to standardize and routinize climate 
observations (Salinger et al., 2002). The Pacific Islands’ GCOS (PI-GCOS) 
gathers climate information in-situ (more detailed than satellite data), and works 
through a formal system for delivering that information to GCOS. Global 
organizations like the World Meteorological Organisation and Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission are working directly with organizations like SPREP 
and SPC to build the PI-GCOS data collection network. The information is then 
analyzed at a global level according to statistically predictive climate models in 
hopes of uncovering the true and correctable patterns of the globe. This globally-
modeled data is then relocalized into Pacific Islands climate policy. The first 
objective presented for the PI-GCOS is, “To continually advocate the importance 
of GCOS observing systems to policy applications on the part of national 
governments and other interested users (e.g. social, cultural and economic 
implications)” (ibid., p. 7). Therefore, the relocalization is complete as PI-GCOS 
interprets global climate information for national policy.  
The relocalization of knowledge produces crises as local and global ways 
of knowing come face to face. As local and global understandings of climate 
 178 
change in the Pacific Islands come into contact, resistance against the global 
constructions of environmental governance is discernable. Particularly in my 
interviews with participants from organizations at the periphery of the network, 
the local/global disconnect was evident. As one individual stated:  
How people from outside governments pretend that they know everything 
in that region. They say, “we have the solutions to your problem.” When 
you see most people talking about the solutions in the Pacific are the ones 
from outside. So, sometimes I just wonder, these are crazy people! 
The idea that an external actor—even an external actor with access to technical 
knowledge and resources—could know the Pacific Islands well enough to speak 
for them and offer definitive solutions was deemed laughable by many 
participants. Communities can also feel confused or overwhelmed by the climate 
work occurring in the region. As one participant stated:  
I just think the way it’s structured right now makes it difficult for 
communities to know whether their money is coming from the SPC, 
SPREP, the UN … I don’t get the sense that they really know that. I heard 
one of the communities say, “Well, we always know when we have to talk 
about the project because we see the UN truck, and that’s how the 
community knows.” Fair enough. 
These challenges can cause disconnect in the ability of Climate Empire to work 
in these localized spaces.  
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While many times the local constructions of climate change can come in 
contrast with global constructions, they are all still focused on a similar goal—to 
alleviate the burden of challenges brought about by climate change. However, 
the complex nature of climate change in the Pacific Islands makes this even 
more of a challenge than in other places. As one individual I spoke with 
described her work:  
one community we went to said, ‘we need more knives.’ And they were 
talking about climate change, and we were like, ‘what?’ And then we 
realized it’s because they associate money coming from big institutions, 
and then we’re there, so they are like, ‘we should ask for knives so we can 
use this for fishing, agriculture or whatever.’ So, for them, this is a holistic 
way of looking at the issues. It’s not like they’re worried about sea-level 
risk. The way we break down issues, I don’t think it’s the same at all 
because ‘this is my life, this is my experience, so it doesn’t really matter 
what it affects…whether the soil is eroding or whether the sea-level is 
rising. No matter is happening, this is how I experience this problem in my 
life.’ 
In this case, local participants may question the relevance to climate change to 
their lives at all. In fact, the focus on climate change may be seen as deferring 
resources away from more immediate needs—knives—such that the imperial 
imposition of Climate Empire is apparent. These levels of detachment between 
global climate change and local realities—ranging from disconnected decision-
 180 
making to imperial imposition—presents a challenge as agencies work to 
connect the global and local for the production and reproduction of the Climate 
Empire.  
It is in this space that CROP agencies become vitally important for the 
production and reproduction of Climate Empire. CROP agencies function as 
boundary organizations in order to mitigate the corruption formed from local 
resistance. These boundary organizations mediate and facilitate the coproduction 
of knowledge (Cash et al., 2006) in ways that may stifle, delegitimize, and 
displace certain forms of knowledge (Lejano & Ingram, 2009) in order to 
streamline knowledge processes. Boundary organizations, thus, work to police 
Climate Empire by managing corruption in multiple spaces of data collection 
networks and relocalization processes. This ensures that there is not a single 
point of resistance, but multiple spaces of contestation. Returning again to the 
analogy earlier in this chapter, while the “tomato sauce” of colonial forms of rule 
required continuous attention, Climate Empire works in and through the “broth” of 
regional governance by creating multiple points of pressure and pressure 
alleviation. This can also be demonstrated through network structure, as is done 
below (Fig. 8). Again, this is not a perfect analogy. Colonial powers many times 
worked through regional elites (Bull & Watson, 1984) in ways that may mirror the 
Climate Empire network approach. However, this is meant to exemplify a broader 
shift in organizational power structures of control.  
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Figure 8: Network visualizations of differing relations of power under colonial and 
Empire rule.  
  
 
 While this could be analyzed under a unidirectional pattern of boundary 
organizations conforming the local to the global requirements—fitting with the 
traditional understanding of Empire—it is also important to consider the ways in 
which these boundary organizations recalibrate global spaces to adapt to the 
demands of the “multitude.” Relocalization of knowledge requires that global 
spaces are capable of creating locally relevant information out of the global 
climate models, while transmitting that information to sites of consumption where 
it can be transformed into policies and practices. While the influence of colonial 
legacies and financing in the Pacific Islands ensures that those local spaces are 
transformed in ways that can accept the global climate information, the continued 
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resistance of local spaces has caused reverberations that run throughout the 
Climate Empire, all the way up to the global level.  
 Global projects are responding to these reverberations of resistance by 
including varying degrees of local involvement in their projects. The REDD 
program has become REDD+, now including good governance, equity, and the 
roles of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities. The Convention 
for Biological Diversity is working to increase the “full and effective participation 
of indigenous and local communities,” guided through an advisory committee 
(Convention for Biological Diversity, no date, para. 1). The UN Climate 
Secretariat has recently added the local communities and indigenous peoples 
platform to inform decision-making (UNFCCC, 2017). This is not to say that these 
programs have completely or even effectively brought local issues into their 
decision-making, but rather that local resistance has encouraged shifts in their 
programs.  
 One participant spoke of a project in the Pacific that addresses some of 
these issues. Under pressure from states and local entities, agencies have 
begun to invest in both the collection of local proverbs and the use of scientific 
methodologies to adapt those local proverbs to the current state of the climate. In 
other words, agencies are collecting these proverbs, verifying proverbs 
scientifically, and then creating new proverbs that are relevant to changing 
conditions. Interestingly, agencies have not stopped there. While the global 
elements of climate change are still considered vitally important to understanding 
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and acting upon the challenges ahead, experiences of climate change vary 
across scales and spaces. A fisherman on the Fijian coastline will experience 
dramatically different effects than a hunter in the Fijian hills. This type of detailed 
scale is not currently possible with the climate models available. However, 
agencies have begun to consider using the local proverbs to change the way in 
which climate change is understood and studied to include the small-scale shifts 
in local patterns.  
 While new, pilot-based, and lightly funded by Australian aid, this project 
makes an interesting step. Pressure within the region has caused external 
partners—like Australia—to fund projects that highlight local knowledge and 
strategies in ways that may have previously been seen as somewhat illegitimate 
under the global, technical solutions of Climate Empire. Again, the goal of this 
project is to incorporate local knowledge into existing scientific models and 
strategies. Therefore, these types of projects could alternatively be seen as 
furthering the biopolitical (Foucault, 2003, 2009, 2010) control over local 
populations. In projects like these, the panopticon of Climate Empire extends 
further down into the local spaces, measuring, quantifying, and standardizing 
experiences at all levels. Enlisting local participants in legitimizing the authority of 
foreign rule occurred throughout the successful empires of the past (Storey, 
1997), and is now repeated within Climate Empire. By using authoritative science 
to validate and update local knowledge, it also extends the normalizing impact of 
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Climate Empire. It is in this tension, space of corruption, and series of 
contradictions that Climate Empire remains ripe for future exploration. 
Conclusion 
Using Climate Empire as a concept by which to explore the power, 
authority, and knowledge within climate change governance in the Pacific Islands 
can ensure that the complexity inherent in the network of local/global spaces is 
properly considered. Grounded in the technical and scientific approaches to 
climate change diplomacy and governance, Climate Empire gains authority by 
utilizing apolitical discourse, bringing instrumental solutions to global, technical 
problems. The informatization of climate change governance that fosters these 
technical approaches, the use of financing to secure the use of Western logics of 
rule, and the regionalization efforts that provide avenues for monitoring and 
policing all work together to form the Climate Empire in the Pacific Islands. The 
relocalization of knowledge, while providing depth for the reach of Climate 




Chapter 6: Conclusion: Findings and Recommendations  
Introduction 
In a recent study of Tuvalu’s landmass, researchers found that, as 
adaptive ecosystems, the islands of Tuvalu had actually grown over the last four 
decades (Kench, Ford, & Owen, 2018). These findings produced a wide range of 
reactions among recipients: hope among islanders, vindication among climate 
deniers, or anger and frustration among Pacific Island climate negotiators, 
depending on the recipient’s position (Friedman, 2018). In 2016, the Guardian 
released a story entitled, “Five Pacific islands lost to rising seas as climate 
change hits” (Anon., 2016). Immediately after, the publication released a 
correction requested by the study’s authors, “Headlines 'exaggerated' climate link 
to sinking of Pacific islands” (Mathiesen, 2016). These instances highlight the 
fact that debates over knowledge within climate change diplomacy and 
governance within the Pacific Islands are rarely that simple. The power and 
authority produced by and productive of climate change knowledge means that 
contestation is at the heart of the decision-making. One of the ways in which 
these contests play out is through the ways of speaking about climate change 
diplomacy and governance—the narratives that ground the stories of policy and 
the discourses that frame climate change in historical contexts.  
This dissertation explored the way that these issues of power, authority, 
and knowledge are constructed and circulated through networks of climate 
change practitioners and decision-makers in the Pacific Islands. Utilizing social 
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network analysis, narrative, and discourse approaches, I focused on issues of 
communication and collaboration in efforts to govern the globe—locally, 
regionally, and globally. In this conclusion, I will provide a summary of the 
dissertation, draw broad themes that run throughout the dissertation, and gather 
together the recommendations for governance that were described by 
participants.  
Summary 
 In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I explored the theories that could help to 
explain the ways in which power, authority, and knowledge run throughout 
transnational environmental governance networks in the Pacific Islands. First, 
transnational governance was positioned as a multi-actor space that includes 
non-state actors. Power was presented as productive, relational, distributed 
throughout society, and expressed through the text and practices of discourses. 
Power/knowledge—or the ways in which this productive, relational, and societal 
discursive power is heavily embedded in regimes of knowledge and ways of 
understanding the world—was used to orient the role of knowledge production in 
formulating power relations. Networks were presented as a useful tool for 
organizing the dynamics of power, authority, and knowledge within the multi-
actor space. Finally, I organized power, authority, and knowledge according to 
traditional, bureaucratic, scientific, and practical relations.  
In Chapter 3, I discussed the diplomatic efforts of the Pacific Islands in the 
lead-up to COP21, particularly the declarations presented at the Pacific Island 
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Forum [PIF] Summit and Pacific Islands Development Forum [PIDF] Summit. 
These declarations were explored from a narrative-network approach, where 
both the organizational representation and narrative construction differed 
between the two groups. The PIF Summit included a limited representation of 
states and IGOs, producing what I referred to as a global technical narrative that 
emphasizes the scientific and bureaucratic solutions to climate problems. 
Alternatively, the PIDF Summit had broader participation that included more 
states and wide variety of domestic and international NGOs, producing what I 
referred to as a local power narrative that advocated local decision-making and 
information. The global technical narrative was presented as efficient, but had 
some challenges for representation of alternative ways of knowing. Alternatively, 
the local power narrative can open up knowledge and decision-making, but can 
also be costly in terms of time and resources.  
For Chapter 4, I used Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s (2006) three 
environmental discourses—green governmentality, ecological modernization, 
and civic environmentalism—to further explore the use of discourse in producing 
and reaffirming the local/global contestations over the power, authority, and 
knowledge of Pacific Island climate change governance efforts. Green 
governmentality emphasized scientific expertise, global knowledge, and decision-
making concentrated in the administrative state and knowledge producing 
institutions. Efforts were being made to broaden these decision-making spaces 
through the use of science communication. Ecological modernization applied the 
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rational-legal authority embedded in an operational knowledge of development. 
Authoritative decision-making under this discourse was either concentrated in 
donor partners and implementing agencies, or distributed to civil society 
depending on the strength of the discourse. Finally, civic environmentalism 
functioned under practical authority, focusing on contextual knowledge and social 
inclusion. Civil society was brought into development processes under the 
reformist version of the discourse, while the radical version that denies the 
primacy of development was limitedly discussed. There was some overlap 
between the central organizations that employed the green governmentality 
discourse and the moderately central organizations that used the ecological 
modernization discourse. The civic environmentalism was used slightly by other 
groups, but mostly was used at the periphery of the network.  
Finally, expanding on Hart and Negri’s (2000) work in Empire, Chapter 5 
looked at climate change diplomacy and governance under the concept of 
Climate Empire—the network of scientific, technological, social, and political 
systems that produce knowledge and communicative services to make the 
climate legible and governable. Climate Empire is formed as informatization (the 
production of the information economy through knowledge, communication, and 
affective services) privileges scientific and technical expertise, financing has 
ensured that Western logics of rule remain pertinent, and regionalism has 
fostered a focal point for these logics of rule. Importantly, the local and global 
elements of climate change diplomacy and governance are connected in the 
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relocalization (Miller, 2004) processes inherent in global knowledge. In climate 
change spaces, data is locally collected, globally analyzed, and relocalized within 
polices and projects. This interaction between the local and global spaces means 
that both are impacted in significant ways.  
Drawing the Strands Together 
While the dissertation follows a number of threads within diplomacy and 
governance in Pacific Island climate change networks, there are a few themes 
that run throughout the dissertation. Chapters 3 and 4 both deal extensively with 
the local and global elements of climate change diplomacy and governance in 
the Pacific Islands (Tables 6 and 7). Global constructions of climate change were 
found in diplomatic spaces through the global technical narrative, while in 
governance spaces it was found in the green governmentality and ecological 
modernization discourses. While these ways of speaking and acting are 
described in previous chapters as distinct, they also hold strong similarities as 
they privilege the role of global technical information in decision-making and 
practice. The local power narrative of the discussion on diplomacy and civic 
environmentalism discourse of the discussion on governance both share many 
key elements of local construction. In these ways of speaking and acting, local 
understandings of climate change and its impacts have power and should be 








Table 7: Narratives of Pacific Island climate diplomacy.  
Global Technical Narrative Local Power Narrative 
Victim: PICs 
Villain: Lack of Capacity, Resources, 
and Scientific Information 
Hero: Regional Organizations 
Policy Moral: Greater Regional 
Functionality 
Victim: PICs 
Villain: Ecological Vulnerability due to 
Emitters 
Hero: Pacific Island Peoples 
Policy Moral: Local Inclusion in 
Decision-Making 
 
These discourses align in such a way that they provide a local/global 
break in the power, authority, and knowledge considered in strategies in the 
Pacific Islands. The global way of understanding power, authority, and 
knowledge in the Pacific Islands is focused on expert and bureaucratic authority 
through the privileging of scientific and operational knowledge (Fig. 9). Through 
the requirements that these types of authority and knowledge place on 
organizations working toward diplomacy or governance, power is found in 
organizations that have large quantities of technical capacity at their disposal. In 
other words, in order to gain power and authority according to global 
requirements, capacity for technical knowledge and expertise is required. These 
ways of knowing the earth also have particular strategies for governing it, 
specifically terraform projects that view the earth as separate from the social 
world and controllable. Thus, the climate is approached with particular attention 





Figure 9: Outline of the global discourse within climate change governance and 




Local strategies for speaking and acting upon climate change governance 
and diplomacy privilege practical authority and contextual knowledge (Fig. 10). 
This reframes capacity challenges under the ability to know the local environment 
and to make decisions at that level. In local strategies for governance and 
diplomacy, nature is unable to be terraformed and controlled. Instead, it is 
integrated with the social world and it is fluid. Nature is, thus, a player in 
governance networks through its activities and efforts for survival (Latour, 1995; 
Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013). This understanding privileges local, adaptive 




















Figure 10: Outline of the local discourse within climate change governance and 




While these local and global strategies are in many ways distinct, they are 
brought together under the formation of Climate Empire. Climate Empire works in 
and through global strategies to produce and uphold their technical bureaucratic 
and scientific authorities; however, these global spaces are also reconnected 
with the spaces of local resistance through data collection networks and efforts to 
relocalize knowledge. This connection means that both the local and the global 
are impacted through the production and reproduction of the Climate Empire. 
While the use of local strategies in global projects has increased in recent years, 
this could have varying impacts on the circulation of power in these spaces. For 
instance, projects that incorporate local knowledge can make for better decision-
making in local spaces, or they could extend panopticon of Climate Empire 














experiences at all levels. It is in this place of expansion and resistance that work 
remains left to be done.  
What Now? 
 There were a few themes that I heard from the majority of Pacific Island 
participants about what could be done to improve the system of climate change 
governance and diplomacy. First, it is important that the burden of climate 
change is distributed according to historic roles in causing climate change. This 
includes the full range of strategies, particularly in regards to diplomatic 
leadership in emissions reductions, domestic mitigation strategies, and easy to 
access, sufficient, and sustainable financing for countries facing the brunt of 
climate challenges. The US has been and continues to be one of the largest 
emitters of GHGs in the world, yet President Trump recently rescinded US 
support of the Paris Agreement. Additionally, the transition in the US has caused 
trepidation within Pacific Island countries that rely on the funding. As one 
participant explained:  
Donors don’t like long term investments. I guess it’s understandable, the 
kind of flux that we have in terms of change. Just this morning I heard 
USAID budget might be slashed in the next year, and USAID has only just 
come back in the region like two years ago with a huge amount of money. 
They wanted to align to climate change. So, on Trump’s end, he’s cutting 
all that out. I have some friends who applied for these USAID posts, and 
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they’re going to go for an interview, but they’re probably not going to take 
it seriously, because they don’t think he’ll last too long. #laughs# 
While lighthearted, this quote one example of how participants felt that their 
projects could easily be put in limbo based on the political shifts of other 
countries. Australia, for instance, had shifted focus while I was there from 
“climate change” to “climate variability” due to the political pressure. This 
adjustment in vocabulary changes the timescales on which their MET services 
focus, shifting emphasis and funding from long-term endeavors. These efforts 
among climate emitters to reduce their involvement and shift responsibility vastly 
exacerbates the already challenging task among Pacific Islands to adapt to 
climate change.  
 While it may require committed global action to overcome the challenges 
of climate change, the second issue pertains to the role of global powers in 
Pacific Island affairs. It is vitally important for the Pacific Islands to receive 
financing and technical assistance in adaptation and mitigation strategies. That 
being said, there are ways of doing this that concentrate power in the hands of 
external actors and those that work to rely on local actors to set the agenda. It is 
not enough that local actors are brought to the table to work on projects dictated 
by external actors. Instead, the practical knowledge and experience of local 
actors must help drive the agenda in the first place. This is important not only for 
issues of justice, but also for efficacy. For example, Govan (2009) and Sievanen, 
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Gruby, and Campbell (2013), among others, have demonstrated the ways in 
which local involvement can bolster the impacts of governance in the region.  
 Along the lines of efficacy, a third issue that came up multiple times in the 
interviews is longevity of projects. Pilot projects, short-term interventions, 
surveys, etc., were discussed as being the mode of operations of many funders. 
This forced the already understaffed organizations and agencies to juggle 
multiple projects at a time with multiple funders, interventions, and reporting 
strategies. As one participant described the pressure that puts on practitioners:  
All these things are an inverted pyramid that lands on one particular 
person’s head on the ground. That person has to have the pyramid stuck 
on his head and goes down to the community level to try and translate all 
those results from all those projects and all those technical interventions to 
make it work at the ground level. It’s hard. … So, all these fancy people 
like myself that might say, “Yeah, you need to drop a good work plan, and 
these are the things we think you need to do.” But at the end of the day, 
that poor sap’s gotta go out and figure out how to do it on his or her own.  
This pressure on practitioners—particularly those within government agencies—
has exacerbated existing capacity challenges within the region. Unsurprisingly, a 
“brain drain” was also discussed as educated and trained individuals leave 
positions in search of better pay and less stressful environments. This happens 
some with the concentration of capacity in regional agencies, but also as Pacific 
Islanders move to Australia, New Zealand, the US, and others. Thus, a number 
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of participants with whom I spoke emphasized the need for long-term 
interventions that are properly funded, particularly in regards to organizational 
capacity and support.  
While these interventions are significant, as it is said, it is important not to 
throw the baby out with the bathwater. These chapters have critically discussed 
the challenges at play with local, regional, and global governance in the region, 
but there is a lot of good at work, as well. Many of the region’s funders, decision-
makers, and practitioners are aware of the challenges discussed in this 
dissertation, and some even made progress toward mending power imbalances 
between my 2015 and 2017 trips through funding requirement changes and 
project shifts. As I spoke about in chapter 6, recent projects have worked to 
integrate local knowledge into climate models in ways that could mutually benefit 
local and global strategies. While acknowledging room for improvement, most 
participants spoke to a few key projects that they saw really making strides 
toward what they wanted to see in climate change governance and diplomacy. 
Perhaps most importantly, many of the individuals with whom I spoke held 
passion, hope, and motivation for a better world that was contagious. 
Acknowledging and appreciating where network actors at all levels can agree (or 
come close to agreeing) that things are working well can help guide future efforts 
for governance and diplomacy.  
Again, these suggestions were generated through the conversations I was 
able to have with Pacific Island climate change practitioners and decision-
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makers, which brings me to the final suggestion. Empowerment is a key element 
of governance and diplomacy that is more challenging in these postcolonial 
locales. Space to have open, collaborative communication that recognizes and 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide for Chapter 3 
 
Introduction of the interviewer. 
 
Sample:  
Hello, and thank you for agreeing to an interview. Again, my name is 
Ashlie Denton, and I am a doctorate student at Portland State University, 
in the United States. As you may remember from my phone call/email, 
participation in this interview is voluntary. This means you may choose 
now not to participate, refuse to answer any question, or end the interview 
at any time. If you decide after the interview that you do not wish your 
interview to be included in the study, you can contact me and have your 
interview deleted. I will leave my contact information for you. Additionally, 
this interview will be recorded, per your approval. Recording the interview 
will help me ensure that I capture your answers more fully, but if you wish 
to not be recorded, that will in no way effect your participation in the 
interview process. Here is the consent form that goes into greater detail on 
the information that I have just provided to you. Please check the boxes 
accordingly and sign.  
 
Thank you! Now I am going to ask a few questions that will help me better 
understand the environmental governance work that is occurring in the 
Pacific Islands. Please feel free to expand on any questions you find 
interesting. Any information you can provide is valuable to my research.  
 
Main Questions Additional Questions Clarifying Questions 
• What work do you do in 
environmental governance? 
 
• What is your job position? 
• What (other) environmental 
organizations are you associated 
with (if any)? 
 
• Can you 
expand a 
little on this? 
 









• What other organizations, 
individuals, or government 




• How frequently would you say that 
you are in contact? 
 
• Tell me about a time in 
which a project or series of 
projects were particularly 
successful.   
 
• Why do you think these were 
successes? 
• Which other organizations worked 
on these projects? 
 
• Tell me about a time in 
which a project or series of 
• Why do you think these projects 
were less successful?  
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projects did not turn out as 
planned.  
• Which other organizations worked 
on these projects?  
 
 
• What sources of 
information do you use to 
make decisions on 
mitigation/advocacy/policy?  
 
• Do these sources of information 
come from local, regional, or 
international sources?  
• Is there any organization, 
individual, or agency that 
your or your organization 
has chosen not to work with 
for any reason?  
 
• Who made the decision to no longer 
work with them? (If applicable)  
 
• Why? (If applicable) 
 
 
• What changes in recent 
years do you see around 
the issue of climate change, 




• What do you attribute these 
changes to?  
 
 
What do you think would help facilitate working together as a group?  
 
Is there anything you would like to add to what we have spoken of thus far?  
 
This concludes your interview. Thank you again for allowing me to interview you. 
As stated in the letter, if you would like to receive results of these interviews, 
please email me. Also, please let me know if you decide at any point that you 
wish for your interview to not be included in the final reports. Also, it is possible 
that I will contact you in the next few months to clarify answers or confirm 
findings. If you wish to not be contacted, you are welcome to say so now or email 
me.  
 
Finally, I am contacting participants for my surveys through recommendations of 
other participants. (Name of previous participant) referred you for this interview (if 
applicable). I was wondering if there were other individuals with whom you think I 
should speak. Would you be willing to provide me with their name and 
email/phone number?  
 
Thank you again for your time. Here is my card, please contact me with any 
questions or comments.  
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Appendix B: Social Network Analysis for Chapter 4 
 
For the social network analysis, I used an ‘actors-as-networks approach’ 
(Kahler, 2009), where the unit of analysis was not the whole network, but rather 
the organizations in the network. The boundaries of the network were formed 
using a positional approach, where characteristics or formal membership criteria 
are used to determine whether actors are a part of the network (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1995). The boundary was drawn at organizations—government agencies, 
environmental NGOs (Pacific Islands focused and global; advocacy and 
scientific), local user groups, and financers—that identify one of their primary 
activities as governance of climate change within the Pacific Islands. The data 
was organized into an adjacency matrix, one-mode (e.g. actor x actor; where 
rows and columns refer to a single set of entities), and using a weighted, 
directional approach (Wasserman & Faust, 1995). This research focused on 
organizations as nodes. Analysis focused specifically on organizations that 
identify as:  
• having an office in the Pacific Islands,  
• engaging in transnational projects, and  
• working on climate change adaptation and mitigation governance. 
 
The ties in the network were defined as the resource exchange evident in 
websites, grey papers (technical reports, programmatic information, etc.), 
newspapers, blogs, environmental reports, and financial statements. This data 
was restricted to that information which is provided in the archival data itself. This 
has its limitations, as it only captured those relationships that are formalized 
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through reporting, but it missed informal discussions and collaborations. This is 
why feedback from local practitioners was vitally important to understanding 
whether the data gathered through archival data captures the nature of 
transnational relationships in climate governance in the Pacific Islands.  
In addition to the data on collaborations and relationships, attributes of the 
organizations networked together in climate governance in the Pacific Islands 
were also gathered. This included: 
• Type—consultancy, financial organization, intergovernmental 
organization, nongovernmental organization, private company, scientific 
advisory organization, government, or university 
• Level of work—local, regional (within the whole Pacific Islands), or 
international  
• Location—this applied to both the location of their primary offices and any 
office within the Pacific for those organizations working internationally 
• Focus—carbon trading, climate change, communications, conservation, 
development, education, financial, food systems, government, health, 
human rights, marine resources, modeling and scientific advice, power, 
private business, religion, and general consultants. 
 
Finally, the type of interaction was recorded for analysis:  
• Archival type—this was used to indicate whether the demonstration of 
resource exchange happened in the context of:  
o Project or Program 
o Scientific Report 
o Policy or Plan of Action 
o Event 
• Level of interaction—categorization and the weight of interaction was 
determined through the level of participation ascribed through the 
introduction, acknowledgements, participant lists, or other key indicators, 
including the presence of logos.  
o Coleadership was demonstrated in the archives when the two 
organizations were discussed as both being central to the 
functioning of the project/plan/event or key to the production of the 
document itself. This category was given mutual directionality and 
given a score of 5.  
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o Financial Support was demonstrated in the archives when the 
organization was discussed as providing “support,” “funding,” or 
was thanked in the document without clear reference to their role in 
participation. This category was used as an “input” to the 
leadership, and was given a weight of 3.  
o Participation was demonstrated in the archives when the 
organization was mentioned in a participant list21 or acknowledged 
or thanked without showing leadership. This category was the 
recipient of the “output” of resources through the leadership, and 
given a weight of 1.  
 
 
Organizations were combined for clarity into the largest organization that could 
be distinguished from all other organizations listed. For instance, if multiple 
government agencies from the Cook Islands were listed, they were collapsed 
under one “Cook Islands” governmental node. A few other combinations are of 
note:  
• The European Commission was combined with the European Union 
• SOPAC, as it is now under the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, was 
combined with the Secretariat of the Pacific Community. 
• When the participant in the document is listed as a program, the 
organization at the head of the program is given credit for the interaction. 
This does include secretariats of agreements and programmatic 
organizations, though. In other words, the European Union’s GCCA 
program would be listed under the European Union, but Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change would remain. 
• If an organization is a branch of a larger org, then they were combined 
under the name of the larger organization. 
																																																						
21 Note: For larger conferences that do not list participants, conference agendas 
were used.  
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In order to ensure that Wasserman’s and Faust (1995) patterns of interaction and 
longevity of structure are exhibited in the network, any interactions that scored 
less than 5 were removed from analysis.  
Data Limitations 
While the PCCP database provided access to many of the documents 
produced in climate change governance in the Pacific, it is still limited to those 
resource exchanges that were evident in the documents. This limits the data to 
those relationships that were formalized, and may miss the exchanges occurring 
through conversations, undocumented projects, or organizations that have not 
uploaded their documents to the database. It also may miss small NGOs that 
engaged regularly, but may not have held leadership positions. As PCCP is 
administrated by the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental 
Programme [SPREP], this could account for some of the strength of ties seen 
with this program and others with whom SPREP partners, such as the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community, University of the South Pacific, and the 
European Union. This is why conversations with local practitioners are vital to 
understanding more about the network.  
Data Analysis 
For the SNA, I focused on exploring the relative power positions of various 
organizations in the network. In order to do so, I used a combination of network 
analysis software options—R, Graph Commons, Gephi, and UCINET. R was 
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used to transform the data from an affiliation matrix to an adjacency matrix. 
Graph Commons was used primarily for visualization of the network. Gephi and 
UCINET provided the analysis measures. 
There are a few measures that provide key insight into the power of 
particular organizations, all of which rely on a graph-theoretic analysis of the 
network (Wasserman & Faust, 1995). The measurements used in this 
dissertation are as follows: 
• Centrality—Centrality is a measure of where an organization is in the 
network, as a whole. There are a number of measures of centrality that 
was explored here:  
o Degree centrality—Degree centrality is a simple measure of to 
how many other nodes (organizations) a particular node is tied. In-
degree centrality refers to the number of directed ties going into the 
node, out-degree refers to the number going out of the node. Below 
the first grey node has an in-degree centrality score of 4, the 




o Betweenness centrality—Betweenness centrality was used to 
show how central the organization is to the entire network. 
Betweenness centrality measures the number of times a node is 
located on the shortest path between two other nodes. In the 
example below, the grey node would have the highest 
betweenness centrality, because many of the shortest paths 





















Appendix C: Interview Guide for Chapter 4 
 




Hello, and thank you for agreeing to an interview. Again, my name 
is Ashlie Denton, and I am a doctoral student at Portland State University, 
in the United States. I am talking with individuals throughout the Pacific 
Islands in order to better understand how climate change issues are 
understood and governed. As you may remember from my [phone 
call/email], participation in this interview is voluntary. This means you may 
choose not to answer any question, or end the interview at any time. If you 
decide after the interview that you do not wish your interview to be 
included in the study, you can contact me and have your interview 
deleted. I will leave my contact information for you. I would like to record 
this interview to help ensure that I capture your answers more fully. 
However, if you do not wish to be recorded, that will in no way effect your 
ability to participate in the interview process. Here is the consent form that 
goes into greater detail on the information that I have just provided to you. 
Please sign, and please keep a copy for your records.  
Thank you! Now I am going to ask a few questions that will help me 
better understand the climate change work that is occurring in the Pacific 
Islands, including the relationships between organizations, the knowledge 
they share, and challenges they face. Please feel free to expand on any 
questions you find interesting. Any information you can provide is valuable 




Main Questions Additional Questions Clarifying Questions 
• First, I’d like to ask you a few 
questions about your organization 
and your work. In your own words, 




• How does [name of organization] 
engage with climate change 
issues? 
• And what is your role in 
[organization]? Please tell me a 




little on this? 
 









• Of course, a lot of organizations 
are working on climate change 
issues in the Pacific. What is your 
experience and understanding of 
how organizations work on these 
issues? Do you see organizations 
working together, or more 
independently? 
• How do you think about your 
work in terms of a larger 
network? How do you understand 




For this research, I looked at the documents shared on the Pacific Climate 
Change Portal. Through these documents, it seems that there are a number of 
ways that organizations work together or share resources. They participate in 
events together, work together on research reports, co-produce plans or policies 
for governments, or engage in projects or programs together. In terms of these 
sorts of activities which organizations jump out to you as being central to climate 
change activities, and what kinds of activities do they perform? 
 
Give participant a copy of the social network map that highlights the highly 
central participants and explain:  
 
This is a visualization that I made from information from the Pacific Climate 
Change Portal that represents the documented interactions between different 
organizations engaged in climate change issues in this region. The organizations 
highlighted in this map are those that are most central to the network as a whole. 
We’re going to discuss the “map” of relationships for the rest of our interview, so 
take a moment to look over it.  
 
Pause briefly.  
 
Ok, now we’re going to discuss what these highlighted organizations bring to the 
network. [Provide the list of resources that organizations can bring to the 
network.] Here is a list of things that I think these organizations can bring to the 
network as a whole. For instance, an organization can provide practical 
resources to the network, including knowledge of the local situation and a history 
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of past successful projects. They may also bring informational resources to the 
network, such as scientific knowledge about climate change adaptation, or they 
may be in a position to set rules or standards, such as limiting the amount of 
greenhouse gas emissions that others can produce. Finally, they may bring what 
I refer to as governmental resources, meaning that they have access to 
government funding or their decisions are determined by a government body. Are 
these clear to you? 
 
Pause for a response and take the time to answer any questions/respond to any 
comments.  
 
Ok. Now we are going to talk through what these highlighted organizations bring 
to the network. Feel free to discuss any contributions of the network outside of 
what I have listed here. The point of our conversation is for me to get a better 
picture of how climate change issues are understood and governed.   
 
 
• Looking at X organization, specifically, can you please tell me which of 








expand a little 
on this? 
 








• If the interviewee denotes that the 
organization brings practical 
resources: What practical 
resources do they bring? 
 
 
• How do these practical 
resources facilitate the work of 




• If the interviewee denotes that the 
organization brings knowledge or 
information: What types of 
knowledge or information do they 
bring? 
 
• Is this knowledge useful for 
decision-making in the region? If 
yes, in what ways? 
 
• If the interviewee denotes that the 
organization sets rules or 
standards: What types of 




• How does their ability to affect 
processes and procedures 
impact the work of the network? 
 
 
• If the interviewee denotes that the 
organization brings government 
resources: What types of 
government resources do they 
bring to the network? 
 
• How would you characterize 
their level of involvement in the 
network? Would you like to see 
more, less, or the same level of 
involvement? 
Repeat for 5 central organizations 
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Give participant a copy of the social network map that highlights the peripheral 
participants and explain:  
 
These organizations appear to not be as involved in the network as other 
participants. I’m now going to ask you to circle the 5 organizations that you 
engage with most frequently or that impact your organization’s work most 
directly. These could be organizations that enjoy working with, or organizations 
that present challenges to your work. I just want to make sure that you are 
familiar enough with the organizations that you choose so that we can have a 
conversation about them. Please take a few moments to select the 5 most 
relevant organizations to your work.  
 
Pause and allow for the participant to complete this activity.  
 
Thank you. Now, we’re going to go through a similar exercise with the 5 
organizations that you listed.  
 
 
• Looking at X organization, specifically, can you please tell me which of 








expand a little 
on this? 
 








• If the interviewee denotes that the 
organization brings practical 
resources: What practical 
resources do they bring? 
 
 
• How do these practical 
resources facilitate the work of 




• If the interviewee denotes that the 
organization brings knowledge or 
information: What types of 
knowledge or information do they 
bring? 
 
• Is this knowledge useful for 
decision-making in the region? 
If yes, in what ways? 
 
• If the interviewee denotes that the 
organization sets rules or 
standards: What types of 
rules/standards do they set in the 
network? 
 
• How does their ability to affect 
processes and procedures 
impact the work of the network? 
 
 
• If the interviewee denotes that the 
organization brings government 
resources: What types of 
government resources do they 
bring? 
• How would you characterize 
their level of involvement in the 
network? Would you like to see 
more, less, or the same level of 
involvement? 
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In your opinion, why are they not more central to the work of the 
network?  
Repeat for 5 peripheral organizations. 
 
Is there anything we haven’t discussed that you feel is important for me to know 
about your organization’s work in climate change efforts and your understanding 
of how others are involved in those efforts?   
 
This concludes your interview. Thank you again for allowing me to interview you. 
As stated in the letter, if you would like to receive results of these interviews, 
please email me. Also, it is possible that I will contact you in the next few months 
to clarify answers or confirm findings. If you wish to not be contacted, you are 
welcome to say so now or email me.  
 
Finally, I am contacting participants for my interviews by my own identification, as 
well as through recommendations of other participants. Another participant 
referred you for this interview (if applicable). I was wondering if there were other 
individuals with whom you think I should speak. Would you be willing to provide 
me with their name and email/phone number?  
 
Thank you again for your time. Here is my card, please contact me with any 
questions or comments.  
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Appendix D: Interview Participants and Times for Chapter 4 
 
List of organizations interviewed during the second trip to the Pacific Islands and 
their approximate recorded interview times (many interviews lasted much longer 
than their recorded sessions, however). These do not include numerous informal 
conversations, such as those with individuals from the University of the South 
Pacific, local organizations, and independently interested parties.  
 
Organization Interview Time 
Apidae Development Innovations 50 minutes 
Australian Bureau of Meteorology 
(BOM) 
49 minutes 
Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation 
(CSIRO) 
1 hour, 14 minutes 
The Fiji Red Cross Society 1 hour, 43 minutes 
International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
46 minutes 
Live and Learn 1 hour, 11 minutes 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) 
53 minutes 
Pacific Centre for Environment and 
Sustainable Development (PaCE-SD) 
24 minutes 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
(PIFs) 
33 minutes 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
(SPC) 
1 hour, 15 minutes 
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme (SPREP) 1 
1 hour, 23 minutes 
SPREP 2 1 hour, 53 minutes 
SPREP 3 1 hour, 26 minutes 
British High Commission Suva 53 minutes 
United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) 
41 minutes 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 50 minutes 
 
Unrecorded interviews:  
Cook Islands MET 
Samoa MET 
Samoa Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) 
Te Ipukarea Society 
